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"In olden days, a glimpse of stocking
Was looked on as something shocking.
But now, God knows,
Anything goes."
-Cole

Porter, Anything Goes (1934)

I. INTRODUCTION
Protecting children from contamination by speech has become
the focus of national attention. The content of the protected speech
that the state seeks to regulate is as varied as the form of communications targeted, including the allegedly indecent, sacrilegious, and
violent in media ranging from books to the Internet. Echoing similar
crusades to protect children from virtually every new form of entertainment over the last century, contemporary regulatory efforts to
protect children reflect the unique legal status of children and the
fragility of constitutional liberties where their vulnerabilities are
invoked. But content-based restrictions on speech-even in the name
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of protecting young people-presumptively violate the First Amendment,1 which mandates "above all else.., that government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content."'
Strict scrutiny under the Speech Clause requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest in regulating speech based
on its content and to show that a real harm exists which the restriction on speech will redress. Confronted with the incantation that the
state aims to safeguard children, courts at every level, including the
Supreme Court, have regularly failed to scrutinize the interest alleged
by the government. This lack of analysis is all the more striking because the speech at issue in this Article is protected under the Constitution. It is neither legally obscene nor used in the service of criminal
acts against children. Both of these categories of speech are unprotected, and are subject to criminal prosecution under pertinent statutes.
Although many parents and other adults might wish it were
otherwise, the Supreme Court has recognized that as long as controversial speech is available, some "enterprising youngsters" will find it.'
The Supreme Court has conceded that no "fail-safe" methods can block
the most determined teen, especially since government regulations
based on content must be narrowly tailored." The Supreme Court has
long held as inviolable the principle that even the desire to protect
youth will not allow the state to "reduce the adult population.., to

1.
The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment
applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966).
2.
Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); see id. at 95-102 (explaining that government may impose content neutral "time, place and manner" restrictions on speech but may not
single out one subject or viewpoint for regulation); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 641 (1994) (reiterating that government cannot stifle speech on account of its content,
"subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions'); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382-383 (1992) (confining unprotected speech to limited categories such as fighting words, direct
incitement of lawless action, and obscenity); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414-20 (1989)
(holding that flag-burning is protected speech). Cases recognize exceptions to protected speech,
for example, statements about private citizens are given less protection than statements about
public officials in libel cases, see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-46 (1974), incitement to "imminent lawless action" is not protected, see Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969), and "fighting words" are not protected, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
571-72 (1942).
3.
See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128-30 (1989) (rejecting the government claim that a total ban is necessary to protect minors). The term was first used in
Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the Use of Common Carriers for the Transmission of
Obscene Materials, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699, 42,706 n.54 (1985), rev'd, Carlin Communications, Inc.
v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986).
4. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 130-31.
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reading only what is fit for children."5 Regardless of the strength of the
government's interest in protecting children, the Court has insisted
that "[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be
limited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox."6
One case stemming from efforts to shield children from controversial speech was recently argued before the Supreme Court and a
second is likely to reach the Court during the next term: Playboy
EntertainmentGroup v. United States ("Playboy II"), involving control
of transmissions from subscription adult cable channels so that they
do not inadvertently reach non-subscribers, and ACLU v. Reno
("ACLU IT), involving the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), 8
which limits commercial computer communications deemed "harmful
to minors."9 Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has ruled on
three other cases involving the constitutionality of federal efforts to
regulate speech in order to shelter children from content: Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC,° Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, and Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU1').' In
each instance, the Court rejected the state's argument that the goal of
shielding children justified significant intrusions on constitutionally
protected speech; in each instance, the Supreme Court overturned all

Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (overturning a state statute barring pro5.
duction and circulation of any book "tending to the corruption of the morals of youth'); see also
Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997).
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1983) (overturning ban on
6.
mailing unsolicited material regarding contraceptives), quoted with approval in ACLU I, 521 U.S
at 875).
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Del. 1998),
7.
prob. juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999) ("Playboy I); see Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v.
United States, 945 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1996), affid mem., 520 U.S. 1141 (1997) ("Playboy 1).
8.
Child Online Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.A. § 231 (West Supp. 1999).
9.
ACLU v. Reno ("ACLU IF), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (preliminarily enjoining
enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act), appeal docketed, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Apr.
1999). The preliminary injunction in ACLU v. Reno 'likely will be appealed all the way to the
Supreme Court." Christopher Wolf, Courts,Not Congress, Should Set Limits on Internet Content,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at 25.
10. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (overturning a total ban on
commercial telephone sex messages known as "dial-a-porn').
11. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (overturning key sections of a federal statute which required cable television operators to prevent transmission of indecent programming over leased access channels, and permitting cable operators to
prevent transmission of such materials on public, educational, and government access channels
(known as "PEGs")).
12. Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU F"), 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997) (overturning the Communications
Decency Act of 1997 ("CDA") which criminalized the use of "indecent" or "patently offensive"
speech on the Internet). Congress subsequently enacted legislation to "remedy the constitutional
defects of the CDA," which was also enjoined prior to enforcement for violating the First
Amendment. ACLUII, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 477.
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or part of the statute at issue. The holding in each of the cases in the
trilogy reiterated the Supreme Court's express statement in Interstate
Circuit v. City of Dallas that the "salutary purpose of protecting children" does not insulate government action from constitutional scrutiny. 3 But remarkably, in each of these three cases, the Supreme
Court ignored its own dictates by failing to analyze the state's asserted compelling interest. Instead, the Court readily accepted the
asserted interest in passing, but found that Congress had exceeded
the boundaries of the Speech Clause in promulgating the specific
regulation.' Legal questions about the regulation of speech to shield
children are likely to recur with increasing frequency, judging from
the docket of pending legislation and statutes not yet tested in the
courts."
As a threshold matter, courts assessing a challenge to a government regulation under the Speech Clause are required to ask
whether the interest asserted by the government is strong enough to

13. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968) (overturning a local
ordinance that established a film classification scheme barring persons under age sixteen from
films "not suitable for young persons" as void for vagueness). The decision in Interstate Circuit
was handed down the same day as Ginsberg v. New York, in which the Court upheld a state
statute barring the sale of "girlie" magazines to minors. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,
637 (1968); see discussion infra Part II.
14. Because speech on the Internet, comparable to that of the soapbox orator, is entitled to
the highest degree of First Amendment protection, a ban on such speech is unconstitutional. See
ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 870. The requirement that cable operators segregate and block indecent
speech on leased access channels is neither narrowly nor reasonably tailored; provisions allowing
cable operators the discretion to ban indecent speech on leased access channels withstand
constitutional scrutiny, but provisions allowing cable operators to ban such speech on PEGs is
not narrowly tailored to protect children, since there is virtually no offensive speech on such
channels. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 733, 760. A total ban on dial-a-porn services violates the
rights of adults who wish to receive such messages. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 128-31.
15. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno ("ACLU IT), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Apr. 1999); ACLU v. Reno, 27 Media
L. Rep. (BNA) 1026 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20, 1998) (temporaraily enjoining enforcement of the Child
Online Protection Act).
Pending federal legislation and bills recently introduced in Congress include the Children's
Internet Protection Act, S. 97, 106th Cong. (1999), and H.R. 543, 106th Cong. (1999), which
requires schools and libraries to install filtering or blocking programs on all computers with
Interpet access, see 145 CONG. REC. H4536 (daily ed. June 17, 1999), the Children's Defense Act
of 1999, H.R. 2035, 106th Cong. (1999), introduced by Senator Hyde, an Amendment to the
Juvenile Offenders Act of 1999, though defeated, see 145 CONG. REC. H4399-4401 (daily ed. June
16, 1999) and the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314,
112 Stat. 2974, providing, among other things, enhanced penalties for use of computers in the
sexual exploitation of a child and requiring a National Academy of Sciences study of the availability of "pornographic" material to children on the Internet. Senator Patsy Murray proposed
legislation to impose civil and criminal liability on those who fail to properly rate their own
Internet sites to allow blocking by Internet filtering programs and the manufacturers of an
Internet filtering program ("Safe Surf) proposed similar legislation called the Online Cooperative Publishing Act.
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move forward with the applicable test under the First Amendment
(normally "strict scrutiny" in the case of content restrictions) as opposed to the mere "legitimacy" or "rational basis" required in most
legislative review.'" Since the restrictions on speech discussed here are
indisputably content-based, the government would need to demonstrate a compelling interest to support the regulations. Then, and only
then, are courts permitted to analyze whether the regulation at issue
is indeed "narrowly tailored" to achieve the government's compelling
aims without unduly imposing on protected speech."
In case after case, courts at all levels have taken, at most, a
cursory glance at the government's asserted interest before accepting
the government's position that the interest is "compelling" or "signifi-

16. Where government regulates speech based on its content, the regulations will not survive judicial review unless they pass muster under "strict scrutiny" analysis. Strict scrutiny
requires that the regulation serve a "compelling" state interest and be narrowly tailored to
achieve that end. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126. On the other hand, where the government
regulates commercial speech, it must only show a "substantial interest," and satisfy the lesser,
intermediate scrutiny standard of judicial review. See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v.
United States, 119 S.Ct. 1923, 1930 (1999) (reiterating the continued vitality of the test for
commercial speech set forth in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S 557, 566 (1980)). Advertisements for the underlying controversial speech discussed here,
such as movie previews or ads for video games, would constitute commercial speech, and the
government would only need to demonstrate a substantial interest in regulating such speech.
Since the promotional materials are ancillary to the underlying communications at issue here, I
focus on the compelling interest requirement that governs the effort to regulate the content of
the core speech.
Occasionally the Court may subject regulations on non-commercial speech based on content
to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. If, for example, the government seeks to ameliorate
undesirable "secondary effects" of such speech, the regulation may be regarded as "contentneutral" and will be subjected to the more deferential "intermediate scrutiny," which requires
only a "substantial" government interest rather than a compelling interest. See City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1986) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a zoning
ordinance intended to prevent crime and maintain property values against the secondary effects
of adult entertainment). Although Justice O'Connor has attempted to extend the reach of the
Renton intermediate scrutiny test in a number of contexts, she has been unable to persuade a
majority of the Court to join her. See ACLU I,521 U.S. at 888-91 (O'Connor, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that the CDA should be construed as an effort to create "adult zones" on the Internet); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318-21
(1988) (O'Connor, J., for a plurality of three) (concluding that the regulation at issue is content
based, but implying that Renton secondary effects analysis could apply to political speech if the
"justification had nothing to do with that speech"). But see Boos, 485 U.S. at 334-38 (Brennan,
J., concurring). A content-based restriction on speech cannot be recast as "content-neutral" if
justified by attempt to reach "secondary effects" which require judicial inquiry into legislative
motive, and in any event cannot be applied to political speech. See id.
17. See Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 ('It is not enough to show that the Government's ends are
compelling, the means must be carefully tailored to achieve those ends.'); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) ('Where a government restricts the speech
of a private person, the state action may be sustained only if the government can show that the
regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest.").
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cant." 8 Legal scholars have also largely failed to analyze the "compelling interests" asserted by the government.19 In a half dozen cases,
however, lower courts have scrutinized, and some have rejected outright, the government's proffered rationale for regulations that impinge on First Amendment freedoms, holding that the government
interest asserted was insufficient as presented.'
Serious consequences flow from this lack of attention to the nature of the interest served by regulating speech in the name of children. First, it leads to the tacit assumption that the government's
proclaimed interests are virtually immune from scrutiny once the
state invokes the protection of children. Second, it suggests that the
boundaries of the speech from which children must be protected are
virtually limitless. As a result of an apparent lack of boundaries,

18. See, e.g., ACLU 1, 521 U.S. at 875; Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; id. at 134 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part, joined by Marshall, J., and Stevens, J.) ('To be sure, the Government has a
strong interest in protecting children against exposure to pornographic material that might be

harmful to them.'); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 513, 517 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined
by Brennan, J., and Marshall, J.) (The "government may not constitutionally criminalize mere
possession or sale of obscene literature, absent some connection to minors.'); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J., and
Marshall, J.) (arguing that obscenity is constitutionally protected "at least in the absence of
distribution to juveniles'); Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649-50 (Stewart, J., concurring) (distinguishing
children's rights to access speech from adults' rights). But see Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 654-55
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing against any special restrictions on speech for minors).
19. To my knowledge, only two articles by legal scholars have raised the issue with respect
to the interest of shielding children. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children,
and TranscendingBalancing, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 141, 147-48, 175-79, 178 n.130 (criticizing the
utility of the strict scrutiny test as applied in ACLU I, and noting that the Supreme Court "did
not squarely confront" the question of whether the government has an independent interest in
shielding children, separate from supporting parental decisions).
Harry Edwards and Mitchell Berman raise the question of whether "a court could conclude
that elimination of televised violence would serve-let alone accomplish-a compelling state
interest in promoting the health and well-being of children" based on the difficulty of identifying
the harm to child viewers done by television violence, but concede "the state's admittedly compelling interest in protecting the emotional and psychological well-being of children viewers."
Harry T. Edwards & Mitchell N. Berman, Regulating Violence on Television, 89 NW. U. L. REV.
1487, 1551-52 & n.288, 1562-63 (1995). Edwards and Berman do not, however, analyze the
state's asserted compelling interest, and limit their discussion to television violence. See also
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling GovernmentalInterests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in
ConstitutionalAdjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988) (discussing the lack of judicial attention
to the government interest generally); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy and the First
Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 267, 278-79 (1991); discussion infra Part V (compelling
interest in empowering parents). First Amendment interests such as "democracy" or "individual
self-fulfillment" are too often reduced to conclusory labels which substitute for "serious engagement" about core issues.
20. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755-56 (1996);
AIDS Action Comm., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D. Mass.
1993) (holding that the goal of shielding children from advertisements, which used witty sexual
innuendoes in promoting use of condoms to prevent spread of AIDS, was not sufficiently compelling to justify authority's limitation of speech in rejecting advertisements).
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government at every level has relied on mere generalized assertions in
promulgating broad regulations impinging on protected speech.2'
Third, when courts beg the question of the nature of the state's interest in regulating speech to shield the young, they inhibit the development of First Amendment jurisprudence and lead emerging doctrine
astray. Because courts have not asked the threshold questions required under First Amendment doctrine, they have opened the door to
using children as an excuse for the state to intrude upon protected
speech, suggesting that regulations on speech will survive scrutiny if
they are narrowly crafted. The cumulative effect of this analytic sloppiness is that courts have glossed over the foundation question of
whether a compelling state interest in regulating protected speech to
shield the young exists at all.
In this Article, I seek to reframe the discussion by calling on
courts to force government actors to meet their constitutional obligation to articulate clear, compelling interests to justify each regulation
of speech imposed under the guise of protecting children. It is imperative that courts examine the nature of the government's alleged compelling interest in protecting children when considering regulations on
speech because if the government's interest is insufficient to satisfy
the applicable constitutional standard, an abridgement of protected
speech cannot survive scrutiny, no matter how narrowly it is crafted.'
My discussion focuses on the two compelling interests that the
government generally offers for regulating speech that might reach
children. First, proponents of government regulation of speech point to
a compelling interest in helping parents to control their children's
exposure to certain kinds of communication. Second, the state claims
an independent interest in the development of children, regardless of
the decisions made by their parents."
Unfortunately, the entire subject of these compelling interests
has been isolated from the growing literature on the relationship
between the state and families.' The first proposed interest--rein-

21. See, e.g., Richard P. Salgado, Regulating a Video Revolution, 7 YALE L. & POLY REV.
516, 516 (1989) (increased awareness of children's access to ultra violent or sexually indecent
movies at local video rental stores has led to "pressures on legislatures to regulate which videotapes may be distributed and to whom"); Library Journal Digital, Intellectual Freedom Legislation: The State of the States (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://www.bookwire.comiljdigital/ legislation.article> (collecting pending and recently passed state legislation regulating speech on the
Internet that is indecent or 'harmful to minors').
22. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664-66 (1994).
23. See infraParts V & VI.
24. See Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Commentary, Child Abuse as Slavery: A
Thirteenth Amendment Response to DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1385 n.106 (1992)
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forcing parental authority-relies on a simplistic view that presumes
a harmony between the interests of individual parents and the interests of the state. If the United States were a theocracy, such an assumption might be warranted: parents who did not share the nation's
views could be forced to do so. But it is a foundational principle of
governance in the United States that an on-going tension exists and
must be tolerated between the constitutional guarantees of individual
autonomy and the desire for a collective vision of the social good.
Applied to the relationship between the variety of families and
the state, this tension translates into perpetual stresses along three
sides of a triangle with endpoints labeled PCS: Parent, Child, and
State. In some instances, the rights and preferences of parent and
child will align perfectly, and will conflict with those of the state. This
configuration is the principle focus of this discussion. In other instances, the state may intervene on behalf of the child in opposition to
the parents, as in child abuse cases. In yet another configuration, a
child may seek to exercise rights outside the home in opposition to
parental wishes, and turn to the state for support, as when a teenager
seeks to obtain an abortion without parental consent. This Article
focuses on situations in which parents either wish the child to have
access to communications that the state regards as inappropriate or
take a more restrictive view than the state of what speech is appropriate for their child.
Proponents of regulation often claim a second compelling interest-an independent interest-rooted in the government's generalized
commitment to nurture and educate the next generation of citizens.
Upon examination, this second interest turns out to be no less problematic than the first. Constitutionally recognized principles of autonomy and family privacy limit the State's authority to make moral or
developmental choices for minors in areas traditionally reserved for
their parents or guardians.' To justify intrusions on parental rights
and family privacy, proponents of abridging speech would need to
demonstrate specific harm flowing from the speech.
Part II of this Article provides a brief historical perspective on
long-standing concerns about the pernicious effect of new forms of
communication on children. Part III defines the universe of protected,
non-obscene but controversial speech that is at issue. Part IV sets out

("Because constitutional law and family law fall on different sides of the 'public' lawfprivate' law
divide, they are studied by different sets of scholars.").
25. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-36 (1925) (upholding injunctions
against enforcement of a state law requiring parents to send their children to in-state primary
schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-03 (1923) (reversing conviction of teacher under
state law forbidding teaching in languages other than English).
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the test which courts are required to use in assessing the existence
and strength of the compelling interest the state asserts for regulating
speech and reveals the failure of the Supreme Court to apply its own
standards for analyzing the government interest when the government invokes the need to protect children from speech. Part V examines the State's asserted compelling interest in empowering parents to
enforce their speech choices on minors, including consideration of the
varieties of families, family autonomy rights, the strength of competing private interests of certain parents and minors, and the potential
conflicts between parental choices and governmental assumptions
about social norms. Part VI analyzes the government's proclaimed
compelling interest in regulating material available to minors based
on the State's independent interest in the well being of its future
citizens. Part VII analyzes the six evenly divided lower court opinions
that have scrutinized the compelling interest put forward by proponents of regulations on speech to shield children, as well as the cases
which the Supreme Court is expected to decide in the near future.
Finally, the conclusion sets forth how scrutinizing the government's
compelling interest will restore analytical rigor to an area of law too
often susceptible to untested intuition supporting the imposition of
majoritarian norms at the cost of constitutional liberties.
II. THE TRADITION OF PROTECTING INNOCENT CHILDREN
FROM NEW FORMS OF EXPRESSION 26
The public is concerned about what children are hearing and
seeing, and to some extent for good reason. Popular concern about the
volume of exposure to various forms of media and about its content
has spilled over into political discourse.'? Even before the shootings at

26. Portions of this section and other ideas in this essay were originally presented in a
panel in 1997. See 1997 Annual Conference Panel, Section on Mass Communications Law,
Association of American Law Schools, Sex, Violence, Children and the Media: Legal, Historical
and EmpiricalPerspectives, 5 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 341, 352 (1997) (comments of Catherine J.

Ross).
27. See, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994 & Supp. 11 1997)
(finding that parents express "grave concern" over their children's exposure to "harmful video
programming" and that children in the United States see an average of 8,000 murders and
100,000 acts of violence on television before finishing elementary school). See generally SISSELA
BOK, MAYHEM: VIOLENCE As PUBLIC ENTERTAINMENT (1998); NEWTON N. MINOW & CRAIG L.
LAMAY, ABANDONED IN THE WASTELAND: CHILDREN, TELEVISION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

(1995). In 1993, a survey noted by Congress reported that 80% of Americans believe that
violence on television is harmful to children and to society. See Alliance for Community Media v.
FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (citing 139 CONG. REC. S505052 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1993) (summarizing social science studies supporting this popular view)),
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Senator Robert Byrd proclaimed on the Senate

The political and social environment in which parents must today raise their children
is, unfortunately, an environment in which anything goes ....Profanity, vulgarity, sex
and violence are pervasive in television programming, in the movies, and in much of
today's books that pretend to pass for literature. The [n]ation is inexorably sinking toward the lowest common denominator in its standards and values. Haven't we had
enough? 29

In response to such anxieties, both federal and state governments
have sought to reduce the exposure of children to arguably unsuitable
material.
Regulations aim at communications that emanate from peers,'
as well as those that appear in books," newspapers and magazines,"
rev'd in part sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996); see also BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR, WHY AMERICANS ARE AFRAID OF THE
WRONG THINGS 58-60 (1999) (stating that unfounded and/or misleading data feeds public
paranoia about influence on America's children including "cybersmut").
28. See Marilyn Manson, Columbine: Whose Fault Is It?, ROLLING STONE, June 24, 1999, at
23 (arguing that in the search for a simple explanation, people forget that Cain did not need
"books, movies, games or music to inspire cold-blooded murder"); Video Battlers Stick by Their
Games, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, at A26 (noting that video games and other violent entertainment have come under increased scrutiny since shootings at Columbine High School in May of
1999 left 15 people dead).
29. 144 CONG. REC. S10,110 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1998) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (emphasis
added); see also 144 CONG. REC. S9923-25 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1998) (statement of Sen. Lieberman). America's families must struggle to raise children in "today's 'anything goes' culture"
where values appear "fungible." 144 CONG. REC. S9923 (daily ed. Sept. 3, 1998) (statement of
Senator Lieberman) (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (student articles in the
school newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (campaign speech for
a student election); Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(speech on the student's website).
31. Controversies over books in school curricula and libraries are widespread, and originate
from a variety of religious, ethnic and political views. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853, 875 (1982) (remanding for inquiry into the motive for removing books from a school library);
Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1998) (involving
controversy over Huckleberry Finn); Scheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 693 (D.
Me. 1982) (granting an injunction against banning a politically controversial book from the
school library, which also served as the town library); Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 92 N.Y.S.2d
344, 345-46 (Sup. Ct. 1949) (involving controversy over Shakespeare's 'The Merchant of Venice");
Today Show: CaroliviaHerronDiscusses the Controversy Over Her Book, "Nappy Hair," and the
White Teacher Who Read It to Her Black and Hispanic Third Graders (NBC television broadcast,
Dec. 2, 1998). See generally STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE
RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS (1993); HERBERT N.
FOERSTEL, BANNED IN THE U.S.A.: A REFERENCE GUIDE TO BOOK CENSORSHIP IN SCHOOLS AND
PUBLIC LIBRARIES (1994); PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, 1996 REPORT: ATTACKS ON THE
FREEDOM TO LEARN (1997) [herinafter P.A.W., 1996 REPORT]; PEOPLE FOR THE AMERICAN WAY, A
RIGHT WING AND A PRAYER: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT AND YOUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1997) [herinafter
P.A.W., RIGHT WING].
32. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) ("girlie" magazines); Salvail v. Nashua
Bd.of Educ., 469 F. Supp. 1269 (D.N.H. 1979) (MS. magazine); Desilets v.Clearview Reg'l Bd. of
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radio broadcasts,33 rock music, 34 movies,35 broadcast and cable television,' card games, 7 video games, 8 telecommunications,'9 and computer
materials-including the Internet." The regulations generally fall into

Educ., 647 A.2d 150 (N.J. 1994) (reviews of R-rated movies in school newspaper); Kevin McDermott, Illinois House Overrides Veto on Student Press, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 30, 1997, at
1A (reporting that the state legislature promoted liberty guarantees for student newspapers
after Napierville, Illinois, blocked publications of an investigative report on school officials' taxfunded travel); Dan Rosek, Outlet for Controversy: Web Site Gives Student Journalistsan Option,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 22, 1998, at 12 (revealing a website devoted to publishing stories censored
from school publications).
33. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-51 (1978) (upholding an FCC order regulating indecent language during radio broadcasts); In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930,
930-31 (1987).
34. See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138-39 (11th Cir. 1992) (finding
rap music to be protected speech); Soundgarden v. Eikenberry, 871 P.2d 1050, 1065 (Wash. 1994)
(enjoining enforcement of erotic sound recordings statute).
35. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 684 (1968) (overturning film
licensing standards which might leave "only the totally inane" available to viewers based on
unsuitability for young viewers); Gilmer v. Walt Disney Co., 915 F. Supp. 1001 (W.D. Ark. 1996)
(alleging sexual images and messages embedded in videotapes of "The Lion King" and 'The Little
Mermaid").
36. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT IT), 58 F.3d 654, 669-70 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc) (expanding "safe harbor" period in which indecent broadcasts may be made);
Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT Il), 932 F.2d 1504, 1509-10 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(overturning ban on all indecent radio broadcasts); Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT
r), 852 F.2d 1332, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding FCC may prohibit indecent radio broadcasts);
see also Children's Television Act of 1990, 47 U.S.C. § 303(a)-(b) (1994); Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d
75, 84-85 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (overturning FCC order allowing regulation of an anti-abortion
television campaign showing aborted fetuses deemed harmful to children); Writers Guild of Am.,
Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1071-72 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (challenging family viewing hour
policy); Report & Order, In re Policies and Rules Concerning Children's Television Programming,
11 F.C.C.R. 10660, 10750-52 (1996) (imposing minimal affirmative obligations on broadcasters to
serve the educational needs of children). See generally Reed E. Hundt, The Public's Airwaves:
What Does the Public Interest Require of Television Broadcasters?,45 DUKE L.J. 1089 (1996);
Julia W. Schlegel, Note, The Television Violence Act of 1990: A New Program for Government
Censorship?,46 FED. COMM. L.J. 187 (1993).
37. See Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 66-68 (2d Cir. 1997) (overturning
county ordinance regulating trading cards depicting crimes); Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist.,
45 F. Supp. 2d 368, 380-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing regulation of 'Magic: The Gathering," a
card game played on school grounds).
38. See, e.g., America's Best Family Showcase Corp. v. City of New York, 536 F. Supp. 170,
174-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (upholding law regulating installation of more than four coin-operated
video games as a legitimate exercise of the state's police power and holding that video games do
not constitute speech). See generally David B. Goroff, Note, The FirstAmendment Side Effects of
CuringPac-Man Fever, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 744 (1984) (summarizing municipal ordinances and
arguing that videogames should be recognized as protected speech).
39. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124-31 (1989); Dial Info. Servs. v.
Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1540-44 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding statute regulating indecent
telephone message service).
40. For a discussion of the evolution of the Internet and its salient characteristics, see Reno
v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997). The Internet, which is included in but not the
primary focus of the following analysis, is widely perceived as posing unique and uncontrollable
hazards for the young. As this Article demonstrates, such arguments have been made about
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four dominant modes: (i) an outright ban on the speech;" (ii) channeling the speech so that it may only be available at times when children
are assumed to be least likely to have access to it;42 (iii) using identification requirements to ensure that only adults receive the speech; 3
and (iv) filtering mechanisms reliant on technology designed to help
parents and other adults screen speech according to pre-assigned
categories and labels attached by others.4
Many parents and grandparents, including legislators and
judges in their individual capacities, "would like to see the efforts of
Congress to protect children from harmful materials... ultimately
succeed and the will of the majority of citizens in this country to be
realized." 5 But they will never succeed in completely shielding the
young from exposure to controversial topics because there is virtually
no information that an enterprising youngster could not pick up from
news coverage. The highest elected official admits marital infidelity

virtually every new form of communication as it developed. For example, see the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1), (d) (1994 & Supp. 11 1997) (subsequently
overturned by Reno v. ACL.) and the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), 47 U.S.C.A. § 231
(West Supp. 1999) (subsequently enjoined by ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999),
appeal docketed, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Apr. 1999) ("ACLU II)). See also ACLU v. Johnson, 194
F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding injunction against enforcement of a New Mexico statute
criminalizing dissemination of computer material that is "harmful to minors'); Cyberspace
Communications v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (enjoining enforcement of a
state law prohibiting the communication of sexually explicit material harmful to minors over the
Internet); ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1231-35 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (granting a preliminary
injunction barring enforcement of GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1, which outlawed communication
anonymously or by using a pseudonym on computer networks including the Internet).
41. See, e.g., ACLUI, 521 U.S. 844; Sable, 492 U.S. 115; ACT II, 932 F.2d 1504 (overturning
a 24-hour ban on indecent broadcasts enacted by Congress); ACT I, 852 F.2d 1332 (overturning a
24-hour ban on indecent broadcasts imposed by the FCC).
42. For example, an FCC ban on indecent radio broadcasts except during the "safe harbor"
hours of midnight to 6 a.m. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1994)
(subsequently modified by Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT IT), 58 F.3d 654, 66970 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (expanding the safe harbor to the hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.));
Writers Guild of Am. Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1071-72 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (discussing FCC
television family viewing hour); Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States ("Playboy
I"), 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (D. Del. 1998) (overturning a statute that "reduce[s] the broadcast
day for sexually explicit programming" to a safe harbor running from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.), prob.
juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999); In re Infinity Broad. Corp., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930-31 (1987)
(suggesting that explicit radio broadcasts should not be aired "when there is a reasonable risk
that children may be in the audience," which may be until midnight).
43. See e.g., Sable, 492 U.S. at 115; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 631 (1968); ACLU
v. Reno ("ACLU r), 929 F. Supp. 824, 828-29 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (discussing challenge to the Communications Decency Act of 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
44. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 688 (1968) (Marshall, J.)
(stating that regulation of speech is no less objectionable because it takes the form of "classification rather than direct suppression). The modes of regulation will be discussed infra in Parts V
and VI.
45. ACLU II, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (Reed, J.) (including "[this Court" among that group).
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involving fellatio; 46 high school students use guns to murder their
teachers and/or classmates; 4' a prominent musician, accused of child
molestation, reportedly pays millions of dollars to avoid legal penalties; 81 international news includes coverage of so-called "ethnic
cleansing" in the Balkans4 ' and ethnic slaughter in Africa.' None of
these news stories could be barred consistent with the First Amendment.5
The prevalence of such speech in news coverage underscores
the flaws in the dominant mode of analyzing speech rights in light of
the medium in which the speech occurs. The fragmented analysis
grows in large part from the Supreme Court's doctrine that different
levels of scrutiny apply to different forms of media 5 -with the highest

46. See Mike Rosen, It's About Justice,Not Sex, DENVER POST, Aug. 21, 1998, at B7.
47. See Tom Kenworthy, Up to 25 Die in Colorado School Shooting: Two Student Gunmen
Are Found Dead, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at Al; Sue Anne Pressley, 6 Wounded at Georgia
High School: Student Was Apparently Upset Over Breakup, WASH. POST, May 21, 1999, at Al;
Suspect in School ShootingFormally Charged,CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1998, at 16.
48. See Vandal Sentenced for PaintingJackson Star, THE ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 5, 1994, at
A14.
49. See John Pomfret, Misery for Muslims and Croats in Bosnia, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
1994, at A22.
50. See Norimitsu Onishi, The Guns of Africa, DisarmingDeadly Rwandan Rebels Is a Key
to Congo's Cease-Fire Plan, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1999, at A8 (reporting that the Hutu militia
killed an estimated a half million Tutsi in 1994).
51. See Miami Herald Pubrg Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 254-58 (1974) (holding unconstitutional a state law granting politicians "equal space" to answer critics in newspapers). Despite
case law, the FCC has not always been scrupulous in distinguishing controversial speech that
constitutes news from other controversial speech. See Joint Brief of Petitioners at 5 & n.3,
Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT H1), 58 F.3d 654, 669-70 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) (No. 93-1092) (quoting FCC statement that newsworthy nature of a broadcast would not be
"dispositive'); KSD-FM, Notice of Apparent Liability, 6 F.C.C.R. 3689 (1990); Report & Order, In
re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704,
709 (1993).
52. The Supreme Court has long taken the view that each form of communication requires
its own First Amendment analysis. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994)
(rejecting the argument that cable television and broadcast television should be analyzed under
the same First Amendment standard); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 377
(1984) (noting characteristics that distinguish "the new medium of broadcasting" and that justify
application of different First Amendment standards); Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 247-54 (discussing
First Amendment standards applying to print media); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
386-87 (1969) (supporting different First Amendment standards for different types of media);
National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) (holding that radio is a unique mode of
expression and subject to government regulation).
Judge Harry T. Edwards laments that:
[Tihe law is in a state of disarray .... [A]s often as not there is little coherence
in the case law. For example, I have yet to comprehend the distinction that is
drawn between broadcast and cable television .... This is but a tip of the iceberg,
so I will not dwell on my incredulity.
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, J.,
concurring with reservations).
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deference traditionally paid to verbal expression and print media and
the lowest to broadcast media.' I agree with the many scholars and
jurists who question the continued vitality of the Supreme Court's
distinction among forms of expression, which reached its apex in FCC
v. Pacifica FoundationY Except where it would be unrealistic to do so,
the analysis here emphasizes the similarities rather than the distinctions among forms of communication.' For purposes of protecting
children, the source of the speech makes little difference, except for
the distinction between forms of speech that require literacy and those
that do not.
The argument that the government has an independent interest in regulating protected speech on behalf of children rests on the
relatively recent social construction of the child as innocent. It is also
class based. Few observers who sought to protect children from contaminated speech in the nineteenth century argued that innocence
characterized child laborers in mines and factories, chimney sweeps,
gutter snipes, or residents of the poorhouses depicted by Charles

The compartmentalization of the law governing the First Amendment by media type has
been the subject of scholarly criticism. See generally THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & L.A. POWE,
REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994); Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes into Focus
When You Remove the Lens Cap: Why ProliferatingNew Communications Technologies Make it
Particularly Urgent for the Supreme Court To Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of
Speech and Bring Obscenity, FightingWords, and Group Libel Within the First Amendment, 81
IOWA L. REV. 883, 956-62 (1996); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & L.A. Powe, Jr., Converging First
Amendment Principlesfor Converging CommunicationsMedia, 104 YALE L.J. 1719 (1995).
53. In Turner, the Supreme Court expressly refused to reconsider the "continuing validity"
of a special jurisprudence for broadcast television based on the scarcity rationale, despite the
widespread criticism that doctrine has received from "courts and commentators." Turner, 512
U.S. at 638 & n.5 (citing Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), Telecommunications Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 508-509 (D.C. Cir. 1986), L.
BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 87-90 (1991), L. POWE, AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 197-209 (1987), M. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES 718 (1986), Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & ECON. 1, 1227 (1959), Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1072-1074 (1994), and Laurence H. Winer, The Signal Cable
Sends-Part I: Why Can't Cable Be More Like Broadcasting?, 46 AID. L. REV. 212, 218-240
(1987)); see also In re Complaint of Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C.R. 5043, 5048-5057 (1987)
(analyzing the rationale for according broadcast media lesser First Amendment protection
developed in Red Lion and concluding that the rationale no longer has validity). See generally
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supranote 52.
54. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
55. Rock songs, for example, are available in a variety of media: compact discs and audiotapes (sometimes accompanied by written lyrics), music videos available on cable television,
videocassette recordings of those videos, and on websites, pointing to the need to engage in a
legal analysis that transcends the mode of communication.
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Dickens. The expansion of the notion of child as innocent made such
conditions intolerable to social reformers.'
Regulatory efforts to shield children from controversial speech
to preserve their innocence have a long lineage. Legal precedent dates
back to at least 1868, in the British case of The Queen v. Hicklin
which, although unconstrained by the First Amendment, proved influential in the United States.' Hicklin enunciated an "obscenity" test
designed to protect the lowest common denominator among minors
and the most vulnerable adults.' According to Hicklin, the work could
be banned entirely if it would tend to "deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose
hands a publication of this sort may fall... [and if] it would suggest to
the minds of the young of either sex.., thoughts of a most impure and
' American courts adopted the Hicklin standard,
libidinous character."59
which provided a roadmap for nearly a century of jurisprudence on
obscene and what would now be deemed controversial speech.'
Moral crusaders persistently justified regulation of every new
form of entertainment as necessary to protect the young. Building on
social anxieties that associate young people with disorder, violence,
and uncontrolled libido, they have targeted new forms of speech as a
cause of youthful immorality, even as they lamented the inability of
parents to live up to the trust society has placed in them as the primary custodians of their children. The gatekeepers of Anglo-American
culture have long enlisted the state's help in limiting the controversial
speech available to the young. In England, G.K. Chesterton commented on the absurdity of the influence on young reprobates attributed to evil reading: "It is firmly fixed in the minds of most people that

56.

See generally VIVIANA ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL

VALUE OF CHILDREN (1985); Janet L. Dolgin, The Fate of Childhood.- Legal Models of Children
and the Parent-ChildRelationship, 61 ALB.L. REV. 345 (1997).

57. The Queen v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360, 369-73 (1868) (Cockburn, C.J.) (holding obscene
and barring distribution of a book that criticized Roman Catholicism).
58. The case actually concerned blasphemy, not sex.
59. Id. at 371.
60. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300 n.6 (1977) (explaining that in Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957), the Supreme Court expressly rejected the Hicklin
test)); United States v. Bennett, 24 F. Cas. 1093, 1104 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1879) (No. 14,571) (adopting
the Hicklin test); State v. Cercone, 196 A.2d 439, 440 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1963) (stating that Hicklin
began the era of "[m]odern confusion" about the definition of obscenity). Judge Edelstein suggests that the Hicklin test was actually modified in the lower courts even earlier. See Klaw v.
Schaffer, 151 F. Supp. 534, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (citing United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119,
121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913) (Hand, J.), and United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 5 F. Supp. 182,
184 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (Woolsey, J.), aff'd 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934)).
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gutter-boys, unlike everybody else in the community, find their principle motives for conduct in printed books."'"
In the United States, Anthony Comstock personified the
movement for state regulation of reading matter and entertainment
on the grounds that it was necessary to protect children." Satan created titillating traps, he proclaimed, "for boys and girls especially."'
Comstock demanded that the state protect children from a seemingly
endless variety of new cultural dangers, including: dime novels and
serialized tales; story papers;' books, theatrical performances and
pictures (including the classics) that might "arouse in young and inexperienced minds lewd and libidinous thoughts;"' illustrated newspapers depicting crimes;' information about contraception;" stage
plays of "beastly character;"" chewing gum containing prizes;' and
candy lotteries available in confectionery stores. Comstock did not
trust parents to be aware of the pernicious effects of such entertainment, or even to realize its proximity to their children.
Motion pictures especially raised a tumult of efforts at censorship from their inception.' Some major cities even shut down all

61. Robert Bremner, Editor's Introduction in ANTHONY COMSTOCK, TRAPS FOR THE YOUNG,
at xxiii (Robert Bremner ed., Belknap Press 1967) (1883).
62. See generally NICOLA BEISEL, IMPERILED INNOCENTS: ANTHONY COMSTOCK AND FAMILY
REPRODUCTION IN VICTORIAN AMERICA (1997). Beisel argues that the moral crusades of the
nineteenth century designed to protect children from various vices reflected the concern of
middle and upper class parents that exposure to vices would render their children unable to
maintain the socio-economic status of their family in a rapidly changing society and economy,
rather than an attempt to socialize immigrants and lower class children to conform to American
mores. To be sure, Comstock frequently drew examples of lives ruined by exposure to cheap
novels and magazines from elite groups including children enrolled in private preparatory
schools.
63. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 651 & n.1, 656-59 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(quoting and reprinting excerpts from Comstock's 1883 book entitled Traps for the Young, and
comparing Comstock to his English forebear, Thomas Bowdler, who expurgated, or "Bowdlerized"
a wide range of literature including Shakespeare's plays and Gibbon's History of the Decline and
Fallof the Roman Empire in the early nineteenth century).
64. See COMSTOCK, supra note 61, at ch.3.
65. Bremner, Introduction,supranote 61, at xviii.
66. See COMSTOCK, supra note 61, at 16-19 (calling the daily press "a thing so foul that no
child can look upon it and be as pure afterward.).
67. See id. at ch. 10.
68. Id. at 46-50 (observing that the "youth in our large cities and towns can scarcely go from
home to school without being forced to look upon invitations to witness representations of crime,
lust, and bloodshed').
69. See id. at 96-97.
70. See id.
71. See Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society -- From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 741, 760-66 (1992). The early films that caused so much uproar over their potential impact
on the young were the very films now regarded as the "Golden Age" before the film industry
prostituted itself to the contemporary market for sex and violence.
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movie theaters, prompted at least in part by the notion that movies
were "schools of crime. ' 7 2 The Supreme Court initially declined to
extend the protection of the First Amendment to moving pictures. 3 In
its 1915 decision in Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission, a
unanimous Supreme Court rejected an industry claim that movies
were "useful, interesting, amusing, educational and moral."4 The
Court condemned movies as "capable of evil.., the greater because of
their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. 75 Following that ruling,
nearly one hundred bills intended to censor motion pictures were
introduced in the various state legislatures in 1921 alone. In the next
year similar bills came before Congress, until the industry agreed to
police itself. 6
The Supreme Court did not reverse Mutual Film until 1952. 7
In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, the Supreme Court held for the first
time that "expression by means of motion pictures is included within
the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.118 The majority opinion flatly rejected the state's justification of censorship on the grounds that "motion pictures possess a
greater capacity for evil, particularly among the youth of a community, than other modes of expression.

72. Id. at 761-62 (quoting a 1907 Chicago Tribune editorial reprinted in MOVING PIcTURE
WORLD, Apr. 20, 1907, at 101, and later quoted in CHARLES FELDMAN, THE NATIONAL BOARD OF
CENSORSHIP (REVIEW) OF MOTION PICTURES 1909-1922, at 3 (1977)).
73. See Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915), overruled in
part by Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
74. Id. at 240-41 (upholding a state board authorized to review all films and to engage in
prior restraint of films that were not of a "moral, educational or amusing and harmless character').
75. Id. at 244.
76. See Blanchard, supranote 71, at 779-781. This flurry of activity led the industry to a
devil's bargain in which it undertook self-censorship, with a list of "Don'ts and Be Carefuls." Id.
at 780. These codes are the precursors of the contemporary movie rating system, which blends
adult identification with what can be viewed as an "honor system" filtering mechanism rather

than an automatic filter.
77. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 504-06 (overturning a ban on Roberto Fellini's
"The Miracle" based on accusations that the film was "sacrilegious'). For a description of 'The
Miracle," see id. at 507-08 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). A few years earlier in United States v.
ParamountPictures,334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948), the Court noted that motion pictures are a form of
speech.
78. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 502 (expressly reversing Mutual Film). This holding
did not relieve the courts of considering challenges to restrictions on the speech of movies,
especially where obscenity was alleged. See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v City of Chicago, 365 U.S.
43, 49-50 (1961) (Clark, J.) (5-4 decision) (upholding a film licensing ordinance); Zenith Int'l Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago, 183 F. Supp. 623, 634-36 (N.D. Ill. 1960) (upholding prior restraint of
director Louis Malle's 'The Lovers).
79. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 502 (Clark, J.).
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In Burstyn, the Supreme Court enunciated the frequently cited
principle that "[e]ach method [of speech] tends to present its own
peculiar problems."' In subsequent references to the "peculiar" properties of each medium, the Supreme Court has inexplicably neglected
the rest of that passage,"1 which underscores that the principles of the
Speech Clause transcend any distinctions based on mode of expression: "the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the
First Amendment's command, do not vary. Those principles... make
freedom of expression the rule.""2
But that did not stop public outcries about the emergence of
new modes of speech.' In 1954-55, the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary concluded that the "crime and horror" genre of
comic books which "offer short courses in murder, mayhem, robbery,
rape, cannibalism, carnage, necrophilia, sex, sadism, masochism, and
virtually every other form of crime' read daily by thousands of children was "contributing to the country's alarming rise in juvenile delinquency."' At about the same time, courts noted that "the broadening of freedom of expression and of the frankness with which sex
and sex relations are dealt with... appear in all media of public expression. '
The controversies continued in response to the evolution of
television, computers, video games, and music.' Cole Porter's "Love

80. Id. at 503.
81. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1975); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87
(1969); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57 (1965).
82. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 503.
83. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (finding comic books entitled to First
Amendment protection).
84. S. REP. NO. 84-62, at 2, 7 (1955); see also Blanchard, supra note 71, at 788. The Congressional investigation built on psychiatrist Fredric Wertham's SEDUCTION OF THE INNOCENT
(1954). In response, the comic book industry refined its rating system, guidlelines and seal of
approval which resemble the movie rating codes that followed a decade later. See Comic Book
Legal Defense Fund, A Short History of Censorship in Comics (visited Jan. 20, 1999)
<http://www.cbldf.org.history.shtml> (reprinting versions of the Comics Code, including the
original and the current Code); see also Sarah Boxer, When Fun Isn't Funny: Evolution of Pop
Gore, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1999, at B1l (explaining that comic strip authors use loopholes in the
Comics Code to produce comics rife with violence, sexism, and racism).
85. Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding D.H.
Lawrence's Lady Chatterley'sLover not obscene under the then-applicable Roth test, and allowing it to be distributed in the United States for the first time).
86. See Boxer, supra note 84, at Bl; Frank Rich, Washington'sPost-LittletonLooney Tunes,
N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1999, at A15 (arguing that politicians used the killings at Columbine High
School in Littleton, Colorado for partisan ends in debating cultural issues). Music is protected
speech under the First Amendment. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981) ("Entertainment, as well as political
and ideological speech is protected.!). The distinction between music and politics may be
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for Sale" may have pushed the envelope in 1930. In the mid-1960s
"Let's Spend the Night Together" seemed pretty risqu. 7 More recently, Grammy Award winner Alanis Morrisette lamented the loss of
her lover to another woman, asking "will she go down on you in a
theater?"' and Nine Inch Nails offered the romantic medley "you let
me violate you, you let me desecrate you, you let me penetrate
you... I want to fuck you like an animal... !"
The pace of social change and the emergence of new modes and
styles of communication have long inspired calls for censorship designed to shield children from contamination, and they continue to
prompt parental concern. But whether or not such adult concerns are
justified, or look reasonable in hindsight, the Speech Clause restricts
the ability of the body politic to regulate speech that is protected for
adults. Government efforts to make protected speech unavailable to
children must overcome a number of constitutional barriers, beginning
with the problem of definition, as explored in the following Part.

Ill. DEFINITIONS AND PARAMETERS
In this Article, I refer to "offensive and disagreeable" speech
that is nonetheless protected under the Speech Clause as "controversial." Controversial speech comprises the combined category of "indecent" speech which does not meet the legal definition of obscenity yet
may be offensive to some recipients, and speech that contains "violent"
material, which are the two kinds of content that seem most likely to

blurred, as in the case of rap music, where some performers view their music as political expression. See Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 137 (11th Cir. 1992).
87. THE ROLLING STONES, Let's Spend the Night Together, on FLOWERS (Decca Records
1967).
88. ALANIS MORRISErrE, You Oughta Know, on JAGGED LITTLE PILL (Maverick/Reprise Records 1995) (1996 Grammy Award Winner for Best Rock Song of the Year).
89. NINE INCH NAILS, Closer, on THE DOWNWARD SPIRAL (Interscope Records 1994). Numerous other, more graphic examples exist. Marilyn Manson, who appears in a black leather
thong and calls himself a satanist, has been barred from performing in a number of localities and
draws protesters in others. See Neil Strauss, A Bogey Band to Scare Parents With, N.Y. TIMES,
May 17, 1997, at A13.
90. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1230 (7th
Cir. 1985) (affirming the district court's finding that mass transit authority ban on "immoral,
vulgar, or disreputable" public interest advertisements violated the Speech Clause, and concluding that the government's policy reduces to nothing more than a subjective belief by officials
that a subject is "controversial"); Coalition for Abortion Rights v. Niagara Frontier Transp.
Agency, 584 F. Supp. 985, 986-87 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that labeling content "offensive"
reduced to an agency concern that it was "controversial").

2000]

ANYTHING GOES

alarm popular sentiment when they reach children." Material that
may offend in other ways, such as speech that might be perceived as
blasphemous or racist also falls within the rubric of "controversial"
speech. Admittedly, the term "controversial" is as vague as the terms
"indecent," "patently offensive," or "violent." Different observers, in
different communities, perhaps depending on context, will draw the
line at different subjects and at different ways of presenting those
subjects." The lines between unprotected speech and controversial
speech are often murky, especially since the definition of obscenity"'
(which is not protected speech) is far from a model of legal precision.
As difficult as it has been for courts to define obscenity, protected
controversial speech is even more amorphous. This Part examines the
parameters of controversial speech by clarifying the sources of concern, the underlying difficulty of establishing meaningful categories of
speech, and the range of controversial speech that has been targeted
for regulation.
Judge Patricia Wald of the District of Columbia Circuit, commenting on the cable indecency statute ultimately overturned by the
Supreme Court in Denver Area," captured the confusion surrounding
the legal status of controversial speech:
Lurid descriptions of programming that may well cross over the line into obscenity and
merit no First Amendment protection at all should not obscure what this case really is
about. This case is not about obscenity; it concerns significant restrictions on a class of
speech that is unquestionably entitled to constitutional protection, although possibly
offensive to some audiences. Under the broad definition of 'indecency' used in this
regulation, affected speech could include programs on the AIDS epidemic, abortion,

91. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 1999 WL 1134595, at *8, Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc. v. United States ("Playboy II)., No. 98-1682 (Nov. 30, 1999)
92. See Planned Parenthood,767 F.2d at 1230 (noting that there is little agreement about
"what subjects would be banned by the [transit authority's] controversiality policy, or indeed,
what subjects are controversial," since banned ads concerned topics such as abortion, the Vietnam war, and certain political messages, while ads were accepted concerning employment
discrimination, arms control, and gun control); American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp.
160, 183 n.10 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (noting various in the different communities of New York); see also
Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105
HARV. L. REV. 554, 581-82 (1991) (arguing that speech about "important social issues" has a
higher legal status fails because of the difficulty of defining such speech and because regulation
of "low-value" speech may reduce the availability of more "valuable" speech).
93. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); infra note 105 and accompanying text.
94. Consideration of the nature of the fora in which the various forms of regulated speech
take place is beyond the scope of this Article, although it may have influenced particular holdings cited herein. For purposes of this analysis, I assume that the speech at issue takes place in
an otherwise accessible forum, and is regulated solely based on its content. For a discussion of
public, private, and limited public forum analysis, see Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 (1995).
95. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
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childbirth, or practically any aspect of human sexuality, as well as much literature and
art from all over the world."

No communications are beyond challenge, even the Bible. The
Song of Solomon is obscene to some people. 7 The Bible is replete with
stories of adultery, family betrayal, and actions motivated by physical
passion." Some who do not find the Bible obscene may find the stories
it contains controversial.
A. Government Regulation of ConstitutionallyUnprotected Speech
By definition, the protected speech that is my concern here is
not legally obscene and is not used to facilitate crimes against children. Both obscenity99 and criminal speech"° are outside the protection

96. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (citations omitted), rev'd in part sub nom., Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
97. See Miller, 413 U.S. at 46 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Courts should not be defining obscenity because the evaluation is primarily emotional; "[t]o many the Song of Solomon is obscene." Id.; see also Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 482-83 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
98. See, for example, Genesis 19:32-38, in which Lot's daughters get their father drunk and
sleep with him; Genesis 38:15-16, in which Judah sleeps with his daughter-in-law thinking she is
a prostitute; Genesis 4:8, in which Cain murders his brother Abel; Genesis 12:11-17, in which
Abraham tells Pharaoh that Sarah, Abraham's wife, is his sister, then Sarah prostitutes herself
with Paraoh. See also BURTON L. VISOTZKY, READING THE BOOK, MAKING THE BIBLE A TIMELESS
TEXT 110-12 (1996) ("All of this rampant sexuality is, mind you, confined to but one family.).
99. See Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I), 521 U.S. 844, 878 n.44 (1997) (observing that transmitting obscenity and child pornography is already illegal regardless of the means of transmission
for both minors and adults). The government expressed its view to Congress that the CDA was
"unnecessary because existing laws already authorized its ongoing efforts to prosecute obscenity,
child pornography and child solicitation." Id. (citing 141 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. June 14,
1995) (letter from Kent Markus, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice, to
Senator Leahy)). The government conceded that obscene cable broadcasts are illegal and if
material is obscene, additional regulation would not be necessary. See Transcript of Oral
Argument, 1999 WL 1134595, at *2-*4, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States
('Playboy IW"), No. 98-1682 (Nov. 30, 1999). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHERINE B.
SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERIcA'S SEX LAWS (1996) (summarizing state criminal law although
not specifically focused on sex with children). For state criminal law regarding sex and children,
see Chapter Three, entitled "Age of Consent," in POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra,at 44-64.
100. Speech used for criminal activity against children, or in the service of other crimes, such
as fraud, or for illegal civil purposes, such as defamation, is not protected by the First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 66 (1994). X-Citement
Video upheld the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 as amended, 18
U.S.C. § 2252. See, e.g., Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990,
18 U.S.C. § 2257 (amending earlier statute to include transportation of child pornography "by
any means including by computer); id. § 2252 (b)(1)-(2) (imposing enhanced sentencing guidelines on criminal offenders who intentionally mistreat children by, among other things, lifethreatening maltreatment or sexual exploitation, whether through abuse or use for pornographic
purposes); Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112
Stat. 2974 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); Preventing Child Exploitation on the
Internet: Special HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Antitrust,Business Rights, and Competition of
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of the First Amendment, and are illegal under a variety of statutes.
None of the arguments offered here challenge the Supreme Court's
holding in New York v. Ferber that "prevention of sexual exploitation
and abuse" of minors is "a government objective of surpassing importance..... In contrast to the speech under consideration here, Ferber
upheld a law intended to stop the use and exploitation of actual children in the production of child pornography. '
Obscenity (or what is generally called hard-core pornography)
lies outside the protection of the First Amendment regardless of the
medium of communication. 3 Obscene speech can be, and is, regulated
for adults and children alike."M Under the test enunciated in Miller v.
California,three elements must coalesce to render a communication
legally obscene:
(a)... 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find
that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b)... the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by

the Senate Comm. on Appropriations,105th Cong. 23 (1998) (testimony of Ernest Allen, CEO and
President of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children) ("[Child pornography is
illegal whether it's in an adult bookstore or sent through the mails or on the Internet... if it
meets the test of obscenity under existing case law, it's illegal wherever."). Plaintiffs inACLUI,
521 U.S. at 864-65, 872, and ACLU v. Reno ("ACLU /I), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 478 n.1 (E.D. Pa.
1999), appeal docketed, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Apr. 1999), did not challenge the portions of the
statutes directed at obscenity.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI) has created several programs to respond to possible Internet abuse by adult predators. These include the Cyber Tipline, where parents and
others can report suspicious computer activity related to children and the Innocent Images
squad, an online undercover operation in which specially trained FBI agents pose as children.
Between its establishment in 1995 and March of 1998, Innocent Images investigations resulted
in 184 convictions of adults attempting to victimize children over the Internet and the number of
warrants and arrests is increasing rapidly. See Hearings on Preventing Child Exploitation,
supra (testimony of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh).
101. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) (upholding a state statute barring production and dissemination of child pornography in order to protect children from the underlying act
involved in producing such material).
102. Id.; see also Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Nothing in Ferbercan be said to justify the regulation of [child pornography] other than the protection
of the actual children used in [its] production... "). Despite the clear distinction between the
behavior at issue in Ferberand the pure speech at issue in cases discussed here, the government
regularly cites Ferberin support of its claim that protection of children comprises a compelling
interest. See, e.g., Respondent's Brief, 1996 WL 34132, at *26, Denver Area Educ. Telecomm.
Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (Nos. 95-124 & 95-227) (citing Ferberfor the proposition
that the government has a "compelling interest" in "shielding children" from expression "that is
not obscene by adult standards"); Respondent's Brief at *17, Action for Children's Television v.
FCC (-Act IM, 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (No. 93-1092) (citing Ferber to
support the government's compelling interest in safeguarding children in the context of regulating indecent speech on television).
103. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989) (ruling that obscene
telephone messages lie outside the protection of the First Amendment).
104. See id. (observing that the First Amendment protects the right of adults to engage in or
receive indecent speech).
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the applicable state law; and (c) ... the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.105

As discussed further below, controversial speech often has "serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific value" which prevents the
speech from falling within the legal definition of obscenity."°
The three elements of the Miller test may be modified when
applied to minors, so that the impact of the speech and its value may
differ depending on whether or not the recipient is an adult. In Ginsberg v. New York, the Supreme Court upheld a variable definition of
obscenity for minors contained in a state statute barring the sale to
minors of non-obscene "girlie" magazines that were protected speech
for consenting adults." It is frequently assumed that Ginsberg pro-

105. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973); see ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 872-73 (finding that
the Miller test remains the applicable standard for gauging obscenity). But see Miller, 413 U.S.
at 41 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that obscenity cases "have no business being in the
courts') (citations omitted). Dissenting in the companion case of Paris Adult Theater, Justice
Brennan argued that obscenity should be brought within the protection of the First Amendment
because, among other things, despite numerous attempts the Supreme Court had "failed to
formulate a standard that sharply distinguished protected from unprotected speech." Paris
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 83 (1973) (joined by Stewart, J. and Marshall, J.). Justice
Douglas, who consistently maintained that the government could not regulate speech on the
basis that it contained sexually oriented matter filed a separate dissent. See id. at 70. The lack
of consensus among the Justices long predated Miller. See, e.g., Interstate Circuit v. City of
Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705 n.1 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Supreme Coures efforts to
define obscenity leave observers in "utter bewilderment" having resulted in a wide array of views
in no less than 55 separate opinions among the Justices in the thirteen cases decided since Roth.
Id.; see also Sable, 492 U.S. at 133 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "[Tihe
concept of 'obscenity' cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity to provide fair notice
to persons" who might be charged with violating criminal statutes. Id. (quoting Paris Adult
Theatre, 413 U.S. at 103).
Some scholars argue that material that satisfies the Miller definition of obscenity should
nonetheless be encompassed by First Amendment protections, but that debate is beyond the
scope of this Article. See, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX
AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS 59-60, 73, 82 (1995) (criticizing the approach of feminist
scholars Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon); Freedman, supra note 52, at 931-43
(arguing that First Amendment exceptions threaten to render free speech protections dramatically weakened). For purposes of the argument here, however, let us assume that we will
recognize obscenity "when [we] see it," since it is not the subject of analysis. Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
106. ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 872 (quoting Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)); see Sable,
492 U.S. at 124 (ruling that the First Amendment protects indecent speech). Some observers
object that the legal test for obscenity does not reach all material that many citizens would
regard as hard-core pornography, especially when the test is applied according to the contemporary norms in liberal communities. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT IT), 58
F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (describing Deep Throat as "notorious" and grouping it
with "hard-core pornography" not reached by obscenity laws); United States v. Various Articles
of Obscene Merchandise, Schedule No. 2102, 709 F.2d 132, 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding
various detailed portrayals of sexual acts-including the movies 'Debbie Does Dallas" and "Deep
Throat-not obscene under the community standards of New York City).
107. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968).
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vides a rationale for regulating protected speech, but in fact Ginsberg
only lowered the bar for obscenity as applied to minors." The statute
at issue adapted the then-governing test for obscenity (the RothMemoirs test)" to weigh community standards as to "what is suitable
material for minors."'' " The act further "adjust[ed] the definition of
obscenity 'to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of
material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests' of such mi11
nors."'
The Supreme Court's opinion in Ginsberg was premised on the
assumption that the material which the statute suppressed for those
under the age of seventeen was in fact "obscene" as to minors (though
not as to adults, under the concept of "variable obscenity"), and therefore that the speech was outside the protection of the First Amendment."' This is a critical distinction from the protected controversial
matter with which this Article is concerned, for it determined the level
of scrutiny the Court applied to the "girlie" magazine statute at issue
in Ginsberg. The majority opinion made explicit that since the magazines were unprotected as to minors under the Speech Clause, the only
question for the Court was "whether the New York Legislature might
rationally conclude.., that exposure to the materials proscribed... constitutes such an 'abuse.' """ Once the Court accepted the

108. Id. at 638 (Brennan, J.) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("[Ihe
power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority
over adults.')).
109. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1956). The Roth test asks whether, to
the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests. Id.
110. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (McKinney 1965)); see Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975). Subsequent to Ginsberg, the Court
rejected the Roth-Memoirs test for obscenity, and substituted the Miller test; the Court has "not
had occasion to decide what effect Miller will have on the Ginsberg formulation." Erznoznik, 422
U.S. at 213 n.10.
111. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509 (1966)). The
state has an interest in barring distribution of materials to children that may be suitable for
adults. See Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75 (1966).
112. In considering a facial challenge to a ban on nudity on the screens of drive-in movie
theaters, the Supreme Court observed that "[tjhe only narrowing construction which occurs to us
would be to limit the ordinance to movies that are obscene as to minors." Erznoznick, 422 U.S. at
213 n.10, 216 n.15. The Court did not reach the question, in part because neither party argued
for such a limiting construction. See id.; see also Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,
697 n.22 (1977) (finding Ginsberg inapposite to non-obscene, protected material); American
Booksellers v. Webb, 919 F.2d 1493, 1501 (11th Cir. 1990) (interpreting Ginsberg to hold that a
state may "deny minors all access in any form to materials obscene as to them"); Bystrom v.
Fridley High Sch., 822 F.2d 747, 751-52 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that a schoors definition of
"obscene to minors" is sufficiently specific); Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989, 997 (10th Cir.
1986) (holding that "[m]inors have more restricted right than adults to sexually oriented material").
113. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641.

452

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:427

legislature's finding that the material was obscene for minors, it logically followed that the law would receive only the rational basis scrutiny that applies to statutes which do not implicate constitutional
liberties. Applying that deferential standard, the Court concluded "it
is not irrational for the legislature to find that exposure to material
condemned by the statute is harmful to minors.".
Many of the doctrinal problems surrounding controversial
speech and children stem from the failure to confront the significance
of the fact that Ginsberg does not stand for the principle that the state
has a "compelling interest" in regulating protected speech that reaches
minors. Nor does any language in the majority opinion suggest that
the Supreme Court would have found a higher standard than mere
rationality to have been satisfied on the facts. Justice Brennan
pointed out that there was no dearth of studies contradicting the
legislative finding that reading such magazines was injurious to the
development of young people. 15' But, he observed, in applying rational
basis analysis, "[w]e do not demand of legislatures 'scientifically certain criteria.' "" To the contrary, in order to support a regulation of
speech that does not infringe on constitutional rights, such as the
speech at issue in Ginsberg, the state must only provide "any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis"
for its action. 17
If "scientifically certain criteria" remain unnecessary when the
government attempts to demonstrate a compelling interest as opposed
to a rational basis for legislation, at least some level of certitude may
be required before courts are asked to approve infringement of core

114. Id. at 641, 643 (contrasting the legislative finding in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923), in which there was no rational basis for finding the teaching of the German language

harmful).
115. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 641. It is worth noting that if Ginsberg had come before a
Court made up of the identical Justices five years later, the outcome in Ginsberg would almost
certainly have been different. Justice Brennan would not have authored the opinion, and
probably would not have signed it. By 1973, Justice Brennan, who had authored the Court's first
express holding on the constitutional status of obscenity in Roth, had concluded that there was
no way to craft a constitutionally sustainable definition of obscenity, as he indicated in his
dissent from ParisAdult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
and its companion case, Miller v. California,413 U.S. 15, 47 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Marshall, who voted with the majority in Ginsberg, and Justice Stewart, who concurred
in Ginsberg,both joined Justice Brennan's dissents in Miller and ParisAdult Theatre. Presumably, if there is no way to define obscenity for adults, the drafting problems do not disappear just
because the standard is a "variable" one for minors. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 673 (Fortas, J.,
dissenting).
116. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 642-43 (citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110
(1911)).
117. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993) (finding a rational basis
for distinctions among cable television facilities under the Equal Protection Clause).
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liberty interests. The government's burden to demonstrate a "compelling interest" requires something more than a mere showing that the
government regulation is not irrational.118 If material does not fall
within the definition of variable obscenity applicable to minors, then
the state may not prevent minors from receiving the speech. Speech
that is not obscene for minors is protected from state regulation for
minors as well as for adults."9
B. ControversialSpeech and the Problem of Meaningful Definitions
While the Supreme Court has never succeeded in defining obscenity with clarity, it has never even attempted to define indecent or
violent speech.' ° The speech subjected to regulation in order to protect
children is often characterized as arguably "indecent," a term which
has no legal definition.' A Congressional attempt to expand the margins of indecency-however defined-lay at the heart of ACLU I, in
which the Supreme Court held that two statutory provisions enacted
"to protect minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive' communica-

118. Professor Volokh, among others, accepts the use of Ginsberg as a precedent for the government's interest in limiting non-obscene speech to protect children, and fails to note that
Ginsberg did not implicate either indecency or strict scrutiny. See Volokh, supra note 19, at 17686.
119. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 769 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority for curtailing First Amendment protections when the speech in question is not obscene

to youths).
120. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1261-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding FCC forfeiture procedures for violation of a statute prohibiting obscene, indecent, or
profane language on the radio).
121. The FCC has relied on the definition of indecency it used in Pacifica in developing
regulation since then. See Edythe Wise, A Historical Perspective on the Protection of Children
From Broadcast Indecency, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 15, 17, 33-34 (1996) (applauding the
FCC's enforcement of the obscenity, indecency, and profanity prohibition in the least restrictive
manner, while protecting the right to privacy in the home). The Supreme Court, however, never
expressly examined the definition of indecency at issue in Pacifica,or in any subsequent case.
See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT r), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(noting that the Supreme Court has never examined whether the FCC definition of indecency
was unconstitutionally vague, and expressly asking the Supreme Court for guidance as to
whether Pacifica should be read as an implicit acceptance of the "generic" definition of indecency), cited in Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 130 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(Wald, J., dissenting) (finding that the Supreme Court has "never actually passed on the FCC's
broad definition of 'indecency' "), rev'd in part sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (failing to define indecency). Indeed, the Supreme Court has
expressly criticized the legislative branch for its failure to define indecency in statutes seeking to
control such speech. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 589-90 (1998)
(upholding the statutory scheme of NEA review of applications for financial grants); Reno v.
ACLU ("ACLU F), 521 U.S. 844, 867, 871 (1997) (criticizing the uncertainty of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 for undermining Congress's objective of protecting minors from
potentially harmful materials).
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tions on the Internee' violated the First Amendment." The portions of
the statute at issue in ACLU I, the Communications Decency Act
("CDA"), effectively barred both indecent and patently offensive
speech from the Internet, but did not define either term.' Significantly, the CDA did not provide any exceptions for content with "serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value" even in an educational context,' including serious communications between parents
and their own children. The CDA imposed criminal penalties both on
speakers who knew that their communications would reach minors
and on those who merely displayed messages on the Internet in a
manner that would be accessible to minors. The latter behavior included all materials posted on unrestricted web pages or contributions
to chat rooms that a minor might enter in the midst of a dialogue.
Because of the lack of a scienter requirement, the breadth of the
speech affected and the lack of a defense based on the inherent value
of the speech, the CDA effectively squelched virtually all speech about
sex and bodily functions on the Internet. It barred adult speakers and
recipients as well as minors from engaging in such speech.
Whatever the precise definitions, however elusive they may be,
Justice Scalia has correctly noted the irony that as society becomes
more tolerant of a variety of speech-removing it from the category of
"obscenity" which may be subject to regulation-the result is that a
higher proportion of speech that offends many citizens falls into the
even amorphous category of "indecent."' The contraction of the scope
of unprotected speech related to sex and the resulting expansion of the
universe of protected "indecent' speech makes the intractable problem
of definitions both more difficult and more important. "[W]here a
reasonable person draws the line in this balancing process-that is,
how few children render the risk unacceptable-depends in part on
what mere 'indecency' (as opposed to 'obscenity') includes," Justice
Scalia observed, focusing on speech that falls at the margins.' 'The
more narrow the understanding of what is 'obscene' and hence the

122. ACLUI, 521 U.S. at 849.
123. Id. at 871 n.35 (assuming, arguendo, that "patently offensive" is synonymous with "indecent" as used in the Act). The Supreme Court's most recent opinion on indecent speech also
failed to define the nature of that speech, reserving interpretation of the congressional definition
("general standards of decency") to a federal administrative agency. See Finley, 524 U.S. at 589
(holding that Congress may instruct the National Endowment for the Arts to decline to fund art
that may offend general standards of decency).
124. ACLUI, 521 U.S. at 872 (quoting Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
125. See Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 132 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-

ring).
126. Id.
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more pornographic what is embraced within the residual category of
'indecency,' the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon greater
assurance of insulation from minors," he concluded.' 7 To justify restrictions on speech, however, the government-unlike parents-must
have an interest that is more than "reasonable."''
The Supreme Court has never squarely confronted the question
of whether speech that is "indecent" (however defined) is entitled to
lesser constitutional protection than other forms of protected speech.'
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, however, that indecent speech falls within the rubric of protected speech, and that the
government may not make such speech inaccessible to adults."' According to Justice Stevens' plurality opinion in Pacifica:
[Tihe concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stanat times of
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs
31
day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience. '

Pacifica represents the epitome of the FCC's gradual expansion of the
concept of indecency since the 1920s from "an amorphous generalization poorly differentiated from obscenity into a concept 'intimately
connected with the exposure of children to"' controversial material.32

127. Id.
128. See discussion infra Part VI.
129. Justice Stevens' plurality opinions in FCC v. PacificaFoundation, 438 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1978), and Young v. American Mini-theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 65-66 (1976), suggested that
patently offensive or indecent speech might have only "slight social value," but that proposition
did not command a majority. See also LA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 n.6 (1992)
(rejecting Justice Stevens' assertion "that selective regulation of speech based on content is not
presumptively valid.') Writing for seven Justices in ACLU I, Justice Stevens no longer took the
position that there is a sliding scale of value assigned to indecent speech. See Volokh, supra note
19, at 144-45.
130. See Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU I"), 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997) (discussing Sable, 492 U.S. at
128).
131. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731-32 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Pacifica Found., 56
F.C.C.R.2d 94, 98 (1975)). Justice Stevens never addressed the question of whether the government had alleged a compelling interest in protecting children, but rather appeared to take the
government's interest at face value. See id. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (citing only
Ginsberg, and failing to note that Ginsberg was inapposite because it applied a rational basis
test); see also Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1541 (1991) (noting that both the
FCC and Congress have tracked the definition approved in Pacifica in post-Sable attempts to
regulate dial-a-porn). But the Supreme Court emphasized in Pacificaitself and in subsequent
references to its opinion therein that Pacificais a narrow holding, limited to its facts, including a
heavily regulated form of media, an afternoon broadcast, and the unique pervasiveness and
accessibility of the medium to young children. See ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 868-70 (distinguishing
Pacifica);Sable, 492 U.S. at 128 (observing that when the recipient of speech must take affirmative steps to obtain communications, Pacificadoctrine does not apply).
132. Wise, supranote 121, at 17 (citing Pacifica,428 U.S. at 732) (tracing legal developments
that led the FCC "to narrow the focus of indecency regulation to children"); see also Lii Levi, The
FCC, Indecency, and Anti-Abortion PoliticalAdvertising, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 85, 112
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The treatment of violent speech is distinguishable from the
speech considered in Pacifica which involved sexuality and bodily
functions. Although there is widespread concern about the amount of
violence contained in entertainment that reaches children, 33 the Supreme Court has never held that speech containing violent sentiments
or imagery lies outside the protection of the First Amendment as
applied to either adults or children."' The sole exceptions are speech
that fits the definition of "fighting words" or rises to the level of "incitement," neither of which applies for the purposes of the analysis
here.'35 Controversial speech about violence merely portrays violent
acts or characters but does not expressly advocate imminent violence.
It is no easier to define than speech dealing with sexuality. As early as
1972, the FCC concluded that it could not prohibit broadcast violence
because the subject matter would prove impossible to define." And
violence has not become any easier to define with the passage of time.
As one Congressman recently wondered, does violence mean "a movie
like 'Home Alone,'... a movie like 'Ben Hur,'... [or] a movie like
'[Saving] Private Ryan'?' 31

(1996) (observing that Justice Stevens' definition of indecency as '"nonconformance with accepted
standards of morality" in Pacifica,438 U.S. at 740, would give the FCC wide range to expand the
notion of indecency in order to protect children).
133. See, e.g., James Gerstenzang, Clinton Sees Violent Influence in 3 Video Games Media,
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1999, at A12 (reporting that President Clinton urges parents, Hollywood,
and software producers to resist products that glorify violence); Richard Lacayo, Violent Reaction, TIME, June 12, 1995, at 24 (discussing the devisive debate over who is responsible for sex
and violence in popular culture). See generally BOX, supra note 27.
134. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (finding hate speech including cross burning to be protected
expression); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 519 (1947) (finding that the First Amendment
protects communications depicting deeds of bloodshed, lust and crime); Video Software Dealers
Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that depictions of violence alone do
not fall within the definition of obscenity for either minors or adults); Sovereign News Co. v.
Falke, 448 F. Supp. 306, 394 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (outlining the Miller test for obscenity).
135. Cf. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (incitement); Chapllnsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (fighting words). A radio or television show, or Internet
communication that urged children to find their parents' guns immediately and go shoot someone would be subject to regulation or liability under Brandenberg. Cf. Weirum v. RKO General,
Inc., 539 P.2d 36, 40 (Cal. 1975) (finding no First Amendment defense for a radio contest causing
personal injury).
136. The Commission referred to the dilemma posed by how to treat Peter Pan, where the
crocodile eats Captain Hook. See Wise, supra note 121, at 34-35 (citing Report on the Broadcast
of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 F.C.C.R.2d 418, 418-419 (1975) (responding to
TELEVISION AND GROWING UP: THE IMPACT OF TELEVISED VIOLENCE, A REPORT TO THE SURGEON
GENERAL FROM THE SURGEON GENERAL'S SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TELEVISION AND
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR (1972))). One can easily see the problems in trying to classify other children's
classics such as Bambi, who sees his mother shot by a hunter, or Babar, whose mother is similarly dispatched at the beginning of the first volume.
137. Alison Mitchell & Frank Bruni, House Undertakes Days-Long Battle on Youth Violence,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at Al, A26 (quoting Representative Mark Foley). The statute being
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As difficult as it has been to develop a legal definition of obscenity, and as elusive as the effort to pin down violent speech has
proven, protected controversial speech is even more resistant to precise definition.'38 Controversial speech falls along a spectrum, so that
some speech may fall just on the legal side of obscenity, saved by some
small measure of "literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," while
other controversial speech is clearly far from obscene but offensive to
some sensibilities. Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet, after all, defied
their families, engaged in ardent teenage sex, and committed suicide.
The third prong of the Miller test (the "value' prong) saves a
substantial portion of speech from being labeled obscene even as to
minors. The CDA would have impermissibly barred Internet communications about birth control practices, safe sex, the consequences of
prison rape, each of the seven dirty words at issue in Pacifica, classic
artworks depicting nudes, and arguably the card catalogues of major
libraries, each of which has value under Miller.3 '
The subjectivity which Justices as different as Justice Scalia
and Justice Brennan have correctly attributed to the Miller test has
become a matter of legal concern because of the "lack of an ascertainable standard" with which to measure value."" As one Congressman put it, "[w]here one Member's aversions end, others with different sensibilities and with different values begin.' 4 ' Justice Scalia, who
concurred in a case holding that the third prong of Miller contemplates requiring jurors to assess the saving value of speech according
to a reasonable person standard,14 protested that asking jurors to
make such a judgment as "reasonable" people was "quite impossible.., there being many accomplished people who have found litera-

debated, the Children's Defense Act of 1999, was touted as reaching all violence in the media.
But the definition of speech subject to regulation was a variable obscenity definition that expressly included "sadistic or masochistic activity,... acts of mutilation of the human body, or
rape." H.R. 206, 106th Cong. § 1471(b)(3) (1999).
138. See Amy Adler, What's Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Problem for Artistic
Expression, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1499, 1506 (1996) (arguing that it is impossible to define terms such
as "pornography," "art," or "hate speech" coherently).
139. See Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.s. 844, 871 (1997). Prison rape, for example, may
be of particular concern to young people, who are increasingly confined in adult prisons where
they are commonly the subjects of sexual assault. See Amy E. Webbink, Access Denied. Incarcerated Juveniles and Their Right of Access to Courts, 7 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 613, 630
(1999) (finding that children in adult facilities are five times as likely as children in juvenile
facilities to be sexually assaulted).
140. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
141. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 582 (1998) (quoting Rep.
Ronald Coleman).
142. See Pope, 481 U.S. at 504.
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ture in Dada, and art in the replication of a soup can. 1 43 Such decisionmaking, if not always impossible, he continued, "is at least impossible in the cases that matter.""
Justice Scalia concluded that "we would be better advised to
adopt as a legal maxim what has long been the wisdom of mankind:
De gustibus non est disputandum. Just as there is no use arguing
about taste, there is no use litigating about it."'' In what may seem to
be a tautology, but is a building block of First Amendment jurisprudence, if the speech is not obscene (and does not fall within limited
other First Amendment exceptions), it is protected under the Speech
Clause.'4 6
IV. JUDIcIAL TREATMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST
The failure to achieve specificity in articulating the kinds of
speech the state seeks to regulate has complicated judicial efforts to
scrutinize the government's alleged interests. And yet, that is precisely what the applicable legal standard requires the courts to do.
A. The Applicable Legal Standard
The Supreme Court has expressly required judges to ask
whether the record supports a finding that the governmental interest
asserted reaches the constitutional dimension required by the applicable First Amendment test. Except in the rarest circumstances, the
test applied to regulations on controversial speech will be strict scrutiny because the regulations are content-based. 47 Strict scrutiny re-

143. Id. (holding it is harmless error to convict under an obscenity statute based on a community standard of value rather than a reasonable person standard).
144. Id. at 505.

145. Id.
146. Two additional doctrines must be satisfied for a regulation on speech to survive judicial
scrutiny. The rule against vagueness requires that the regulation be drawn with sufficient
precision so that persons who seek to exercise their First Amendment rights will have notice of
the speech being regulated. The rule against overbreadth demands that the regulation cover
only that conduct which is subject to control under the Constitution and that it not extend either
to protected conduct or to conduct which it is unnecessary to control in order to accomplish the
government's goal. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 364-65
(1970).
147. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 514-15 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (finding a

compelling governmental interest in controlling potentially misleading speech in a class action
litigation determined by the nature of the speech and the scope of the interference with speech
imposed by the governmental regulation). Since Pacifica, the Supreme Court has consistently
rejected government arguments that something less than "strict scrutiny" is required when the
government seeks to protect minors. The government, however, continues to make, and courts at
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quires courts to balance the individual liberty
interests affected
8
against the government's proclaimed interest.'1

The Speech Clause occupies a special place in constitutional jurisprudence because it lies at the core of three foundational principles
of our system of governance: the marketplace of ideas, selfdetermination, and personal autonomy. "9 The marketplace of ideas
primarily captures the notion that "good" speech will overcome "bad,"
so that "truth" will prevail. The marketplace is a prerequisite for
creating an informed populace capable of governing itself through
democratic self-determination." Both of these interrelated utilitarian
values are closely linked to the third goal of personal autonomy. As

least to consider, that argument. At oral argument in Playboy II, the government urged same
deference under what it characterized as "not quite strict scrutiny" requiring a compelling
interest because the regulation is content-based. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 1999 WL
1134595, at *2, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States ("Playboy IT), No. 98-1682
(Nov. 30, 1999); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (stating that
Pacificais a narrow holding); Fabulous Assoc., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 896 F.2d
780, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1990) (rejecting the state's argument that a lesser standard of scrutiny
applies). In ACLU I, the government conceded that strict scrutiny applied. Reno v. ACLU
("ACLU 1'), 521 U.S. 844, 863 n.30 (1997). A lesser standard might, however, apply if the speech
were both controversial and commercial. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servs. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980); supranote 16.
Eugene Volokh has criticized the continued use of the strict scrutiny doctrine as leading to
unpredictable results. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and
TranscendingStrict Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2441-43 (1996). My argument suggests
that rather than seeking a new method of analysis, the courts should apply strict scrutiny
seriously.
148. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 101-02 (1981). While not necessarily framed
explicitly as a balancing test, "strict scrutiny" analysis requires judges to compare the weight of
two important interests-the government's compelling interest and the individual liberty
interest-against each other, knowing that one will be compromised. See Volokh, supra note 19,
at 167-68. Many scholars have argued that the compelling interest will almost always trump the
liberty interest under strict scrutiny. See id. at 169 & n.86 (discussing the "compelling interest
trumps" approach as the "conventional wisdom").
If the compelling interest does generally trump, it becomes even more important to begin the
analysis by examining whether the asserted interest holds up to scrutiny. The Supreme Court,
however, has repeatedly failed to do so. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r'), 521 U.S. 844, 875
(1997) (examining whether there are less restrictive alternatives to the regulation of speech at
issue); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 134 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)
("[Tihe Government has a strong interest in protecting children against exposure to pornographic
material that might be harmful to them."); Pope, 481 U.S. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("[G]overnment may not constitutionally criminalize mere possession or sale of obscene literature, absent some connection to minors."); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that obscenity is constitutionally protected "at least in
the absence of distribution to juveniles); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-650 (1968)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (distinguishing children's rights to access speech from adults' rights).
149. See C. THOMAS DIENES ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 5-11 (2d ed. 1999) (describing the leading rationales for the special status accorded to freedom of expression: the
marketplace, democratic, and liberty models.)
150. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245, 249-50 (1936) (discussing the
history of American and English constitutional protections of speech).
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Justice Brandeis explained, the Founding Fathers believed that "the
final end of the state was to make men free to develop their facilities,
and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
151
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means."
All three values are at stake when the state abridges speech even for
the popular goal of shielding children.15
Constitutional jurisprudence imposes a heavy burden on the
state when regulating expression." According to First Amendment
doctrine, courts may not even evaluate whether a given regulation is
narrowly tailored until the state establishes its compelling interest.
The state must both articulate and demonstrate a compelling interest
based on a real harm in order to justify any government regulation on
the content of speech. The government must also show two corollaries
to shore up its claim that the interest is compelling, rather than
merely legitimate. First, the government must demonstrate a nexus
between the harm the government seeks to diminish and the particular speech affected by the regulation. Second, the state must demonstrate a likelihood that the regulation will substantially diminish the
harm.
The Supreme Court has long held that government may not
regulate otherwise protected speech based on its content without
demonstrating a specific nexus between the speech and harm flowing
to citizens. For example, a state may have a 'legitimate interest!' in
preserving the integrity of the electoral process, but that interest is
not sufficiently "compelling" to sustain statutory limitations on the
nature of the promises a candidate may make to the electorate during
a campaign." Similarly, the Supreme Court overturned a statutory
limitation on political contributions made by corporations, on the

151. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), rev'd in part,
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

152. See ROBERT

C.

POST,

CONSTITUTIONAL

DOMAINS:

DEMOCRACY,

COMMUNITY,

MANAGEMENT 298 (1995).
153. Free Speech occupies a special status in contemporary legal discourse on civil liberties.
See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, InformationAs Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts
on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 676 (1992) (stating that
"free speech ranks high" in discussion of civil liberties).
154. See Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 60 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (overturning a statute that
barred candidates from promising to reduce their own salaries if elected, on the grounds that the
"State's fear that the voters might make an ill-advised choice does not provide the State with a
compelling justification for limiting speech); see also id. at 62 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("[On
different facts] I would give more weight to the State's interest.").
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grounds that
the regulation was "unjustified by a compelling state
interest.""I
In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Supreme Court invalidated a regulation designed to protect children, because it lacked the
"clarity of purpose" essential under the Speech Clause." To justify
differential treatment of speech based on content, the State must first
show that the regulation "is necessary to serve a compelling state
interest..... The burden is on the government to demonstrate that it
has a compelling interest in regulating speech; the government interest cannot be taken for granted.158 As Justice Brandeis warned, "[f]ear
of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free
speech ....Men feared witches and burnt women ....To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that
1'5 9
practiced."
is
speech
free
if
result
will
evil
serious
In Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. FCC, the case that accorded cable television greater protection than that available to the
broadcast media, the Supreme Court clarified its earlier hints about
the judicial duty to inquire into the government's compelling interest.
Despite fractured opinions on the merits in Turner, and the application of intermediate rather than strict scrutiny, the Justices unanimously agreed that:

155. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 485 (1960)) (holding that the asserted interest in protecting the electoral power of the
citizens is not compelling absent a showing of imminent threat posed by corporate contributions,
and that there was no "substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest
asserted" and the regulation on speech); see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322-24, 329 (1988)
(O'Connor, J.) (analyzing but not resolving the question of whether a regulation barring offensive
signs near foreign embassies serves a compelling government interest, since the statute was, in
any event not narrowly tailored); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (Powell, J.)
(holding that the state does not have a sufficiently compelling interest in maintaining separation
of church and state to justify content-based limitations on the access of student groups to a
generally open forum).
156. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 217-18 (1975).
157. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
118-120 (1991) (citing Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987))
(holding that the state Board's assertion that the state has a compelling interest in classifying
criminal assets to ensure "that criminals do not profit from storytelling about their crimes before
their victims have a meaningful opportunity to be compensated" is "hardly compelling," but
finding a compelling interest in depriving criminals of the profits of their crimes and in using
such profits to compensate victims but holding that the statute was not narrowly tailored to
advance the latter interest.)
158. See FirstNat'l Bank, 435 U.S. at 786, 788-89. The burden is on the government to show
a compelling interest, which the Court held was not "supported by the record or legislative
findings" in this matter. Id. (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976)); see also ACLU v.
Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ("ACLU r. The government conceded at oral argument that it has the burden of proof to show a compelling interest.
See id.
159. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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When the [g]overnment defends a regulation on speech as a means to... prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply 'posit the existence of the disease sought
to be cured! ....It must demonstrate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.' 6°

One year later, in United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, a case that did not require strict scrutiny because the
regulation was content-neutral, the Supreme Court reiterated the
burden on the government. 6 ' The Supreme Court made explicit that in
order to regulate protected speech at all, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest, including a nexus between the interest it
asserts and the actual harm that the regulation can prevent.16" ' National Treasury Employees involved a statute banning federal employees from accepting compensation for speeches and articles, regardless of subject matter. Because the statute did not discriminate
among forms of speech based on content, the Court only subjected it to
a rational basis review, but one that can be understood as a "heightened reasonableness" test." Even in this context, the majority imposed the burden on the state to establish a compelling interest which
it had spelled out in Turner."
Under the Turner test, it is not sufficient for the government to
assert an abstract or generalized interest in children's development to
sustain a regulation on speech. In order to meet its burden to show a
compelling interest in regulating speech to shield the young, the state
would have to demonstrate: (i) that children's social, moral or emotional development is at stake; (ii) that the speech is the direct cause
of the risk; and (iii) that restricting the speech will in fact reduce the
risk of harm. This means that after the government establishes that

160. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., Blackmun, J., and Souter, J.) (citing Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1455
(D.C. Cir. 1985)) (overturning the "must-carry" provisions, which required cable broadcasters to
provide channels for all local broadcast networks, which the Court considered as a contentneutral limitation on speech). Regarding the unanimity of the Justices on this point in Turner,
see id. at 670 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring), id. at 680-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, joined by Scalia, J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J.) ("It is not enough that the
goals of the law be legitimate, or reasonable, or even praiseworthy. There must be some pressing
public necessity, some essential value that has to be preserved, . . ." i.e., a compelling interest),
and id. at 685 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See also Eclipse Enters., Inc.
v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 1997) (interpreting Turner to hold that the government must
present "substantial supporting evidence" to justify a law regulating speech).
161. United States v. National Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995).
162. See id. at 467-68.
163. See id. at 475-76. The burden is not a "reasonable response to the posited harms," when
the regulation of speech "heightens the government's burden of justification." Id.
164. See id. at 475 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 664).
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controversial speech jeopardizes children, it must also show that the
regulation will effectively minimize the risks.
Balancing involves more than a declaration that one set of interests is more important than another. It requires the court to identify the interests on both sides, value them, and compare them." In
order for a court to assess value, the government may need to provide
empirical data about such issues as the extent and seriousness of the
problem which the government seeks to resolve by impinging on a
constitutional right, on the one hand, and whether the regulation is
likely to resolve the problem efficiently enough that the trade-offs are
justifiable, on the other.
Despite the clear instructions set forth in Turner, courts at all
levels regularly fail to explore whether the government has demonstrated the components of a compelling interest. The formal judicial
inquiry under the Speech Clause normally skips the required threshold inquiry into the compelling interest alleged by the government and
focuses instead on just two of the three critical questions that courts
must weigh in analyzing abridgements of speech: (i) the nature of the
constitutional liberty interests at stake;" and (ii) whether the regulation is narrowly tailored to achieve the government interest without
undue burden on speech.16
B. The Supreme Court Cases
Although the government regularly cites Pacificafor the proposition that a compelling interest in shielding children from indecency
justifies at least some forms of regulation," the facts in Pacificawould
not satisfy the standards subsequently spelled out in Turner." In
Pacifica, the Supreme Court upheld FCC enforcement proceedings

165. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 972 (1987) (arguing that constitutional balancing by the Court has recently been guided by
liberal policies, instead of more rigorous investigations of rights, principles, and structures).
166. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 160 F.R.D. 478, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1995). Speech implicating rights of political expression, civil rights or political association can only be impinged
upon to serve a "compelling interest." See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 431, 438 n.2 (1978); cf.
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940) (observing that speech derived from "racial or
religious conceit," which incites violence or breaches of the peace may be appropriately punished
by the states). In contrast, commercial speech, while protected, may be assessed under a lesser
standard. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Servs. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980).
167. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118
(1991).
168. See Brief for the Appellants, 1997 WL 32931, at *19-22, Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844
(1997) (No. 96-511)("ACLU 1); Brief for the Cross-Appellants/Appellees, 1988 LEXIS U.S. Briefs
515, at *14, *18-21, Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (Nos. 88-515 & 88-

525).
169. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729-31 (1978).
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that followed from an afternoon radio broadcast of satirist George
Carlin's monologue about seven dirty words that must never be said
on broadcast media. Justice Stevens' opinion for the plurality took the
government's interest for granted in that context.17 None of the four
opinions issued offered any explicit discussion of whether an independent government interest in protecting children exists, much less
whether the government had established a convincing nexus between
the regulated speech and the anticipated harm.17'
Even in the most recent Supreme Court cases involving regulation of speech to protect children, the government has not seriously
attempted to establish that the controversial speech it sought to
regulate is a cause of real harm. Nor has the Supreme Court raised
Turner as a hurdle that the government must clear, despite the test it
had set forth. This judicial deficit is emphatically present in the trilogy of cases involving speech deemed harmful to children with which
this Article began: ACLU I, Sable, and DenverArea.
In ACLU I, the Supreme Court entirely failed to analyze the
governmental interest in protecting children from indecency on the
Internet. Instead, it summarily noted the "legitimacy and importance
of the congressional goal."'' Under First Amendment analysis, a
merely 'legitimate" or "important" interest normally would not withstand even intermediate scrutiny, much less the strict scrutiny imposed where
the government interferes with protected speech based on
17 3
its content.

170. See id. at 749-50 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (relying entirely on Ginsberg and failing
to note that Ginsberg was inapposite because it involved only a rational basis analysis, as
discussed supra Part MI.A).
171. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan implicitly
challenged the glib assumption of a compelling government interest when he raised serious
questions in his dissent about the potential conflict between such government choices and the
preferences of individual parents. See discussion infra Part V.
172. ACLUI, 521 U.S. at 849 (Stevens, J.) (emphasis added) (recognizing the interest in the
second sentence of the Court's opinion overturning the core provisions of the statute enacted to
protect minors from indecent and patently offensive speech on the Internet). In ACLU I, the
coalition of plaintiffs that challenged the CDA below did "not dispute that the Government
generally has a compelling interest in protecting minors from 'indecent' and 'patently offensive'
speech." Id. at 863 n.30. All of the Justices agreed on this point, and none scrutinized the
assumption. See id. at 886, 897 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (agreeing
that to the extent that the statute bars knowing transmission of indecent material to minors, it
should be upheld because the state may restrict access by minors to such materials). In dicta,
however, the majority analyzed the possible competing interests of parents. See discussion infra
Part V.
173. In its next attempt to regulate controversial speech on the Internet, Congress tried to
circumvent the issue by defining the proscribed speech circularly as "harmful to minors." ACLU
v. Reno ("ACLU 11), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 478 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (preliminarily enjoining enforcement of the new statute because it would unnecessarily chill speech that is protected as to
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In Sable, despite the Supreme Court's earlier pronouncements
on the importance of scrutinizing the interests set forth by the government, the majority summarily concluded that the Court has "recognized that there is a compelling interest in protecting the physical
and psychological well-being of minors."' " To reach this sweeping
conclusion, the Supreme Court accepted the government's reliance on
Ginsberg and Ferber.'5 Neither Ginsberg nor Ferber, however, were
decided under a strict scrutiny analysis, and therefore neither establishes a "compelling interest" for purposes of regulating protected
speech in any context.'
In Denver Area, the Justices paid slightly more attention to the
government's asserted interest, but were inconsistent in labeling the
nature of that interest. Justice Breyer's plurality opinion notes at the
outset that the government has a "basic, legitimate objective of protecting children from exposure to 'patently offensive' materials."'"
Subsequently, in a portion of the plurality opinion joined by only three
Justices, Justice Breyer changed the label applied to the government
interest from "legitimate" to "compelling," in the context of analyzing
why a total ban on protected speech violates the First Amendment,
regardless of the strength of the government's interest. 8 In Denver
Area, the Supreme Court held that while Congress could permit a
cable operator to decide whether to allow broadcast of indecent material on leased access channels, it could not require cable operators to
segregate and block such programming. Nor could Congress allow
cable operators to prevent rare or nonexistent 'patently offensive'
programming on public, educational, and government channels

adults), appeal docketed, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Apr. 1999). The District Court did not analyze the
government's asserted interest. See id. at 495.
174. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (citing Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968)); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982); see also
Sable, 492 U.S. at 134 (Brennan J., concurring) ("[Tihe government has a strong interest in
protecting children against exposure to pornographic material that might be harmful to them.").
175.
See discussion supraPart M.
176. As discussed in Part I, supra, Ginsberg was analyzed under a rational basis test because it involved speech that the Court held was not constitutionally protected for minors; Ferber
did not regulate speech, but instead involved the underlying activities that gave rise to the
production of child pornography.
177. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 728 (1996) (emphasis added).
178. See id. at 755, 759 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., O'Connor, J., and Souter, J.) ("[W]e
agree with the government that protection of children is a compelling interest."). Protection of
even the most determined child from controversial speech cannot justify "reduc[ing] the adult
population ... to... only what is fit for children." Sable, 492 U.S. at 128; see also Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp, 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957).
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("PEGs") since it had not proven that a social problem even existed on
channels reserved for use by public and nonprofit organizations.'
The incoherent discussion of the government's interest in Denver Area was extraordinary because it violated every requirement the
Supreme Court itself had imposed under Turner. The Justices jumped
from labeling the state interest "basic" or 'legitimate" to calling it
"compelling" and, in the next breath, concluded that at least one part
of the legislation was not even "necessary." Not a single opinion asked
how a statute that is not "necessary" could serve a compelling state
interest. If it had applied Turner, the Supreme Court should have
concluded that to the extent the government failed to demonstrate
that the harms it alleged were real, it had no compelling interest in
regulating controversial material."w
Where protection of children is invoked as an interest, cogent
legal analysis too often is deemed gratuitous. Many factors contribute
to this analytic looseness. These factors include an emotional response
to children's vulnerability, an irrational sense that if a law is designed
to protect children, then it must be good, and the often unquestioned
legal principle that while children may have rights, the rights accorded to them are not co-extensive with the rights of adults."8 ' The
operative presumption of the latter principle, which is too often inverted, is that children do indeed possess some version of constitutional rights. Those rights include the right to receive speech and
the right to speak. The Supreme Court has never defined the precise
parameters of children's constitutional rights, whether under the
Speech Clause or more broadly,"'2 but the Supreme Court has sometimes minimized those rights by indicating that the state may regulate the conduct of minors beyond what would be constitutional if
applied to adults.l" It is not necessary to resolve the debate sur-

179. See Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 764-65.
180. See id. at 773-74 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 129-31) ("[T]he government may have a compelling interest in protecting children from indecent speech on such a
pervasive medium .... When the government acts to suppress directly the dissemination of such
speech, however, it may not rely solely on speculation and conjecture.").
181. See generally Katherine Hunt Federle, On the Road to Reconceiving Rights for Children:
A PostfeministAnalysis of the CapacityPrinciple,42 DEPAUL L. REV. 983 (1993); Wendy Anton
Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIz. L.
REV. 11 (1994); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspectiveon
Parent'sRights, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1747 (1993).
182. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl, 431 U.S. 678, 692 (1976) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion).
183. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664 (1995) (limiting Fourth Amend-

ment rights while in the custodial care of schools); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545
(1971) (finding no constitutional right to a jury); Catherine J. Ross, Disposition in a Discretionary
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rounding the scope of children's speech rights with regard to limitations imposed by the state in this context, because constitutional
liberties are not operative between children and their parents."' The
central issue here is whether the state has a compelling interest in
limiting speech that some parents may wish their own children to
receive.
Whatever the respective merits and defects of presumptions
about rights that flow directly to minors, the frequent diminution of
rights exercised by young citizens should raise warning flags when
used to justify regulations on speech that affect adults as well as children, which was the case with the statutes at issue in ACLU I, Sable,
and Denver Area. It may well be that the statutes under review in
ACLU I and Sable-and, more indirectly, in Denver Area-were so
transparently unconstitutional in the scope of their ban on speech that
the Justices realized at first glance that the regulations before them
would not survive scrutiny. Under such circumstances, not confronted
with a close case, perhaps the Supreme Court deemed it less pressing
to analyze the state's compelling interest. This approach carries grave
consequences. First, it promotes undisciplined thinking about the
nature of the government's interest, which may affect the future actions of legislators and regulators. Second, it suggests to judges sitting
on the lower courts that they too can skip the required inquiry into the
state's compelling interest. Finally, the implicit promise of judicial
deference invites legislators and advocates of censorship to abridge
speech with relative abandon.
It may seem that assessment of the weightiness of the state's
interest is largely subjective.'" The standard is not, however, entirely
subjective because it places a burden on the government to demonstrate the existence of a specified harm that can be successfully addressed by regulation-a minimal requirement that the government
has frequently failed to meet when it relies on "the salutary purpose of

Regime: Punishment and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 36 B.C. L. REV. 1037,
1040 (1995).
184. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-42 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
(arguing that parents may impose their views on their children to the extent that they can do so
without the assistance of the state); John E. Coons et al., Puzzling Over Children's Rights, 1991
B.Y.U. L. REV. 307, 347.
185. See Edwards & Berman, supra note 19, at 1529-30, 1530 n.201 (citing Turner Broad.
Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 680 (1994) (O'Connor, J., dissenting in part), as an example of "untethered subjectivism"); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term: Foreword,
The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43 (1989) (arguing that personal and majoritarian values dominate the Rehnquist Court's constitutional jurisprudence).
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protecting children.""' A finding that the state's interest in regulating
speech to protect children does not constitute a sufficiently "compelling interest!' to justify the regulation of protected speech does "not
belittle the state's interest in the well-being of minors." '87 The interest
might still be sufficient to satisfy a rational basis test, as in
8 8 It would also justify numerous government programs
Ginsberg.'
designed to help children and families that do not impinge on speech
rights or other foundational constitutional liberties.
C. The Specter of Censorship
The incoherence of the judiciary invites efforts to constrain
freedom of expression. As Justice Kennedy has argued, raw censorship
based on content renders any government regulation of speech unconstitutional unless it reaches only the narrowly defined types of speech
that fall outside the protection of the First Amendment.189 He fears
that the Court's willingness even to examine the proposed compelling
interest behind a regulation "might be read as a concession that States
may censor speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for doing so."' ° To be sure, the passivity of most courts-including the Supreme Court-in accepting the interest the government
alleges in protecting children suggests that this concern may be wellfounded.
If Justice Kennedy's view prevailed, it would be unnecessary to
explore the depth, precision or legitimacy of the state's alleged compelling interests in regulating speech to protect children. But as long
as strict scrutiny, beginning with analysis of the compelling interest
asserted, remains the mode of analyzing infringements on protected
speech, courts should perform the serious inquiry urged here where
the government claims to be motivated by a desire to protect children.

186. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968) (holding the regulation
void for vagueness).
187. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 691 (8th Cir. 1992).
188. See id. (finding that a statute limiting sale or rental of undefined "violent" videos niust
serve a compelling government interest, which the state failed to articulate precisely).
189. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 124 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring); cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 880 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (arguing that state action calculated to suppress certain content is
fundamentally antithetical to the First Amendment).
190. Simon & Schuster, 505 U.S. at 124-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Court's "recent" adaptation of the compelling state interest analysis from its Equal Protection
jurisprudence undermines the First Amendment's ban on content regulation, and voicing similar
concerns about the Court's willingness to examine whether regulations on speech are narrowly
tailored).
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1. Looking at Motives

Strict scrutiny does hot permit courts to wear blinders regarding the intent of those who would curtail speech.'91 In the major cases
involving restrictions on controversial speech to protect children,
intent to chill the speech more generally has not been a close question,
as courts have noted repeatedly. The Supreme Court has been unequivocal in stating that to withstand scrutiny, the compelling interest
alleged by the government must be the "actual purpose," not just one
that seems convincing."2
In ACLU I, the majority of the Justices expressly labeled the
CDA a transparent attempt at "censorship,''9 3 and with good cause.
Senator James Exon, one of the drafters of the CDA, presented the
Senate with a compendium of lurid materials available on the Internet
that, in his view, threatened to turn every computer into a "red light
district."" He lamented the littering of "this information superhighway with obscene [and] indecent... pornography ....Virtual but
virtueless
reality is projected in the most twisted, sick use of sexual9
ity., , 5
So too, Senator Joseph Lieberman, praising a separate title in
the statute that contained the CDA which required that television
manufacturers install a "V-chip" allowing parents to block receipt of
certain categories of programs, proclaimed that the problem is not
"rating the garbage" but how to "get rid of the garbage."" Supporters

191. "Motives and purposes for legislation are notoriously elusive, ambiguous and multifarious." Louis Henkin, Morals and the Constitution"The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 391,
392 (1963).
192. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908
n.4 (1996); see also Susan H. Williams, Content Discriminationand the FirstAmendment, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 615, 634 (1991) (criticizing the Court's recent focus on permissible legislative motive
as failing to take unintended restriction of communication into account).
193. Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) ('The interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society outweighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of
censorship.').
194. 141 CONG. REC. S8087, 88089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (describing the "blue book"); see
140 CONG. REC. 89746 (daily ed. July 26, 1994); see also ACLUI, 521 U.S. at 885 (discussing the
Exon Amendment as the source of the statutory provisions at issue before the Court-the socalled "indecent transmission" provision and the "patently offensive display" provision). The
amendment, as revised, became Section 502 of the Communications Act of 1996.
195. 141 CONG. REC. 88293 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Senate Chaplain Lloyd
Ogilvie). This kind of statement on the Senate floor underscores the frequent linkage between
organized religious groups and efforts to restrict speech, raising further concerns under the
Establishment Clause. See Henkin, supranote 191, at 407-11.
196. GAY AND LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION ("GLAAD'), AccEss DENIED: THE
IMPACT OF INTERNET FILTERING SOFTWARE ON THE LESBIAN AND GAY COMMUNITY 2 (1997) (on
file with author) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman on The Television Improvement Act of
1997) (It only became clear at the end of the battle for the v-chip that the agenda was "the
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of the statute overturned in Denver Area stated on the floor of Congress that controversial cable programming "should be stopped, must
be stopped."'97 The purpose of the legislation, they continued, was "to
put an end'to the kind of things going on" on cable channels.'98
While neither a considered nor a cavalier attitude toward enactment by the legislators is dispositive," federal courts have noted
with dismay the cavalier process commonly accorded government
regulations on speech once the goal of protecting children is invoked.
The frequent lack of serious consideration to restrictions on speech
adopted in the name of protecting children flies in the face of the
Supreme Court's proclamation that the "essence" of the Speech Clause
is "that Congress may not regulate speech except in cases of extraordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of care that we have not
elsewhere required.""
In ACLUI, for example, the Supreme Court detailed the lack of
legislative attention paid to the CDA's key provisions by legislators. In
contrast to the other six Titles of the statute in which the CDA was
embedded, each of which, Justice Stevens noted, was "the product of
extensive committee hearings and the subject of discussion in Reports
prepared by the Committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives," in enacting the CDA, he underscored, "[t]he Senate went
in willy-nilly, passed legislation, and never once had a hearing, never
once had a discussion other than an hour or so on the floor."2" Further,

imposition of conservative political ideologies to change the content of television programming to
suit their views.").
197. 138 CONG. REC. S649 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Wyche Fowler).
198. 138 CONG. REC. S652 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 1992) (statement of Sen. Jesse Helms).
199. Compare Clinton v. City of New York, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2107 (1998) (Stevens, J.) (overturning the line item veto even though the text of the Act "was itself the product of much debate
and deliberation in both Houses of Congress'), and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,
171 (1803), with National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 594 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (stating that although thorough, "all this legislative history has no valid claim upon
our attention at all'), and Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 133 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (stating that the First Amendment does not require legislation to be supported by
careful consideration, "but only by a vote").
200. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996).
201. Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 858 n.24 (1997) (quoting Cyberpornand Children: The Scope of the Problem, the State of the Technology, and the Need for Congressional
Action: Hearing on S. 892 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 7-8 (1995)
(statement of CDA opponent, Sen. Leaky)); see also, e.g., Playboy v. United States, 918 F. Supp.
813, 822 (D. Del. 1996). The court in Playboy issued a temporary restraining order because,
among other things:
there is an absolute void of legislative findings that Section 505 [of the Telecommunications Act of 1996] is necessary to protect minors from exposure to sexually
oriented material shown on adult cable channels which their parents have chosen
not to subscribe to.... [T]he legislative record contains no findings as to how of-
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Justice Stevens drew an express and disapproving parallel between
the legislative process that resulted in the CDA and the haphazard
process that resulted in the statute regarding telephone indecency at
issue in Sable.' Sable was perhaps even more troubling, because the
legislation at issue in the case emerged following a decade in which
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") attempted end-runs around decisions by the lower courts invalidating
their efforts to eliminate commercial telephone sex."°3
The government has repeatedly failed to exercise even a modest degree of care in enacting measures that limit protected speech
with the asserted purpose of protecting children, much less to demonstrate the special sensitivity required under the Speech Clause. The

ten this bleeding occurs, how many minors are exposed to the adult programming
... or what effect such exposure has on minors.
Id.; see also Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States ("Playboy r), 945 F. Supp. 772,
779 (D. Del. 1996), affd mem., 520 U.S. 1141 (1997) (finding that except for the statements of the
two sponsors on the floor of the Senate, there "was no debate on the amendment and no hearings
were held on it').
To be sure, legislative enactments on a variety of topics are attached as amendments to bills
on other subjects, such as appropriations or so-called "omnibus" bills. See, e.g., Clinton, 118 S.
Ct. at 2119 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the overturning of the "line item veto"
statute because a typical budget appropriations bill may have "a dozen titles, hundreds of
sections, and spread across more than 500 pages of the Statutes at Large'). Most of these billssuch as appropriations-do not have constitutional implications.
202. See ACLU I, 521 U.S. at 876 n.41 (citing Sable, 492 U.S. at 129-30) (noting that the bill
on which hearings were conducted never reached the floor, nor did a committee report emerge;
the legislation was introduced on the floor, received no hearings and has no meaningful legislative history); see also Alliance For Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 141 (Wald, J., dissenting) (observing that the 1992 Cable Act indecency provisions were enacted as the result of a
series of amendments from the floor, "without benefit of committee hearings or even substantial
floor debate'), rev'd in part, Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727
(1996).
203. Sable, 492 U.S. at 119-23 (observing that the dial-a-porn business has been the subject
of efforts at regulation and litigation since its inception). For examples of these efforts, see
Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC ("Carlin IIr), 837 F.2d 545, 546 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding
inclusion of "indecent" messages in federal statute regulating commercial phone sex services
overbroad); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC ("Carlin H), 787 F.2d 846, 855 (2d Cir. 1986)
(overturning FCC limitation of access to dial-a-porn messages to those with credit cards or access
codes); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC ("Carlin 1'), 749 F.2d 113, 121 (2d Cir. 1984) (overturning FCC limitations on the times of day when dial-a-porn phone messages could be made
available). Congressional revision of the statute underlying the FCC regulations in the Carlin
trilogy led to the Sable litigation. Nor did the dialogue among the branches of government on
the subject end after the Supreme Court's decision in Sable. See, e.g., Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1537 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding post-Sable congressional revisions to the
Communications Act barring, inter alia, "indecent communication for commercial purposes" to
any person under age eighteen and subsequent FCC regulation).
The tortuous history of FCC efforts to design a "safe harbor" banning indecent material from
broadcast television and radio at times when children were likely to be in the audience is very
similar. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT I"), 58 F.3d 654, 657-59 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc).

472

VANDERBILT LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 53:427

record indicates that legislators have used children as a transparent
excuse for broad censorship on more than one occasion. The lapses in
sensitivity to speech rights when children are involved, noted by the
Supreme Court, make it even more imperative to analyze the interests
asserted by the government as Turner requires. To sustain its purported interest, the state must demonstrate that a compelling state
interest exists sufficient to justify regulation of protected speech by
showing that the targeted speech places children's development at
risk, that the speech causes the identified harm, and that restrictions
on speech will reduce the risk of harm to children. Parts V and VI
turn to this analysis.
V. EMPOWERING PARENTS AS A GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST
Although the courts have not demanded that the proponents of
regulation articulate the compelling interests they seek to promote,
the government has offered two plausible compelling interests which
merit serious consideration. First, the state asserts an interest in
reinforcing parental authority, which is the focus of this Part. Second,
the state posits an independent interest in shielding children from
speech that could harm them, examined in Part VI.2
The government's strongest argument in support of a compelling interest in regulating speech to shield minors is the claim that the
state acts to reinforce parental decisionmaking and to help parents
enforce their personal choices about what their children are ready to
read, see, or hear."5 It comports with longstanding obiter dicta that
parents and guardians are entrusted with the care and upbringing of
children."° When regulations on protected speech impinge on the zone
of family privacy, two foundational rights collide, creating an even
more urgent demand that the government interest be clearly articu-

204. In Playboy EntertainmentGroup, Inc v. United States ("Playboy IF), 30 F. Supp. 2d 702,
715 (D. Del. 1998), prob. juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999), the government asserted an additional interest in protecting the home from unwanted communications, echoing Pacifica. To the
extent that such an interest overlaps with the parental interest in protecting children within the
home, the two interests are treated as one in this discussion.
205. See, e.g., ACT III, 58 F.3d at 680 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting); id. at 686 (Wald, J., dissenting).
206. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in parents .... .'); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (holding that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes the
liberty to "marry, establish a home and bring up children"); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (interpreting Meyer to stand for the "liberty of parents and guardians to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their contror).

20001

ANYTHING GOES

lated and pursued with the greatest sensitivity. Government discrimination among types of speech based on its assessment of whether the
speech is suitable for minors, assumes a harmony of value preferences
among parents within a pluralistic society. Because of the range of
views among parents, it may ultimately prove impossible for the government to regulate speech with the goal of reinforcing the exercise of
every parent's autonomous authority.
A. The Principleof FamilyAutonomy
Personal autonomy is part of the essence of the First Amendment.' Applied to families and children considered as one unit, the
general principle of autonomy is reinforced by the Supreme Court's
longstanding obiter dicta that "it is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents."' In its 1923
decision in Meyer v. Nebraska, upholding the right of parents to seek
instruction in the German language for their children, the Supreme
Court expressly rejected communal models of child rearing where "no
parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent," as well as
the model of ancient Sparta where the state trained children over age
seven in barracks in "order to submerge the individual and develop
ideal citizens."' No matter how many men of genius might support
such modes of child rearing, the Court stated, "their ideas touching
the relation between individual and State were wholly different from
21 Any effort
those upon which our institutions rest.""
to impose such
restrictions on parental choice would do "violence to both letter and
spirit of the Constitution. 21.
The state's claim of an interest in reinforcing family authority
flounders in the face of the diversity of values among families in a
pluralist society. 2 The interests of the state and of individual parents
often conflict in the sensitive areas protected by the First Amendment.
The notion that families may differ about the values they wish to

207. See EMERSON, supra note 146, at 6-7; MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 11-12 (1984); STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND
ROMANCE 113-20 (1990). Not all scholars agree on this point. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, supra
note 92, at 556.
208. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166; see also Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979); Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972).
209. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See generally AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP (1995) (emphasizing the
importance of the multitude of group identities to constitutional law).
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transmit to their children has received longstanding deference from
the courts."' Parents have a recognized liberty interest in raising their
children as they see fit, so long as they do not cross the line to jeopardize their children's safety." '
For heuristic purposes we can divide families into three categories that reflect the complex relationships among government actors,
mainstream mores, and each family's values. First, in an "idealized
normative family," the parents share the moral values of the government actors as well as sharing the same understanding of how to best
transmit those values to the next generation, and the children are on
the low end of the spectrum of enterprise and disobedience. Second,
the "imperfect normative family," the parents are assumed to share
the general moral preferences of the government actors, but fail,
through lack of information, fatigue and over extension, or under
performance of the parental role to protect their children, and/or the
children fall higher on the bell curve for traits of enterprise and disobedience in seeking out controversial speech. Third, countless varieties of the "nonconformist" family exist, in which the parents do not
share the view of the dominant culture and lawmakers regarding the
definition of controversial speech. Such families differ from both kinds
of normative families in how they wish to handle children's exposure
to controversial speech and in how they view the impact of such
speech on their children. The children of nonconformist parents may
either share family norms or push parental limits through enterprise
and disobedience, even when those limits are relatively porous."'

213. Such deference may be largely theoretical when the child welfare system or the courts
consider the behavior of racial, ethnic and social minorities. See Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images
of Motherhood- Conflicting Definitions from Welfare 'Reform," Family, and Criminal Law, 83
CORNELL L. REV. 688, 690 (1998); Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV.
95, 131 (1993).
214. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 233 (1972); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401-02.
215. The nonconformist family discussed here should not be confused with the "nontraditional family" that has received so much scholarly and popular attention in the last few years.
The "nontraditional family" refers to the form of the family, and the biological or other relationships among its members. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (holding
that the government may not prevent closely related individuals who function as a family unit
from living together); see, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Toward a CommunitarianTheory of
Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569, 570 (1996) ("'[N]ontraditional' is a misnothe "Nontraditional"
mer.... [N]onnuclear families have become the norm for a generation.).
Here, in contrast, the
focus is on the family's inner values and choices about how to handle sexuality, modernity, and
maturation. Family form and child-rearing practices concerning speech do not necessarily
overlap, although it is possible that at least some proponents of government regulation of speech
believe that they do.
For scholarly debate surrounding "nontraditional" family form, see generally, for example,
NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE-PARENT FAMILIES (1996); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
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Nonconformist families themselves will fall on both extremes of a bell
curve of attitudes toward various issues involving controversial
speech.
For the regulatory interest in reinforcing parental authority to
survive scrutiny, the regulations would need to accommodate parental
preferences in all three types of families, including the nonconformist
family. In Turner, the Supreme Court underscored that "[o]ur political
system and cultural life rest upon th[e] ideal" of individual choice
regarding ideas and expression."' "Government action that stifles
speech on account of its message," the Supreme Court explained,
"contravenes this essential right. Laws of this sort pose the inherent
risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate
the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion."17
Parents in all three types of families presumably do not want
the government to substitute its judgment for theirs. 18 Nonetheless,
the nonconformist family in particular consists of exactly the sort of
individuals that the Supreme Court had in mind when it observed
that, as a society, we cannot achieve "intellectual individualism" and
"rich cultural diversities" unless we tolerate the risk of "occasional
eccentricity and abnormal attitudes."'19 The Court stated that "freedom
to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would

THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE: FROM SEXUAL LIBERTY TO CIVILIZED COMMITMENT (1996);
MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE, LAW AND FAMILY IN THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 252-84, 291-98 (1989); Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking
Parenthoodas an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 944-61 (1984); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformationof American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
Some scholars criticize trends in family form away from the traditional nuclear family. See
generally, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT
SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage,Kinship, and
Sexual Privacy; Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983);
Lynn Wardle, The Use and Abuse of Rights Rhetoric: The ConstitutionalRights of Children, 27
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 321, 327-28 (1996) (arguing that marriage is the best means of providing
"committed parents" for children). For the Christian Coalition's proposal for defeating forces it
perceives as threatening the traditional American family, see CONTRACT WITH THE AMERICAN
FAMILY (Ralph Reed ed., 1995).
216. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641 (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 449 (1991)); see
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943).
217. Turner, 512 U.S. at 641.
218. See J.M. Balkin, Media Filters, the V-Chip and the Foundationsof Broadcast Regulation, 45 DUKE L.J. 1131, 1139 (1996).
219. Barnette,319 U.S. at 642
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be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order."'r
In sum, two sets of constitutional values are at stake. The
whole notion of "controversial" speech "require[s] discrimination on
the basis of conformity with mainstream mores, '' " an undertaking
that is incompatible with the premises of the First Amendment. Despite the popularity of the fig leaf provided by the state's asserted
compelling interest in children, whether under the guise of reinforcing
parental preferences or not, it remains necessary to "carefully scrutinize[ ]"the justifications the state offers for content-based distinctions
on controversial speech.' In addition, parental value choices, including those about what speech their children should be able to hear,
have been recognized as having constitutional dimensions.'
B. EmpoweringParentsDemystified

The state relies heavily on the image of protecting children
within the family unit by empowering parents to enforce the rules
they impose on their children.' The Supreme Court has deferred to

220. Id. at 641-42 (Jackson, J.); see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 310 (1990) (discussing the importance of rights
discourse for protecting subgroups, including families, whose norms conflict with officially
countenanced behavior).
221. National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 605 (1998) (Souter, J., dissenting). In Grove Press,Inc. v. Christenberry, the judge explained, we are not "concerned with
whether the community would approve of Constance Chatterley's morals." Grove Press, Inc. v.
Christenberry, 175 F. Supp. 488, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that D.H. Lawrence's Lady
Chatterley's Lover-in which the wife of a paralyzed baronet has a passionate and tender affair
with the gamekeeper-was not obscene).
222. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
125 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (tracing the compelling interest test for speech cases to
application of Equal Protection jurisprudence as developed in Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461
(1980)); see also Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 875 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(arguing that removal of books from a school library based on their content is nothing less than
censorship).
223. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); see also Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to
Voice: Appointing Counselfor Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1586-87 &
nn. 76-87 (1996) (arguing that despite dicta regarding parental autonomy, the cases proceed to
constrain parental rights and to ignore the independent rights of children). That discussion is
not in conflict with my argument here, which focuses on the autonomy of the family unit rather
than on the potential conflicts among minors, their parents, and the state which may end up in
the judicial system. On Meyer and Pierce, see generally Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who
Owns the Child?". Meyer and Pierce and the Child As Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995
(1992).
224. In an ironic twist, Congress has adapted the language of critical legal theorists and others concerned with the rights of the disempowered, titling the legislation providing for the v-chip
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the "importance of the parental role in child rearing. '' "s The Constitution also demands "that constitutional principles be applied with
sensitivity... to the special needs of parents and children. '' "s If, in
fact, regulations on speech would empower the idealized normative
family, the imperfect normative family, and the nonconformist family,
then a compelling state interest might exist."
But this is not the case. Scrutiny of the various arguments put
forth in support of the notion that state regulations on speech actually
empower any family reveals that regulations on speech adopted to
protect children in fact threaten to undermine parental authority
instead of reinforcing it."s
1. Parental Discretion
When the state makes controversial material entirely unavailable, it preempts crucial parental discretion about what children can
see or do.' The presumption of family autonomy suggests that such
choices should normally be based on the family's preferences, which
might well take into account the individual minor's level of maturity
and responsibility.' ° As adult citizens, the parents have a First
Amendment right to receive speech that is controversial but not obscene. The right to receive information is a corollary of the right to
speak."' All adults have the right to engage in controversial speech,

the "Television Violence Reduction Through Parental Empowerment Act of 1995." See Action for
Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT mT), 58 F.3d 654, 680 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Edwards,
C.J., dissenting); id. at 686 (Wald, J., dissenting); Henkin, supra note 191, at 394, 413 (arguing
that the state's efforts to "assist parents" in preventing the corruption of youth may require
different resolution from the imposition of morality on adults).
225. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
226. Id.
227. The state would still have to craft regulations that met the stringent demands of the
First Amendment.
228. A possible exception exists with reference to the idealized normative family which, by
definition, shares the dominant values reinforced by the government.
229. See Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards,
C.J., dissenting).
230. In this Article, I focus on the division of authority between the family unit as represented by parents and the state. In an article intended as a companion piece, I argue that under
certain conditions mature minors may have a right to receive information that is generally
available despite their parents' objections. The claim is especially strong where it involves
hybrid rights, in other words, where minors seek information in order to exercise constitutional
liberties in a meaningful way, and where the minor faces an irreversible decision. See Catherine
J. Ross, An EmergingRight for Mature Minors to Receive Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONsT. L. 223,
246 (1999).
231. See Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 564 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concur-
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whether as speakers or as recipients of speech they wish to hear. In
addition, parents have a constitutionally protected interest in their
ability to digest and pass on information to their children, regardless
of community norms. 2 That right is protected for parents in three
ways: (i) through the right to receive information under the Speech
Clause; (ii) as a speaker communicating information and ideas; and
(iii) by the right of family privacy.
In the area of sexuality, for example, the Supreme Court has
recognized that parents may need concrete information about sex,
birth control, and sexually transmitted diseases to help them communicate with their adolescent offspring. 3 The fundamental rights of
parents protect a parent's decision to provide a teenager with information about sex and related topics, even if the rest of the community
were to condemn such openness as violating the community's norms of
appropriateness. 4 The Ginsberg decision, sustaining regulation of the
sale of girlie magazines that were unprotected speech for minors,
rested in part on the understanding that parents who "may wish their
children to have uninhibited access" to such literature could still legally purchase the material for their children. 5 Purchasing a magazine at a newsstand or convenience store is much less burdensome
than circumventing bans and safe harbors by using "subscription and
pay-per-view cable channels, delayed-access viewing using VCR
equipment, and the rental or purchase of... audio and video cassettes." "n Where the government places obstacles in the way of those
who wish to obtain controversial speech, but does not ban the speech,
it inhibits both individual adult recipients and adults acting in their
parental role who might wish to allow their children to receive such
speech or to use that speech to communicate with their children." If
the material remains available but hard to obtain,"s government

ring); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). For a fuller analysis of the right to receive

information, see Ross, supranote 230, at 227-33.
232. See ACLUI, 521 U.S. at 877.
233. See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 76, 79 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
234. See ACLUI, 521 U.S. at 878.
235. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 674 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting); see id. at 639
(Brennan, J.).
236. Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT IMl", 58 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en
banc) ("Parents who wish to expose their children to the most graphic depictions of sexual acts
will have no difficulty doing so" through alternative means of transmission.).
237. See Bolger, 463 U.S. at 67. A twelve-year-old girl who gives birth to a child will remain
a minor herself until her child starts school. She is a parent as well as a child, and may require
information about controversial topics affecting both her own health and development, and those
of her baby.
238. That is, the potential recipient must affirmatively request information or the information is only available in the middle of the night.
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regulations would burden a parent's ability to share controversial
speech with an adolescent child. " '
Although courts may assume that the "vast majority" of parents agree with the choices made by government regulators,2 4 ' and
that those parents welcome intervention, many parents might wish to
allow their children access to controversial material. Not every parent
will agree about what material is controversial, much less what material may be harmful to the young. Adults within the same family may
not always agree about such matters.4 1 Each set of parents may differ
depending on which child is asking to see the controversial material.
Issues such as the minor's age, maturity, and judgment will all enter
into parental decisions.4 2
Some parents may decide to "view or listen to material with
their children, either to criticize, endorse, or remain neutral about
what they see or hear." " For example, a parent may watch a racially
insensitive or derogatory movie with an older child in order to help the
child learn "to think critically about offensive ideas."" Such a -parent
might believe that the shared experience and discussion would help
the child to respond more effectively to racially disparaging speech
heard outside the home, in keeping with the family's non-racist values. '' The same might hold true of discussions of violence, sex, and
other controversial topics. Parents who choose such an approach may
be dismissed by legislators and courts as having poor judgment, 6 or
condemned as those "who wish to expose their children to the most
graphic depictions of sexual acts."4

239. See Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 556 (1975).
240. ACTIII, 58 F.3d at 663.

241. See Ira C. Lupu, The Separationof Powers and the Protectionof Children, 61 U. CHI.L.
REV. 1317, 1333 (1994).
242. See J. CANTOR ET AL., WHAT PARENTS WANT IN A TELEVISION RATING SYSTEM: RESULTS
OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 11 (1997).

243. ACT III, 58 F.3d at 678-79 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
244. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1031 n.14 (9th Cir. 1998)
(Reinhardt, J.) (discussing objections of African-American students and parents to school assignment of Mark Twain's Adventures of Huckleberry Finn); Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 92
N.Y.S.2d 344, 346 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ("[]nstruction in the home will remove religious and racial
intolerance more effectively than censorship.").
245. Richard Delgado and David Yun argue that when it comes to hate speech, more speech
is not an effective cure. Instead, they suggest that elites use such speech to construct social
reality. Richard Delgado & David Yun, "The Speech We Hate" First Amendment Totalism, the
ACLU, and the Principleof DialogicPolitics,27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1281, 1299 (1995).
246. See id. at 679 n.29 (observing that in its briefs the government conceded that the regulations only "trample[d]" on the rights of "those parents who do not agree with the [FCC] about
how best to raise their children').
247. Id. at 663.
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The Speech Clause protects the decisions that each person
makes about whether to obtain and what to make of such controversial speech. First Amendment doctrine is clear: individual choice
about ideas is the keystone of "[o]ur political system and cultural
life." 8 It is inconceivable that when a person selects speech in a parental capacity he or she sacrifices the right to choose among ideas.
The "heart of the First Amendment" protects the freedom of each
person, including each parent, to "decide for him or herself the ideas
and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence""49 or
condemnation. To be sure, it is not always easy to live up to these
ideals.' But it is important to do so, even if the vast majority of parents were to demand that they wanted controversial speech blocked."l
The heterogeneity among nonconformist families further undermines the notion that the state can reinforce the choices of all
parents by regulating speech. The category of nonconformist families
includes families that strive to shelter their children from virtually all
modern, secular speech. 2 Those families pose special regulatory dilemmas.' They frequently feel that their essential values are endangered by exposure to subjective belief systems which propose that
there may not be one objective source of truth, and by other secularizing influences.' Such families often attempt to enlist the state as an
ally, seeking accommodation in public schools to limit their children's
exposure to such topics as sex education and evolution, as well as to
many types of literature. 5

248. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).
249.
Id.
250. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT ll'), 58 F.3d 654, 683 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en bane) (Wald, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 682 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting) (observing that the government did not present data on parental preferences). Had the government presented even overwhelming data, the
Speech Clause and the principle of family autonomy would still protect the rights of the minority
of parents.
252. See Stark v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F.3d 1068, 1072 (8th Cir. 1997); JAMES
G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998); P.A.W., 1996 REPORT, supra note
31; P.A.W., RIGHT WING, supra note 31.
253. See generally STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE
RELIGIOUS RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS (1993); STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS
DEVOTION (1994); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA,
MAKING SENSE OF THE BATTLES OVER THE FAMILY, ART, EDUCATION, LAW AND POLITICS (1971).
254. See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "HeDrew a Circle That Shut Me Out:"Assimilation,Indoctrination,and the Paradoxof A Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993); see also sources
cited supra,note 253.
255. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, A Public Role in the Private Family: The ParentalResponsibilitiesAct and the Politics of Child Protection and Education, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 393, 41113 (1996).
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Such particularist families expand the boundaries of robust debate. But the state cannot fully accommodate the preferences of the
subgroup of nonconformist parents who want to eliminate speech for
the children of their fellow citizens as well as for their own children.
The litigation record makes clear that such parents have frequently
asked the state to engage in radical censorship in order to help enforce
their own views.' Once again, the notion that regulation of speech
reinforces parental authority confronts disparities, not just among
three types of families ranging from the idealized normative to the
nonconformist, but among nonconformist families themselves. Some
want their children to hear everything, others virtually nothing. These
disparities make it nearly impossible for the government to establish
criteria that will not favor one family to the detriment of others.
Protecting listeners by banning controversial speech altogether
is incompatible with the First Amendment." The Supreme Court has
consistently held that "the fact that society may find speech offensive
is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it."' To the contrary, protection of unpopular speech is the essence of the First Amendment. 9 As
the Supreme Court forcefully reminded readers in Texas v. Johnson,
"[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is

256. See, e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore (complaint available at <http://www. filteringfacts.org/livLcomp.html>), dissmissed for failure to state a claim (reported at <http://www.aclu.
org/news/1999/n011499a.html>), appeal docketed, No. A086349 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Oct. 1999)
(reported at <http://www.aclu.org/news/1999/n101999a.html>) (seeking to enjoin the public
library system from maintaining any computer available to any patron with access to the World
Wide Web or Internet on which a child could obtain "material harmful to minors").
257. There is considerable reason for skepticism about whether legislators always make good
faith efforts to confine regulations of speech to the scope of the constitutionally permissible. See
Hearing on Cyberporn and Children, supra note 201 (statement of CDA opponent, Sen. Leahy,
criticizing members who voted for the CDA); Editorial, Republican Mischief on Gun Control, N.Y.
TIMES, June 16, 1999, at A28 (opining that Judiciary Committee chairman Sen. Hyde has offered
"a plainly unconstitutional crackdown on the dissemination of violent material by the media");
The Effects of Television Violence on Children: Hearings on S. 876 Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science & Transp., 106th Cong. (1999) (available at <http://www.senate.gov
/-commerce/issues/telco.htm#Hearings0518jsm.pdf >) (testimony of Sen. John McCain, declining
to endorse the "safe harbor" approach to violence on television because of its "constitutional
infirmities").
258. Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 745 (1978). The Supreme Court has never considered whether violent speech not rising to
the Brandenberg level enjoys lesser protection. See Benjamin P. Deutsch, Note, Wile E. Coyote,
Acme Explosives and the First Amendment: The Unconstitutionality of Regulating Violence on
BroadcastTelevision, 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1101 (1994).
259. See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 745-46 (finding that if the content of speech gives offense, that
"is a reason for according it constitutional protection"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.").
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that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."'
Banning speech with the goal of reinforcing parental preferences is the height of irony. Bans deprive parents of the opportunity to
make their own decisions. As Chief Judge Edwards of the District of
Columbia Circuit has forcefully written, such a regulation "does
nothing to facilitate parents' supervision of their children, unless we
assume that all parents' views are not only identical to each other, but
also the same as the Government's. This assumption is preposterous ....

261

The assumption in its least benign form is worse than "preposterous." Once the state regulates communications in order to protect
children from the "harm" such communications would allegedly inflict,
it is but a short step to label parents who disagree with majoritarian
views and the government's content choices as inadequate in their role
as parents. The potential scope of child neglect laws is broad, and the
interpretation is open to subjective judgments. Child neglect statutes
frequently have been used in an effort to legitimize government intervention in culturally nonconformist families. 2
Although there does not seem to be any reported case in which
exposure to speech, without more, led to a neglect prosecution, the
federal government has publicly contemplated this patently absurd
result under legislation designed to shield children from speech. At
oral argument in ACLU I, the Solicitor General conceded that, since
the CDA lacked any exception for parents who allowed their children
to obtain "indecent" speech over the Internet-including information
about birth control or AIDS-there could be "instances in which permitting access actually might constitute child abuse."' As one of the
Justices correctly noted in response, that would be "interfering with
the relationship between parent and child."' Government labeling of

260. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
261. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, C.J.,
dissenting).
262. See Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race and
Class in the Child ProtectionSystem, 48 S.C. L. REV. 577, 579 (1997).
263. Transcript of Oral Argument, 1997 U.S. TRANS. LEXIS 40, at *20, Reno v. ACLU
("ACLU I), 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511).
264. Id. at *21. Solicitor General Seth Waxman urged the Justices to narrow the inclusive
language of the statute "to exclude parents." He retreated from his own broad interpretation of
the statute by noting that "as a practical matter" prosecution would be unlikely "in the absence
of true abuse, which is separately actionable." Id. That premise, however, is unsupported by
statistics on foster care placements, which show that only about ten percent of children in foster
care are removed from their homes because of tangible physical or sexual abuse. See ABA,
AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK 50 (1993).
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"preferred" speech and "harmful" speech for children is not only incompatible with the dictates of the First Amendment, it undermines
the very families it claims to reinforce.
2. Aspersions on the Adequacy of Parental Supervision
Efforts to bar controversial speech or to make it hard to obtain
in the name of helping parents present yet another irony: they tacitly
discount the capacity of parents in all types of families to raise their
children without the government's intervention. Limitations on speech
suggest that neither the idealized normative family nor the imperfect
normative family is equal to the job of enforcing the values that they
share with the regulators. Lower courts have said as much. In the
context of a safe harbor requirement for radio broadcasts, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reasoned that it did not suffice to
limit controversial broadcasts to the hours when parents are at work
and therefore entirely unavailable to "supervise what their children
see and hear."'' Parents apparently could not be counted on to have
any idea what their children were up to, even when the entire family
was at home.' As one of the sponsors of the statute at issue stated,
"parental supervision is not a cure-all." ' The court agreed, concluding
without elaboration, "[i]t is fanciful to believe that the vast majority of
parents who wish to shield their children from indecent material can
effectively do so without meaningful restrictions on the airing of
broadcast indecency."'
If the government is correct that parents do not provide adequate supervision for children who watch broadcast and cable television, listen to music and radio, cruise the Internet, and play video
games, it may be in part because the parents wittingly choose not to
supervise, or do so in a way that is too subtle for regulators to understand. In cases involving the channeling of controversial speech to offhours,' such as ACT H, the government failed to adduce any evi-

265. Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT IB), 58 F.3d 654, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en

banc).
266. The view of parents as at best ineffectual that is reflected in government efforts to
regulate controversial speech contrasts dramatically with recent efforts to impose financial and
even criminal liability on parents for acts their children commit outside the home. See Naomi R.
Cahn, Pragmatic Questions About Parental Liability Statutes, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 399, 415-16
(1996).
267. 138 CONG. REC. S7304, S7309 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Helms).
268. ACT 11, 58 F.3d at 663.
269. The creation of "safe harbor" hours or "channeling" may severely limit adult access to
controversial speech. For all practical purposes, restrictions limiting broadcast of controversial
speech to the middle of the night means that adults who follow normal daylight hours, or hold
nine to five jobs, would have little opportunity to hear the protected controversial speech.
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dence about whether significant numbers of youngsters were exposed
to controversial material or whether parents wished to limit what
their children heard."' The logic of supporting parental authority
suggests that, if the government has any legitimate interest at all in
making controversial speech hard to obtain, that interest should be
limited to the times when the average parent is at work and therefore
unable to supervise. But when "the great preponderance of children
are subject to parental control,"2 whether or not they choose to exercise it, no governmental interest in regulating speech exists that is
even legitimate, much less compelling.
The argument that the job of responsible parenting is impossible even for the best intentioned parents at times masks a frontal
attack on nonconformist parents, as Justice Brennan recognized when
he dissented in Pacifica:
As surprising as it may be to individual Members of this Court, some parents may actually find [the broadcast's] unabashed attitude toward the seven 'dirty words' healthy,
and deem it desirable to expose their children to the manner in which Mr. Carlin defuses the taboo surrounding the words. Such parents might constitute a minority of the
American public, but the absence of great numbers willing to exercise the right to raise
2
their children in this fashion does not alter the right's nature or its existence. 72

Sixteen-year-old Filipina bi-sexual Rheana Parrenas and her
parents recognized themselves as targets of the CDA.' 7' Rheana contributes to a forum dedicated to people like herself on the Internet.
She was concerned that the CDA would criminalize her self-expression, depriving her of an audience and others of the "fundamental idea
of not being alone."'7 4 Her parents fully supported both her expressive
activities
and her participation in the litigation challenging the
7 CDA.
The neighbors of nonconformist families and their children's
schoolmates will understand the government's message in the CDA
and other statutes as well. Nonconformist parenting appears to equal
irresponsible parenting, even if it does not rise to the level of abuse
that would justify the state's concrete intervention in the family. By

270. ACT III, 58 F.3d at 682 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting); see also Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 719 (0. Del. 1998) (stating that if signal bleed is
not a pervasive problem, "parents may have little concern that the adult [premium] channels be
blocked), prob. juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999) ('Playboy N).
271. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J., dissenting).
272. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 770 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
273. See ACLU Background Briefing: Teens Speak Out About On-Line Censorship (visited
Jan. 8, 2000) <http://www.aclu.orglissues/cyber/trial/rheana.html>.
274. Affidavit of Rheana Parrenas (visited Jan. 8, 2000) <http://www.aclu.org
courts/rheana.html>.
275. See ACLU Background Briefing, supranote 273.
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means of moral legislation,"' the state intervenes at the heart of the
family without the due process that would be necessary in a formal
investigation of abuse."'
When the state divides speech into favored and disfavored
categories on the premise that disfavored speech harms children, it
acts on deeply embedded cultural norms. Law and regulation are
suffused with such cultural norms, frequently masquerading as either
scientific findings or analytically derived legal certainties. The range
of cultural norms is critical to the contemporary legal and political
debate about controversial speech and children, which one commentator has referred to as the "problematization of children." '
Regulations that impose moral norms on civil behavior implicating personal autonomy can have pernicious effects on child rearing.
Family autonomy means a right for parents to raise their children as
they see fit." A mother might reasonably conclude that a daughter
who would soon be leaving for college should not be subjected to many
rules at home, because she needs "the opportunity to learn to manage
her time and make decisions before going away to college."' In other
contexts, parents have testified that:
[J]ust as part of teaching children about responsible behavior involves setting limits,
part of that teaching also involves showing them that rules are not rigid, and that reasonable exceptions should be made when there is reasonable justification ....Itusurps
our role as parents for the government to step in and tell us and our children that we
cannot make those decisions for ourselves .......

This view of parenting as fostering the emerging autonomy of
the young meshes with the legal view of the maturation process. "Constitutional rights," like children, the Supreme Court has held, "do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the
state-defined age of majority."'' As Justice Powell explained, the
parenting role promotes responsible maturation by an "affirmative

276. See Henkin, supra note 191, at 395.
277. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (holding that due process is required before a state may terminate the rights of parents in their natural child).
278. 1997 Annual Conference Panel, supranote 26, at 352 (comments of Jack Balkin).
279. See, e.g., Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 942 F. Supp. 665, 680 (D.D.C. 1996), affd 144
F.3d 798 (D.C. Cir. 1998), vacated, 156 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 188
F.3d 531, (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc). Only a plurality of the judges contested that a juvenile
curfew implicated fundamental parental rights; a majority concluded that the statute implicated
parental rights but survived intermediate scrutiny. See also Hutchins v. District of Columbia,
188 F.3d 531, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Edwards, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (stating that the law "implicates significant rights of both parents and minors,"
but survives intermediate scrutiny).
280. QUTB v. Strauss, 11 F.3d 488, 496 (5th Cir. 1993) (opposing juvenile curfews).
281. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 572 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Plaintiffs Affidavit).
282. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 443 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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process" through which parents teach, guide and inspire in a way that
is "beyond the competence of impersonal political institutions."' Such
individualized decisionmaking teaches that actions have consequences, and that responsibility is rewarded with freedom.' These
precepts help the "children of this diverse and democratic nation... to
develop habits of responsibility necessary for self-governance and to
observe not only the formal rules established by government but also
the informal rules and understandings that undergird civilized society."
Parental autonomy values are at issue when the state substitutes its own value preferences and judgments for parental discretion
regarding otherwise legal activities. In the arguably distinguishable
context of a juvenile curfew, 2' a plurality of the District of Columbia
Circuit sitting en banc in Hutchins v. District of Columbia suggested
that parents' rights to direct their children's upbringing were limited
to life at home and educational activities. 7 That plurality's pinched
version of parental autonomy would impinge upon daily decisions
most parents make without thought of government intervention.
Surely it:
would come as a stunning surprise to countless parents throughout our history who
have imposed restrictions on their children's dating habits, driving, movie selections,
part-time jobs, and places to visit, and who have permitted, paid for, and supported
their children's activities, in sports programs, summer camps, tutorial counseling, college education and scores of other such activities, all arising outside of the family residence and school classroom.'

The notion of government as decision-maker for children outside the home would trample minority views. The principle holds even
if some parents-or nearly all parents-welcome the government's
legal reinforcement of the restrictions that they themselves would
impose. The Hutchins plurality's loose approach to the scope of state
authority over children would violate Meyer by making the child a
virtual creature of the state. 9

283. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
284. See Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 572 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
285. Id. at 573.
286. For an argument that juvenile curfews are not distinguishable because they violate
children's rights, see Katherine Hunt Federle, Children, Curfews and the Constitution,73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1315, 1364-65 (1995).
287. Hutchins, 188 F.3d at 540-41 (en banc) (Silberman, J., plurality opinion).
288. Id. at 550 (Edwards, C.J., concurring).
289. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1923).
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C. ParentalPreferencesand the PrivateMarket
To the extent that regulating controversial speech facilitates
parental decisionmaking, and cannot be accomplished without government action,' a compelling interest may exist. Such a hypothetical
situation would require balancing the state interest against the speech
rights of adults and minors as both speakers and recipients. But this
possibility raises two additional questions. First, are large numbers of
parents eager for help in protecting their children from speech? Second, even if they are clamoring for help, is state action the only way to
provide that help?"
The measurable actions of parents themselves suggest that the
answer to both questions is no. Parents facilitate access to controversial speech by providing electronic equipment for their children: over
ninety-six percent of American households have televisions," and
more than two-thirds of households subscribe to cable service,"s although parents are acutely aware that children watch a lot of television. 4 Even more telling, about eighty percent of all children have
their own radios (and among children under age twelve, two-thirds
have their own radios), half of them with a headphone that prevents
others from hearing what they are listening to."s Approximately 110
million Americans of all ages have access to the Internet whether at
home, or through school or work; that number grows daily.' This data

290. See generally Matthew Spitzer, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of the VChip, 15 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 429 (1997) (concluding that V-chip legislation and accompanying developments constitute state action).
291. The question of harm independent of parental preferences is addressed supra in Part
VI.
292. See 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1998, at
573 (1998). A 1995 poll found that 54% of American children had television sets in their own

rooms, slightly more generally watched television without their families, and 66% of children
lived in households with three or more television sets. See Action for Children's Television v.
FCC ("ACT III), 58 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (citing poll by Fairbank, Maslin,
Maullin & Associates on behalf of Children Now).
293. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 745 (1996);
Satellite/Cable Competition: An Examination of the EchoStar/MCT Deal: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights, and Competition of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 6 (1999) (testimony of Charles W. Ergen, CEO EchoStar Communications Corp.,
that 68.2% of homes reached by cable wires subscribe, and cable reaches over 97% of homes).
294. Television Violence Reduction Through Parental Empowerment Act, S.306, 104th Cong.
§ 2(3) (1995).
295. See ACT LU, 58 F.3d at 661. According to the Consumer Electronics Manufacturing Association, most homes in the United States have at least eight radios, not counting car radios,
making radios "easily the most ubiquitous" communications medium. Joel Brinkley, Listening to
Sounds of a Wave, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1999, at G1.
296. See Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (stating that in 1997, about 40
million Americans used the Internet and the number was expected to reach 200 million by the
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suggests that parents as an aggregate have concluded that the benefits of receiving speech outweigh the risks for their own children.
Nor are parents rushing to embrace voluntary forms of monitoring compatible with their own preferences, as represented by technologies such as Internet filters, cable lockboxes. 97 and television Vchips"8 that erect barriers between their children and controversial
speech. With the possible exception of the somewhat rarified telephone
dial-a-porn services," in most forms of communication, as Judge Wald
expressed it, "parents would have to be hermits to be unaware
through newspapers and even television itself of the debate over sex
and violence."3" After years of growth, improved technology and public
debate, only about one-third of American parents with online connections in their homes use a commercially available filtering program."°
On the other hand, this is a dramatic rise from only two years earlier,
when the district court received evidence in ACLU I' The statistical
trend suggests that as the market develops more refined filtering
mechanisms that are responsive to the genuine concerns of parents,
families may be more inclined to use them. In contrast, a negligible

end of 1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Code Comfort, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 10, 2000, at 37, 38 (stating
that more than 100 million Americans now use the Internet); see also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp.
916, 926 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Cabranes, J.) (citing Joint Stipulation of Parties), affd, Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844 (1997). Libraries.are the sole source of Internet access for many Americans, and
more than three-quarters of the nation's libraries offered Internet access as of March 1998. See
Amy Harmon, LibrarySuit Becomes Key Test of Freedom to Use the Internet, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
1998, at D7.
297. Cable operators are required to provide "lockboxes" which enable the adult subscriber to
block viewing of selected cable services at certain times or indefinitely. See 47 U.S.C. § 544(d)(2)
(1994). Federal regulators presume that parents will use lockboxes to restrict their children's
access to certain cable broadcasts. See In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast
Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1064, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297, 5305 (1990).
298. A so-called "v-chip" (a series of technological devices) allows viewers to identify and
block sexually explicit and violent broadcast and cable television programming based on codes
embedded by producers of such material and selected by potential recipients. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C.A. § 330(c) (West 1991 & Supp. 1999). The constitutionality of the
statute requiring manufacturers to install v-chips in new televisions over a certain size and the
accompanying industry regulations have not yet been tested in the courts. See Denver Area, 518
U.S. at 756 (noting that the v-chip is significantly less restrictive than a ban but reserving the
question of whether the statute is "lawful').
299. Many parents are unaware that dial-a-porn even exists, much less that they can install
voluntary blocking technology. See Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 938 F.2d 1535, 1542 (2d Cir.
1991).
300. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Wald, J., dissenting) (discussing cable television programming).
301. See John Schwartz, It's a Dirty Job; Web ChildproofersKeep Surfing Through Muck,
WASH. POST, June 23, 1999, at Al (citing a recent poll for the Annenberg Public Policy Center).
302. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824,838-42 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (describing how the various
filtering systems work and their low cost to consumers), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ("ACLU r).
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number of cable subscribers have requested the free lockboxes that
federal law requires cable operators to provide."
The potential legal and logistical problems with the voluntary
use of filters are outside the scope of this inquiry.' But a brief consideration of filters, rating systems, and responses to sexually explicit
e-mail in terms of the capacity of technology to enhance parental
authority underscores that constitutionally permissible measures
exist to help parents in the private market. When filters and ratings
provide information that helps parents make decisions, such developments have the potential to enhance parental authority.' Parents
need to understand, however, that existing filtering programs for
Internet communications are both over-inclusive and under-inclusive.' Such programs almost uniformly block valuable controversial speech, such as all messages concerning homosexuality, as well as
sites that include linguistic derivatives of the words "gay" or "sex.' '
One filtering system used in some public schools blocks all information
on the Gulf War, on the grounds that it is too violent, while allowing
unfettered access to information about sports teams, including
hockey.' Nonetheless, to the extent that mechanisms can facilitate
individual choice about which speech is received without overbroad

303. See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States ("Playboy 1'), 30 F. Supp. 2d
702, 712 (D. Del. 1998) (citing a nation-wide government survey showing that 'less than one-half
of one percent (0.5)" of subscribers have lockboxes), prob. juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999).
304. See generallyBalkin, supranote 218 (discussing the challenges posed by media filters).
305. See In re Implementation of Section 551 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report
and Order, F.C.C. 98-35 (Mar. 12 1998), available at <http://www.fcc.gov./bureaus/cablelorders/
1998Ifcc98035.pdf> (statement of Comm. Gloria Tristani that "[t]he v-chip is essentially a remote
control device with a longer range ....[]t will not be a substitute for parents).
306. See Ira Glasser, The Struggle for a New Paradigm:ProtectingFree Speech and Privacy
in the Virtual World of Cyberspace, 23 NOVA L. REV. 627, 648 (1999); see also Reply Brief for
Appellant at 5 (indicating that both the plaintiffs and the government agree that blocking
software is flawed because it is both under- and over-inclusive), ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d
473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) appeal docketed, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Apr. 1999) ("ACLUIT").
307. See GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFAMATION, supra note 196, at 2. Filtering
programs block the maps of the town Gay, West Virginia and reliance on key words in a filtering
mechanism may also block access to information on Middlesex, England and Superbowl XXXSee ACLU,
frequently being a shorthand for sexually oriented sites.
=XXX¢'
based on
FAHRENHEIT 451, at 9 (1997); see also Glasser, supra note 306, at 648 ("Censorship offered by
such software is often like poison gas: it seems a good idea when aimed at a target you oppose,
but the wind has a way of shifting" and, in any event, blocking software is both over- and underinclusive.).
308. Government efforts to facilitate or enforce the use of filters have not yet been tested in
the courts outside the context of public library Internet service. In a case of first impression, a
federal court held that use of filters by the government in public libraries is an unconstitutional
abridgement of speech. See Mainstream Loudon v. Loudon County Library Bd., 24 F. Supp. 2d
552, 570 (E.D. Va. 1998) (enjoining use of a commercial Internet filtering program on public
library computers).
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blocking of speech the recipients might wish to see, filtering appears
to be a potentially useful approach for parents.'
Filters may best enhance parental authority when a variety of
ratings systems are available for each medium of expression, reflecting a range of tolerance for speech and a diversity of world views.
Although the sheer volume of speech on the Internet, and even on
cable television, makes it difficult for raters who are not the producers
of the material to keep pace, the system that might serve parental
autonomy would involve ratings by groups such as religious denominations, and secular or political groups that have an articulated view
about cultural norms and values. Parents consulting such ratings on
movies, or programming computer filters in order to impose restrictions based on these ratings, would have a context for understanding
the basis on which ratings were assigned. Parents could also test
different rating systems to find the ones that most closely approximate
the decisions they would make themselves. Those issues, however,
concern the "means" side of the speech equation, rather than the government interest or "ends" side, which is the focus here.
Finally, many parents worry about the risks they perceive to be
associated with unsolicited e-mails from strangers containing controversial sexual material. Yet it is unclear that even this invasive practice creates a compelling independent government interest, because it
can be handled through another form of filtering that gives parents a
great deal of choice. Unwelcome e-mail messages can be cut off by
technology that empowers individual parents. For example, the system offered by America Online allows parents to block all e-mail with
illustrations or attachments, to post a list of senders whose mail
should be delivered, with all other mail to be returned to sender, or to
instruct the Internet provider not to deliver mail from certain senders.
Under First Amendment doctrine, listeners may affirmatively decline
to receive certain materials.31 Consistent with that tradition, parents
who choose to do so can give their Internet provider a list of approved
correspondents for their children (or themselves), and ask that mail
from persons not on the list be returned to sender. Unwanted e-mail
can also be deleted unread under parental supervision, just as unwanted postal service mail goes in the trash basket.

309. See Lawrence Lessig, The Constitutionof Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of
Cyberspace Regulation, 5 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 181, 187 n.36 (1997).
310. See Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737-38 (1970) (upholding a statute that
allowed individuals to request that the post office not deliver "sexually provocative" materials to
their homes); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 310 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Filters installed in the home and administered by parents do
not raise the same First Amendment problems as those installed in
public libraries, where the state becomes the censor. "' Significant
constitutional questions arise where the government installs filters or
mandates the use of filters. 3 To the extent that fiters and rating

systems impose or are tied to potential state sanctions that limit what
speech the young can receive, they risk becoming "a
solemn ratifica313
tion in constitutional terms of the 'generation gap.'

1

Government activities that neither regulate speech nor infronge on other protected liberties do not require a compelling interest. A range of government programs designed merely to provide
information without categorizing or disfavoring any particular speech
may enhance parental authority and pass constitutional muster.
These programs include pamphlets containing advice on technology
that could help enforce the family's rules, regulations requiring service
providers to inform parents about available blocking technology, and
even warnings about unproven risks in herent in various forms of
media. The government has a rational interest in establishing a commission to examine existing research on whether controversial speech
harms children.31 5 A rational basis is all that is necessary to justify

government recommendations and reference materials designed to
help all parents make informed decisions about the rules they wish to
impose on their own children, as long as the state does not inhibit
speech itself.
The economic market has demonstrated an ability to provide
alternatives when a sufficient number of parents care strongly about
protecting their children from controversial speech. Filters for television, monitored Internet sites, 31 '

and tame computer games are

311. See Ross, supranote 230, at 234-36, 251.
312. See Mainstream Loudon v. Loudon County Library Bd., 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va.
1998); supra note 15 (describing congressional proposals for requiring Internet filters in public
schools and libraries).
313. HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA 59 (1988).
314. See Cyberspace Communications v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 750 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
(summarizing expert testimony that parental control through participation with a minor or
oversight in a public area of the home is the most effective means of monitoring content, and can
be complemented by lockboxes, filtering programs, logs of web sites accessed and even the on/off

switch).
315. The Child Online Protection Act ("COPA") establishes a temporary national commission
to review technologies that would help "reduce access by minors to material that is harmful to
minors" on the Internet, but not to resolve what material is in fact "harmful." Child Online
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1405(c), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-739 (1998).
316. No screening software currently exists for Internet forums such as chat rooms or email.
See Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 881 (1997). Some major Internet providers, such as
America Online monitor chat rooms designated for minors at their own volition in order to
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achievable through the market if there is adequate consumer demand.31 ' Similarly, labels designed to inform parents but which are not
attached to a screening mechanism, such as ratings of movies and
musical recordings, do not require state action. 18
For example, since the rap group 2 Live Crew recorded a companion "clean" version of its sexually explicit album "As Nasty as They
Wanna Be," entitled "As Clean as They Wanna Be,". 9 retailers have
made the release of expurgated rock music almost routine. Wal-Mart
Stores, the nation's largest retailer, among others, refuses to stock
audio or visual material that their managers regard as too sexually
explicit or violent." Some record producers regularly provide a second
version of both the lyrics and the album cover to large retailers like
Wal-Mart visibly labeled "clean," or "sanitized for your protection." 2 '
As in other forms of First Amendment chill, some producers and artists tone down the original release so that major marketers will carry
it." = While such developments affect the range of speech available,
they do not constitute state action so long as the impetus really comes
from stores and consumers."
On the other hand, in many rural areas a major chain might be
the only retail outlet for music within a reasonable distance. Private

enforce codes of discourse. Such activity does not implicate state action, and parents can instruct
their children to limit chat room contact to systems that monitor such sites.
317. Microsoft, the major provider of computer operating systems, recently announced that
the next version of its operating system Windows will include a feature that will allow "parents
to keep a game with gruesome violence, offensive language or nudity from being played, based on
the game's content rating," which major manufacturers will encode. The system will also allow a
game to be set at different levels of violence, language and so forth dependent on the identification of each family member. See Sharon R. King, Game Blocker to Be Installedon Windows, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1999, at Cl. This plan does not involve any state action, and leaves material
completely accessible to adults and to minors with parental consent. I am not unmindful of the
possibility that enterprising and disobedient minors may find ways to override the codes or gain
access to an older family member's more explicit version of a game.
318. See, e.g., Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838, 840-41 (1999) (holding that the voluntary film-rating system is designed solely to promote parental control; no duty
flows to theaters or to society at large).
319. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 592 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (comparing "Clean," which sold less than 250,000 copies, with "Nasty," which sold 1.7 million), rev'd
sub. nom, Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138 (11th Cir. 1992).
320. See Steve Morse, Is It Live, Or Has It Been Sanitized for Retail Sale?, NEW ORLEANS
TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 13, 1996, at L20.
321. See id.; Neil Strauss & Alan Hustak, Chains Like Wal-Mart Writing the Lines for Music,
Movies in the U.S., MONTREAL GAZETTE, Nov. 14, 1996, at Al.
322. See Strauss & Hustak, supranote 321. Expurgation of music and video to satisfy large
retailers is ubiquitous in the United States, but not in Canada.
323. For a discussion of the role of private boycotts and censorship in the framework of the
First Amendment, see Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension
Between Privacyand Disclosure in ConstitutionalLaw, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 57-61 (1991).
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choices may have an impact on the entertainment industry, because
consumer purchases at large chains affect the sales charts." A chain
store's marketing decisions may make controversial speech harder to
obtain, but for purposes of constitutional analysis the distributor's
choice is not necessarily more significant than its choice of what color
shirts to stock in any given fashion season. These private actions
constrict the marketplace of ideas, even as they enhance the authority
of conservative parents. But they do not implicate or require government action, thus further undermining the notion that state action is
necessary to reinforce parental efforts to shield children from controversial speech.
Producers and distributors cater to the demand for non-controversial entertainment by providing special fora. These include PAX, a
cable network which offers only family-oriented programs,3" Christian
radio and television stations, and the burgeoning industry of Christian
rock."e Pacifica Radio network and Playboy Enterprises-among other
frequent parties to First Amendment litigation-respond to demand
from a different group of listeners. When the market responds to
particularized tastes by enhancing the possibility of matching speakers to those who want to hear their message, it expands the marketplace of ideas for everyone. The marketplace could thus be responsive
to all levels of parental levels of tolerance.
An expanded marketplace that reflects consumer preferences of
all three types of parents, including both the most restrictive and the
most permissive nonconformist, facilitates parental decisionmaking.
As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit explained, parental
choice is an inherent part of the systems to which we adhere as a
society. "[Tjhe decision a parent must make," about whether to install
a filter on a computer is comparable to the decision about whether to
block a phone line, to "keep sexually explicit books on the shelf or
subscribe to adult magazines. No constitutional principle is implicated. The responsibility for making such choices is where our society
has traditionally placed it-on the shoulders of the parent.32 7

324. See id.; Marie-Josee Kravis, Nothing Orderly About Industries Transforming Themselves: From Megadealerships in Auto Sector to Virtual Banking, Get Ready for Explosive
Change, FIN. POST, Nov. 20, 1996, at 19 (stating that the power of major retailers like Wal-Mart
allows them to "impose countless constraints on manufacturers).
325. See Lisa de Moraes, On Monday, The Genesisof PAX TV, WASH. POST, Aug. 29, 1998, at
C7 (creating a "haven from the sex, language and violence" on other networks, PAX founder will
not air shows that "[God] won't want to watch).
326. See Steve Lohr, It's Demons vs. Angels in Computer Game with a Religious Theme, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 1999, at C1 (describing a new genre of "violent Christian action games').
327. Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Com'n, 896 F.2d 780, 788 (3d Cir.
1990); see also Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.s. 844, 887, 893, 901 (1997).
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VI. THE STATE'S INDEPENDENT INTEREST IN SHIELDING CHILDREN

REGARDLESS OF FAMILY PREFERENCES
Proponents of regulation rely as well on a second potential interest, an independent state interest in shielding children. Under
Turner, in order to show that such a government interest is compelling, the state must demonstrate the specific harm that flows from the
speech it seeks to regulate. It must also show that the regulation is
likely to diminish the risk of the identified harm. But in case after
case, the proponents of government regulation have failed to articulate any specific harm to children that would establish such an independent compelling interest.
A. The Government as Inculcator of Values for Citizenship
The primary argument that government has an independent
interest in regulating controversial speech that might reach minors
builds on Prince v. Massachusetts,in which the Supreme Court upheld
the use of child labor and compulsory school laws to bar a child from
proselytizing on the street with her family in the evening.' The government's interest in assuring the well-being of the next generation of
citizens is unquestioned when the actions taken to promote healthy
development do not impinge upon fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech or religion. Under Prince, government has a unique role
to play in a democracy by ensuring "the healthy, well-rounded growth
of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies.""
In attempting to regulate speech that children might receive in their
homes, proponents of regulation appear to claim that the language "all
that implies," lacks any boundaries. The
risk arises that the state
33
would present itself as a "superparent." 3
Those who favor state action designed to protect children from
controversial speech base their arguments on children's vulnerability
and presumed lack of capacity to make critical choices or protect
themselves. Anglo-American jurisprudence has frequently accepted,
without question, the notion that the average child experiences legal

328. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170-71 (1944) (holding that the government may
enforce child labor laws over religious exercise claims by Jehovah's Witnesses whose children
wish to participate in proselytizing).
329. Id. at 168.
330. Transcript of Oral Argument, 1999 WL 1134595, at *20, Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc. v. United States ("Playboy If), No. 98-1682 (Nov. 30, 1999) (including a question as to
whether the government saw itself as "a kind of super-parent" and why the government's
interest should not yield to parental decisions, even if these decisions stem from inertia as the
government alleges).
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"disabilities" compared with the average adult.331 Even legal commentators who are committed to an expansive reading of the Speech
Clause have accepted vulnerability as a justification for the state to
restrict children's speech rights.332 Concurring in Ginsberg, Justice
Stewart emphasized that "children lack the full capacity for individual
choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees."3n
Without a presumption of capacity, Justice Stewart argued, children
are not free to participate in the "free trade in ideas" envisioned by
Justice Holmes or to decide for themselves "what [they] will read and
to what [they] will listen..3
Judicial acceptance of paternalism, the dominant doctrine supporting the notion that children need state regulation to shield them
from speech, proceeds from an undifferentiated notion of children's
vulnerability."s In applying paternalistic presumptions, courts have
failed to distinguish between rules made by the state and rules imposed by parents on their own children;3" between an eight-year-old
and a person who will turn seventeen in the next month;37 and between choices made by the state about what children should read and

331. See Ross, supra note 223, at 1571-72 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *452)).
332. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 938-39 (1963); Henkin, supra note 191, at 413 n.68; Harry Kalven, Jr., The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7. All these authors were cited,
among others, in Ginsbergv. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 n.5 (1968). Ginsberg did not, however,
reach this question. Id. at 636 ("We have no occasion in this case to consider the impact of the
guarantees of freedom of expression upon the totality of the relationship of the minor and the
State. ) To date, the Supreme Court has not addressed the scope of minors' speech rights.
333. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 650 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (making six votes for
the holding).
334. Id. at 649.
335. Such public concerns are highly selective, outweighed by the prevailing view that the
concrete needs of children for care and sustenance are the sole responsibility of parents. For
critiques of that view, see, e.g., MINOW, supra note 220, at 271 & n.15; Martha Fineman, Cracking the FoundationalMyths: Independence, Autonomy and Self-Sufficiency, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER,
SOC. POL'Y & LAW 101 (forthcoming 2000) (proposing public support for private caretaking);
Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9
HARV. WOMEN'S L. J. 1, 1-24 (1986); Catherine J. Ross & Naomi R. Caln, Subsidy for Caretaking
in Families: Lessons from Foster Care, 7 AM. U. J. GENDER, Soc. POL'Y & LAW 101 (forthcoming
1999) (response to Professor Fineman).
336. On the distinction between rules imposed and enforced by parents and those enforced by
state action, see Ross, supra note 230, at 243, 246-50, 262. Justice Stewart shows enormous
deference to the parental role, and finds it hard to imagine a situation in which the interests of
parents and children would not be aligned perfectly. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 621
(1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("[Flor centuries it has been a canon of the common law that
parents speak for their minor children.'); Ross, supra note 223, at 1580-81 (discussing Justice
Stewart's views).
337. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 443 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) ("Constitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of majority.").
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hear in school and in the rest the universe they occupy outside of
school hours.33
A decade after Ginsberg,the Supreme Court clarified the characteristics of the age of minority, which it saw as threefold: (i) "the
peculiar vulnerability of children"; (ii) "their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner"; and (iii) legal recognition
'
of the importance of the "parental role in childrearing. ' ns
In the context of constitutional liberties, the Court underscored the legal significance of distinguishing between "mature" and "immature" minors,
although it provided no guidelines to the lower courts on how to make
that distinction.'
The distinction remains important despite the lack of concrete
guidance. In ACLU I, for example, Justice Stevens' majority opinion
chastised the government for its failure to acknowledge the range of
maturity represented during minority. "[T]he strength of the government's interest in protecting minors is not equally strong" for threeyear-olds and seventeen-year-olds.3 "l For the fourteen years in between, the level of maturity required may well depend on what kind of
decision the child is asking to make, and on the characteristics of the
individual child. Parents are best equipped to make such subjective
distinctions based on their knowledge about each child's level of maturity.42 The state, in contrast, can only make rules of general applicability.
The government's role in safeguarding children and promoting
their development into responsible citizens generally falls into three
categories: (i) regulation of juvenile behavior that could not be con-

338. See Mainstream Loudoun v. Loudoun County Library Bd., 2 F. Supp. 2d 783, 795 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (overturning the use of a filter on the computers made available to users by the public
library, and noting that the lesser First Amendment protection traditionally accorded to children
because their "minds and values are still developing" applied particularly in the school context,
not the public library).
339. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979) (Powell, J.) (holding that a minor must have
the opportunity to go directly to court for a judicial determination, without prior parental
consent, to obtain an abortion).
340. Id. at 640-43; see Ross, supranote 230, at 256-57 (discussing how the lower courts apply the Bellotti factors).
341. Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 878 (1997).
342. See supra PartV.
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strained for adults;343 (ii) protection from abuse and neglect;3 . and (iii)
education and inculcation for citizenship."5
The regulation of juvenile behavior generally has no bearing on
restrictions on pure speech and requires no further discussion here.
While conduct may, under certain circumstances, constitute protected
speech,"6 receipt of protected communications does not currently constitute conduct amenable to punishment by the state.4 7 It is not unimaginable that in a regime which labeled selected speech as dangerous for the young, receipt of such speech could join the array of
status offenses, i.e., acts such as truancy that are illegal only when
committed by minors, and which are punishable by confinement.
Parents cannot protect their children from state involvement by consenting to behavior that constitutes a status offense.38
On the other hand, some parents turn to the juvenile justice
system to help them discipline "incorrigible" young people. This pattern suggests that, if courts find a compelling interest in isolating
children from controversial speech sufficient to turn receipt of speech
into an act of delinquency, parents whose children break the family
rules about television, movies, and music could turn the state into the
enforcer of family discipline. Such an outcome, while extreme, builds
logically from the arguments offered in support of regulation. If controversial speech threatens to turn children into criminals, a proposition which is open to question, as discussed below, why not treat adolescents who obtain such speech in the same way that courts treat
teenagers who carry guns or sell drugs?
The second category-protection from abuse and neglect at the
hands of parents and guardians-might support a compelling governmental interest in regulating controversial speech if the government
could establish that such speech leads to serious physical, emotional,
or psychological damage which, in turn, could be attributed to negli-

343. Children are subject to penalties including confinement when they commit "status offenses," that is, acts which would not violate the law if performed by an adult. These include
truancy, incorrigibility, and failure to obey parents. See Mark H. Moore & Stewart Wakeling,
Juvenile Justice:Shoring up the Foundations,22 CRIME & JUST. 253, 261, 264-66 (1997).
344. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 771 (1982).
345. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
346. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
347. Controversial speech as part of a pattern of child abuse may constitute an element of a
criminal offense. See United States v. French, 31 M.J. 57, 59 (C.M.A. 1990) (finding liability for
two counts of "communicating indecent language" to a minor when combined with sexual contact); Kansas v. Ramos, 731 P.2d 837 (Kan. 1987) (showing a pornographic magazine to ten-yearold daughter as part of a sexual approach).
348. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 169 ("What may be wholly permissible for adults... may not be
so for children, either with or without their parents' presence.").
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gent parents."9 In Ginsberg, the Court correctly relied on Prince for
the proposition that the state may intervene against parental wishes
to "protect the welfare of children" and to safeguard them from
abuse."n This approach seems to suggest that where the "imperfect
normative family" or the "nonconformist family" fails to provide adequate supervision, the state could claim an independent role as
guardian of last resort.' Although one can imagine a case where
parents exposed a child to speech that crossed such a clear line that it
constituted child abuse, such as reading sado-masochistic material
that qualifies as obscene under Miller to a four-year-old, it seems
unlikely that such speech-related behavior would be the only questionable acts committed by such parents. Because facts like these do
not appear to occur frequently, and courts are unlikely to find such
cases difficult to decide if they do arise, this issue does not require
prolonged discussion.
The third and most widespread area of state intervention is the
state's role in education. Public schools, the Supreme Court has held,
are vital "in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens."" Schools are the vehicles for "inculcating fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.""
Under existing doctrine, the government has great leeway in assessing
and regulating the content of speech when it functions as educator.
Its role as educator and "inculcator of values" requires the state
to make choices based on content and, at least sometimes, on viewpoint.' It must, for example, create a curriculum consisting of re-

349. The state overrides parental decisions in limited instances, including denial of potentially life-saving medical care and judicial consent to abortions for adolescents without parental
notice or consent. Both of these instances are easily distinguishable from the state secondguessing a parent's decision to allow a child access to controversial material. In the case of
medical care, courts will generally impose treatment over parental religious objections only
where intervention is likely to save a life. The risk of harm and the benefits of state action are
clear. See In re Green, 292 A.2d 387, 391-92 (Pa. 1972). In the instance of abortions, the state is
responding to a mature minor's invocation of her own constitutional privacy rights. Even then,
she must meet certain requirements, including inability to talk to her parents, in order to avoid
involving at least one of her parents.
350.
This of course is the holding in Prince,notwithstanding that it is frequently cited for
its dicta that the care of children rests with their parents and guardians. See Ross, supra note
223, at 1586.
351. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (Brennan, J.) (pointing out that the
statute was saved in part because parents who choose to do so can purchase these same materials for their minor children); see also discussion infra at Part VII.
352. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979).
353. Id. at 77.
354. The discretion of public schools is not unlimited. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578, 586-87 (1987); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 861 (1982); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 105 (1968).
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quired and perhaps elective materials, and select texts that cover the
curricular areas."n The curriculum cannot accommodate every idea
afloat in the marketplace of ideas, or even every possible topic. In the
unique setting of schools, such choices normally are not held to violate
constitutional norms because where the government is speaker, it
must make choices by drawing selectively from the marketplace of
ideas." Courts give school officials great leeway in making such
choices. 5 ' Even though parents have some degree of choice about what
kind of school their children attend-public or private, religious or
secular, licensed or home-based-state governments set minimum
standards and curricular requirements that educational institutions
must meet in order to satisfy compulsory education laws." When
children attend public schools, the discretion that courts accord to
local officials is vast. 59
Although it is possible to argue that the principles of free inquiry should prevail in schools outside of core curricular choices,'
courts have held that schools have "a significant measure of authority"

355. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 863-64; 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 17:1 (2d ed. 1996); William Buss, School Newspapers, Public Forum and the First
Amendment, 74 IOWA L. REV. 505, 506 (1989).
356. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 863-64; Epperson, 393 U.S. at 104 (noting that federal courts
should not "ordinarily interfere in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of
school systems"); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) ("Probably no deeper division of our people could proceed from any provocation than from finding it
necessary to choose what doctrine and whose program public education officials shall compel
youth to unite in embracing.").
357. See Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 241 (1990) (O'Connor, J.) ("[S]chools and
school districts maintain their traditional latitude to determine appropriate subjects of instruction.").
358. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) ('CNo question is raised concerning the power of the State to reasonably regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and
examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some
school.., that certain studies plainly essential to good citizenship be taught, and that nothing
be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.'); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
402 (1923) ("[The power of the State to compel attendance at some schools and to make reasonable regulations for all schools... is not questioned."); see also Barnette, 319 U.S. at 657 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (observing that because parents have the right to choose what schools their
children attend they cannot always request special accommodation at public schools); Barbara
Kentrowitz & Pat Wingert, Learning at Home: Does It Pass the Test?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1998,
at 64-66 (estimating 1.5 million children are currently being taught primarily by a parent);
Lupu, supra note 241, 1357-58 (arguing against the constitutional legitimacy of the premises
supporting home schooling).
359. In theory, the government could expand this role by extending the length of time children spend in school. At some point between the school year as we now know it and compulsory
year round boarding school, the state would come into conflict with parental autonomy rights.
360. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Pico, 457 U.S. at 877
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
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over many student activities. 6 ' A plurality of the Supreme Court has
indicated that officials may even remove books from the school library
based on their subjective judgment of "educational suitability."'
Boards of education are not exempt, however, from the demands of the Bill of Rights. The discretion accorded public schools is
bound by the underlying goal of promoting democracy and pluralism.
As the Supreme Court emphasized in Barnette, the fact that schools
are "educating the young for citizenship is [particular] reason for
scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if
we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to
discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes."''
The vast discretion accorded the state during school hours
gives it a large bite at the apple.' The ability to inculcate values
during the school day-in the curriculum, in the library, and in extracurricular activities"6 - - undermines the state's position that its discretion to limit speech available to minors should extend outside of school
and even into the home. When the proponents of regulating speech to
shield children seek to expand the state's discretion outside the educational context, they must overcome constitutional presumptions about
both free expression and the zone of privacy that protects parental
decisionmaking.
Even if courts were to conclude that the state could justify expanding its inculcative function beyond the schools, the precedents
within schools themselves alert us to the risks that government decisionmaking will threaten the autonomy of some portion of families. All
over the country, school choices about material have provided a continuing source of controversy and litigation. School officials have
proven vulnerable to political mobilization by small groups of activist
parents. Parents with varying strongly-held beliefs relentlessly challenge the inclusion of books in the curriculum, in optional assignments, and in the library." They have challenged the exclusion of

361. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 240 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988)
and Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)).
362. Pico, 457 U.S. at 871.
363. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
364. See Doni Gewirtzman, Comment, "Make Your Own Kind of Music:" Queer Student
Groupsand the FirstAmendment, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1131, 1140 (1998) (noting that as the Supreme
Court's image of the educational mission shifted from "producing independent thinkers to
articulating cultural values" the discretion accorded to schools expanded).
365. See, e.g., Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260; Fraser,478 U.S. 675; Pico, 457 U.S. 853.
366. Parents challenged such works as 'The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn," see Monteiro
v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir. 1998), 'The Merchant of Venice,"
and "Oliver Twist," see Rosenberg v. Board of Educ., 92 N.Y.S.2d 344, 345 (Sup. Ct. 1949). See
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Communities are divided over sex education re-

quirements and the content of such programs, as well as over whether
schools should provide access to condoms to protect the health and life
of students.' In some school districts, parents with strongly-held
religious views have objected to the use of movies, secular music, and
even computers in the classroom."
Such controversies reiterate the divisions among family types,
whether based on religion or other core values and beliefs. These
differences render categorization of communications directed at children very difficult, even where the state has the greatest flexibility in
making choices. Further, school systems have not demonstrated a
reliable or uniform ability to withstand pressure from parents or other
groups with a clear social or religious agenda."' Cultural battles in
local schools suggest that national efforts to label or to regulate communications in an effort to shield children will be rife with disagreements based on differing world views, creating genuine cause for
concern that government regulation of controversial speech will incorporate viewpoint as well as content discrimination."'
B. Identifying Harm
As Turner made clear, for the government to meet its burden to
demonstrate a compelling interest in regulating speech, it must do
more than allege that a harm exists. The state must present evidence
that the harm is real, not merely conjectural, and show a nexus between the speech and the harm indicating that the regulation will
37 Proponents of
alleviate the harm "in a direct and material way.""
regulation have not yet identified the required specific harm and

also Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 195-96 (5th Cir. 1995) (challenging
the history of voodoo).
367. See DeNooyer v. Merinelli, No. 92-2080, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 30084, at *3-*4 (6th Cir.
Nov. 18, 1993); C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. Supp. 341, 346-47 (D.N.J. 1997), affd mem., 166 F.3d 1204
(3d Cir. 1998).
368. See Ross, supra note 230, at 259, 263-64.
369. See, e.g., Stark v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 640, 123 F.3d 1068, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1998)
(objecting to use of computers); Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F. 2d 1058, 1061-61
(6th Cir. 1987) (stories dealing with magic); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp 395, 397 (D.N.H. 1974)
(audio-visual equipment violating religious beliefs).
370. See, e.g., Pico, 457 U.S. at 856-58 (removing objectionable books from high school curriculum). See generally FOERSTEL, supranote 31.
371. Cf. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985) (holding
that the desire to avoid controversy is a reasonable grounds for limiting access to a nonpublic

forum).
372. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994); see supra note 160.
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nexus in their efforts to defend any of the regulations on speech that
purportedly places children at risk.
Although decided under a mere rational basis test, Ginsberg
contains the Supreme Court's most detailed analysis of the govern3 73
ment's independent interest in shielding children from speech. Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of five, agreed that the risks of
pornography reaching children required an insurance policy against
parental inadequacy:
While the supervision of children's reading may best be left to their parents, the
knowledge that parental control or guidance cannot always be provided and society's
transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children justify reasonable regulation
of the sale of material to them. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper for a state
to include in a statute designed to regulate the sale of pornography to children special
4
standards, broader than those [regulating sales to adults].

But pornography is not protected speech, and was never alleged to be
at stake in the controversial speech regulated by the legislation overturned in ACLU 1, DenverArea, or Sable.
In order to establish the harm necessary to support a judicial
finding of a compelling interest, proponents of regulating speech first
must show that the speech they wish to abridge actually reaches
children in significant numbers, and then must demonstrate the harm
to the children whom the speech reaches. Both of these inquiries bear
directly on whether the harm is real or merely conjectural.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly chastised the proponents of
regulation for failing to demonstrate that the targeted speech even
reaches children with any frequency-let alone harms them. In
ACLUI, the Supreme Court relied on the government's concession
below that children would rarely if ever stumble upon controversial
material on the Internet by accident and, if they did, they would be
warned to leave the site before viewing it.1 5 The few examples of controversial or obscene sites discovered by inadvertence turned out to be
sites accessed because the government's expert already knew that the
key words he was using would pull up material barred under the CDA,

373. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640-43 (1968) (analyzing the state's "independent
interest in the well-being of its youth" as separate from its interest in helping parents discharge
their responsibilities); see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 486-87 (1957); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923); Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 110 (1911); Bookcase, Inc. v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75 (1966);
People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311 (1965)).
374. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 640 (quoting Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d at 312 (Fuld, J., concurring))
(striking down an earlier version of the statute at issue in Ginsbergas void for vagueness).
375. Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU F), 521 U.S. 844, 869 (1997).
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rather than sites that real children had found.376 The paucity of evidence offered may be explained in part by the informal reports that
adult patrons almost never use Internet access in libraries to find
"mildly pornographic" or explicit sites, and librarians informally monitor children who seek pornographic sites."' Regulations on cable television suffer from the same constitutional infirmity. In Denver Area,
the Supreme Court criticized the government for presenting only
"anecdotal references to what seem isolated instances of potentially
indecent programming,"37' 8 "borderline examples as to which people
may differ."3n The government failed to show that controversial speech
existed on PEGs, much less that it harmed children.
Lower courts have made similar findings. In regulating controversial speech on public radio, for example, the FCC ignored the fact
that teenagers comprised only 0.2% of the audience for public radio,
and further insisted that it had no obligation to take data on listening
habits into account.3" An undercover officer in New York State who
logged over 600 hours on the Internet failed to identify a single case
that could not have been prosecuted under existing statutes criminalizing child pornography. "
In addition to showing that controversial speech actually
reaches children regularly through the targeted means of communication, those who wish to abridge speech to protect children must isolate
the specific harm such speech causes to children who receive it. But
this requirement has also received short shrift. When Congress passed
the CDA, for example, it expressly rejected language that would have
limited the Act's reach to materials deemed "harmful to minors."" The
legislative history, sparse as it is, specifically indicates a Congressional intent to reach beyond the "harmful to minors" standard
upheld for unprotected speech in Ginsberg.' As Judge Dalzell ob-

376. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affid, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)
("ACLUl").
377. See Daniel Le Duc, At Libraries,Little Worry Over Sex Sites on the Web, WASH. POST,
July 15, 1999, at B1,B5.
378. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 763 (1996)
(Breyer, J.).
379. Id. at 765.
380. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT II"), 58 F.3d 654, 667 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc); see Brief of Petitioners at 9 & n.2, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58
F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nos. 93-1092, 93-1100).
381. See American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Preska,
J.) (overturning a New York state statute regulating speech on the Internet as violating the
Commerce Clause).
382. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 189 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 202.
383. Id.; see Robert Corn-Revere, New Age Comstockery, 4 COMM. L. CONSPECTUS 173, 174
(1996).
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served in his separate opinion in ACLU I, the interest in protecting
children "is as dangerous as it is compelling," because it has no limiting principle.3"
Even where legislators try to stay within the rubric of the
"harmful to minors" standard, the supporters of regulation have failed
to show that exposure to controversial (as opposed to obscene or violent) speech in fact harms minors, as it is required to do under
385 For example, Chief Judge Edwards
Turner.
of the District of Columbia Circuit, after several hearings on the regulation of indecent cable
broadcast that was ultimately overturned by the Supreme Court in
Denver Area, concluded that the "[g]overnment has not offered one
shred of evidence that indecent programming harms children."3 "
The design and results of empirical studies about the effects of
speech make it important to distinguish speech about sexuality from
speech about violence. Although it is nearly impossible to find an iota
of evidence that controversial speech about sex harms children,387
speech concerned with sexuality is the content most commonly subject
to regulation on their behalf, in contrast to speech with violent content." For example, during one debate, five of the eight articles cited

384.

ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 882 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)

("ACLU r).
385. See id. at 881 (Dalzell, J., concurring) (I am hard pressed... to identify the disease [the
CDA intended to cure.]' ) (referring to Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. u. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)
(plurality) (stating that government must identify the disease to be cured by regulation of
speech)).
In stark contrast, social science studies presented to courts in support of the argument that
controversial speech harms minors, are expressly limited to "pornography," which is not at issue
here. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae of Enough is Enough et al. for Reno at 10-16, Reno v.
ACLU ("ACLU I'), 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (No. 96-511) (arguing, by reference to studies of "pornography," i.e., obscenity, that exposure to sexually explicit speech harms minors by, among other
things, negatively influencing their image of sexuality, creating chemically encoded harmful
images on the brain, unnaturally accelerating development, causing sexual addiction and
promoting negative attitudes toward women).
386. Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Edwards, C. J., dissenting, in part). Similarly, in the companion case, Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Edwards, J., concurring with reservations),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 773 (1996), argued the same day as Alliance, Judge Edwards concluded
that the harms the government sought to address by limiting the hours during which indecent
speech could be broadcast were "merely conjectural," since "[t]here is no showing of harm in this
case."
387. See Joint Brief of Petitioners at 33-36, Action for Children's Television v. FCC ('ACT
III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (No. 93-1092). Even studies regarding the impact of
pornographic speech on adults have been criticized. See Freedman, supra note 52, at 910-11
ni.127-130.
388. See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States, 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716 (D.
Del. 1998), prob. juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999) ("Playboy IT). A recent study of broadcast
and cable television, movies, and music videos found that extensive violent content often received
an industry rating as acceptable for teenagers. See S. Robert Lichter et al., Merchandizing
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on the Senate floor in support of regulating indecent speech expressly
examined the impact of material about violence or suicide rather than
the indecency targeted by the legislation.389 The FCC, in turn, relied on
the same evidence about violent speech in defending its abridgement
of sexually explicit speech that it did not dispute was protected under
the First Amendment.3"
In contrast to the dearth of support for the notion that sexually
explicit speech is harmful, substantial social science research conducted over several decades lends support to the allegation that violent speech may lead some children to violent attitudes or actions.391
Even this research, however, is not uncontroverted.39" One unresolved
issue is that mere correlations do not equal a nexus, or indicate that
Mayhem: Violence in Popular Culture (visited Sept. 28, 1999) <http://www.cmpa.com/archive/
viol98.http>.
389. See 138 CONG. REC. S7309-10 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Helms); Joint
Brief of Petitioners at 35 & n.21, ACT IU, 58 F.3d 654.
390. See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 5, ACT Iff, 58 F.3d 654 (en banc) (No. 93-1092) (arguing that the FCC's claim that "indecent" material harms children is "purely speculative" since it
is based primarily on sources discussing "violent' material). Similarly, in Eclipse, the witnesses
for the government admitted that they knew of no studies linking trading cards or reading
material to violence. Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1997).
391. See, e.g., Hearingson the Effects of Television Violence on Children,supra note 257 (testimony of Leonard Eron, Professor of Psychology and Research Scientist, University of Michigan)
(summarizing meta analyses); Aletha C. Huston et al., Public Policy and Children's Television,
44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 424, 430 (1989); Edwards & Berman, supra note 19, at 1537-41. (summarizing data); Dale Kunkel & John Murray, Television, Children, and Social Policy: Issues and
Resources for Child Advocates, 20 J. OF CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 88, 92 (1991); Patricia M.
Wald, Doing Right By Our Kids: A Case Study in the Perils of Making Policy on Television
Violence, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 397, 419-21 (1994).
392. See Peter Johnson, The Irrelevant V-Chip: An Alternate Theory of TV and Violence, 4
UCLA ENT. L. REV. 185, 187-92 (1997) (critiquing the ' hypothesis" that watching violence on
television causes violent behavior, and reviewing the data); see also Edwards & Berman, supra
note 19, at 1565 (concluding that the context so critical to measuring causation cannot be
captured in legislative definitions). See generally Guy Cumberbatch, Legislating Mythology:
Video Violence and Children, 3 J. OF MENTAL HEALTH 485 (1994); Horst Stipp & J. Ronald
Milavsky, U.S. Television Programming'sEffect on Aggressive Behavior of Children and Adolescents, 7 CURRENT PSYCHOL. 76 (1988) (the authors are employed by the National Broadcasting
Company). It is not necessary to resolve the social science debate to consider the constitutional
issues. See Hearingson the Effects of Television Violence on Children, supranote 257 (testimony
of Robert Corn-Revere).
One of the earliest studies demonstrated substantial common sense in concluding that "[flor
some children, under some conditions, some television is harmful. For other children, under the
same conditions, or for the same children under other conditions, television may be beneficial.
For most children, under most conditions, most television is probably neither harmful nor
particularly beneficial." WILBUR ScHRAMM ET AL., TELEVISION IN THE LIVES OF OUR CHILDREN 1
(1961), quoted in Scott Stossel, The Man Who Counts the Killings, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
1997, at 86, 104. Contemporary studies reach substantially similar conclusions. See, e.g.,
Michael Furlong et al., The Effects of Media Violence on Youth, 19 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 33,
39 (1999) (reviewing the social science literature on the effect of depictions of violence on youth
and concluding that the children who are most influenced by media violence are high risk
children due to multiple factors, including personal exposure to aggression).
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abridging speech will reduce harm.393 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit was persuaded by expert testimony that 'TV violence
studies do not provide strong evidence that TV violence causes criminal behavior or aggression." "" Another problem is that the results of
social science research focused primarily on television and movies. 5
are frequently attributed to other forms of speech. The Second Circuit
criticized the defense of a regulation on trading cards depicting violence based on inconclusive evidence about the very different medium
of television, "a far more powerful medium." "
Although social scientists point to correlations between violence in the media and violent behavior, they have not found evidence
that exposure to depictions of violence causes or even contributes to
antisocial behavior.3 9 ' Social scientist James Q. Wilson, a political
conservative, recently concluded that there is "virtually no evidence"
that violence on television and in the movies "affects the serious crime
rate," which has been falling even as entertainment has become "more
gruesome." ' Other commentators, starting from the perspective that
there is more evidence to justify regulation of media violence than
other forms of controversial speech, have concluded that existing
social science data do not provide "a basis upon which one may determine with adequate certainty which violent programs cause harmful
behavior."399
Similar evidentiary weaknesses help to explain the fact that no
court has ever found civil liability for violence based on the influence
of controversial speech.4" Courts have refused to find causation in tort

393. See Edwards & Berman, supra note 19, at 1540; see also Sissela Bok, 1997 Survey of
Books Relating to the Law: X. Legal Regulation and Reform: Censorshipand Media Violence, 95
MICH. L. REV.2160, 2165 (1997).
394. Eclipse, 134 F.3d at 65 (Miner, J.) (cautioning that "environmental risk factors" including child abuse, drugs, alcohol, and gang membership must be considered).
395. See, e.g., KEVIN SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE AS OBSCENITY: LIMITING THE MEDIA'S FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION 29-44 (1996); Kevin Saunders, Media Violence and the Obscenity
Exception to the FirstAmendment, 3 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 107, 167-73 (1993).
396. Id.
397. See Bok, supranote 393, at 2162.
398. James Q. Wilson, Beware the Many Easy Answers for Ending Violence in Schools, STAR
TRIB., Apr. 28, 1999, at 15A.
399. Edwards & Berman, supranote 19, at 1492.
400. See, e.g., Waller v. Osbourne, 763 F. Supp. 1144, 1152 (M.D. Ga. 1991), affd 958 F.2d
1084 (11th Cir.1992) (suicide attributed to rock music); Matarazzo v. Aerosmith Prods., Inc., No.
86 Civ. 8815, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1989); Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.
Fla. 1979) (television violence); Delgado v. American Multi-Cinema, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 838, 839
(1999) (shooting immediately after viewing a violent film); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App.
3d 989, 1007 (Ct. App.1988) (suicide attributed to rock music); Bill v. Superior Court, 137 Cal.
App. 3d 1002, 1014 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Olivia N. v. NBC Corp., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488, 496 (1981)
(alleged replication of violent act in television movie); Walt Disney Television Prods. v. Shannon,
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actions even where the violent acts were committed contemporaneously with exposure to the speech."0 ' This line of cases suggests that
the link between speech that depicts violence and violent actions is not
sufficient to satisfy the standard of causation under tort law. Presumably, the nexus would have to be even stronger to satisfy the
government's burden of proof in establishing a compelling interest in
suppressing protected speech.
For all of these reasons, the second compelling interest offered
for regulating speech, the government's independent interest, fares no
better than its first interest of reinforcing parental authority. In the
future, if proponents of regulating speech to protect children succeeded in meeting their burden of proof on each element needed to
show a compelling interest, the issue still would not be resolved. Then,
and only then, would a court actually confront a close question about
whether the regulation would survive constitutional scrutiny, requiring it to balance the weight of competing constitutional interests. At
that point, the courts would have before them a question of balancing
at the margin, that would permit comparing "the incremental promotion of the interest on which the government relies with the incremental threat to freedom of expression."' " That balancing would include consideration of the mode and sweep of the regulation and other
values such as parental autonomy.
VII. THE CRITIQUE OF THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST APPLIED TO
GERMANE LOWER COURT OPINIONS
Notwithstanding the pervasive dicta to the effect that the government has a compelling interest in shielding children from controversial speech, only a handful of lower courts have squarely considered and ruled on the proposition. 3 Those courts are divided as to

276 S.E.2d 580, 583 (Ga. 1981) (accidental self-inflicted wound mimicking Mickey Mouse Club);
Yakubowicz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 536 N.E.2d 1067, 1071 (Mass. 1989) (fatal assault
occurred after viewing violent film).
401. See Waller, 763 F. Supp. at 1151.
402. John Hart Ely, FlagDesecration:A Case Study in the Roles of Categorizationand Balancing in FirstAmendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1485 n.10 (1975).
403. The most detailed discussion of compelling interest in the context of regulation of speech
to protect minors is found in Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT HI), 58 F.3d 654,
659-69 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc). The majority held that the government had at least two
compelling interests in regulating indecent radio broadcasts, but two dissenters who had served
on the original panel hotly contested that conclusion. See id. at 670 (Edwards, C. J., dissenting);
id. at 683 (Wald, J., dissenting); see also Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1091-94
(9th Cir. 1999) (absent studies linking computer-generated child pornography to the subsequent
sexual abuse of actual children, there is no nexus establishing a compelling interest in regulating
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whether the government's interest met the standard of "compelling,"
sufficient to justify narrowly tailored limitations on speech. A brief
review of these decisions, in light of the previous discussion of the
government interests generally asserted, clarifies how analyzing the
compelling interest can improve the quality of judicial reasoning with
respect to controversial speech and children.
A. Decisions Rejecting the Government's Asserted Interest
in ProtectingMinors from Speech
In Video Software Dealers Association v. Webster and Eclipse
Enterprisesv. Gulotta, the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth and Second Circuits overturned statutes designed to protect children from
violent material on videocassettes, and in trading cards depicting
crimes.' Both courts agreed on several baseline points. Depictions of
violence, they held, fall within the umbrella of the Speech Clause, so
efforts to regulate violent speech are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring that the regulation serve a compelling government interest.4" In
each case, the state relied on its general power to protect children,"
but both courts demanded that the government demonstrate a more

all computer-generated child pornography); Eclipse Enters., Inc. v. Gulotta, 134 F.3d 63, 67 (2d
Cir. 1997); Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684, 688 (8th Cir. 1992); Cyberspace Communications v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (overturning a state
regulation of Internet speech as overbroad and as a violation of the Commerce Clause after
finding that the act did not further the state's compelling interest and questions, sua sponte, in
obiter dictum, whether the regulation interferes parental liberty interest in child rearing);
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc v. United States ("Playboy 11'), 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 720 (D.
Del. 1998) (enjoining enforcement of the statute), prob. juris. noted, 119 S. Ct. 2365 (1999);
Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc v. United States ("Playboy 1'), 945 F. Supp. 772, 785 (D. Del.
1996), affd mer., 520 U.S. 1141 (1997) (denying preliminary injunction and removing temporary
restraining order preventing enforcement of Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
47 U.S.C. § 561, which required scrambling of sexually explicit video programming); AIDS Action
Comm., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D. Mass. 1993); Bering v.
SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 937 (Wash. 1986) (upholding constitutionality of a statute restricting
verbal statements of anti-abortion picketers in the presence of young children).
404. Eclipse, 134 F.3d at 68 (Miner, J.) (overturning county ordinance barring dissemination
of trading cards depicting 'Indecent crime material . . . harmful to minors"); Video Software
Dealers, 968 F.2d at 691 (Fagg, J.) (barring enforcement of a statute that restricts sale or rental
of videos depicting violence to persons under age seventeen); see Salgado, supra note 21, at 52022 (discussing the widespread efforts to restrict dissemination of violent videos to minors).
405. See Eclipse, 134 F.3d at 66 (finding that violence, unlike obscenity, is protected speech);
Video Software Dealers, 968 F.2d at 688 (rejecting the state's argument that violent videos are
"obscene" for children and thus the statute need only have a rational basis); see also Winters v.
New York, 333 U.S. 507, 508 (1948) (finding that the First Amendment protects speech about
"deeds of bloodshed, lust or crime); American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330
(7th Cir. 1985) (holding that violence is protected speech).
406. In Eclipse, the plaintiffs did not contest the state's compelling interest. Eclipse, 134 F.
3d at 66 n.1.
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precise compelling interest tied to a direct harm to children, and held
that the government had failed to do so.
In Video Software, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
held that the state's failure to articulate whether it was concerned
with "all kinds of violence" or only with "slasher" movies was fatal to
its efforts to restrict access to films.4" The court rejected out-of-hand
the state's assertion that its "power to protect children" allowed it to
suppress speech "that is neither obscene as to youths not subject to
some other legitimate proscription... solely to protect the young from
' 8
ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them."
The court made clear that the state must identify the precise nature of
the harm it is trying to prevent in order for the court to assess
whether or not the statute is narrowly drawn.' °
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit went a step further
in Eclipse, holding that the government had failed to "demonstrate
that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and that the
regulation will in fact alleviate these harms."4 ' The government had
failed to offer anything more than surmise and conclusory statements
to show that crime trading cards either harm minors or cause juvenile
delinquency. " The court expressly held that the statute barring dissemination of crime trading cards was not "necessary" to protect
young people.'
In AIDS Action Committee of Massachusetts v. Massachusetts
Bay TransportationAuthority the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts sent a message to proponents of regulation: where the
government fails to demonstrate a compelling interest, it should expect the court to overturn the regulation without discussing narrow

407. Video Software Dealers, 968 F.2d at 688-89 (observing that the statute as drawn reaches
cartoons, westerns and war dramas, boxing matches, and psychological violence in suspense

stories).
408. Id. at 689 (citing Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).
409. See id. at 688 ("Because the Missouri legislature failed to articulate the type of violence
it deems harmful to minors, the district court found it 'virtually impossible to determine if the
statute is narrowly drawn to regulate only that expression.' "), affg and quoting Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 773 F. Supp. 1275, 1277, 1279-80 (W.D. Mo. 1991). Judge Bartlett, for
the district court, had relied on Sable, Ginsberg, and obiter dictum in Prince for the general
proposition that the state has a compelling interest in the well-being of minors. Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 494 U.S. 115, 125 (1989); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968);
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168 (1944).
410. Eclipse, 134 F.3d at 66 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664
(1994)).
411. See id. at 67 (rejecting the use of contested studies showing harm done by exposure to
television violence, especially since experts testified that even if the television research conclusively linked violent material to violent behavior, television is a "more vibrant medium than
trading cards" and the television research cannot be analogized to the impact of trading cards).
412. See id. (holding that the law was not narrowly tailored to its stated purpose).
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tailoring.413 Judge Zobel rejected the agency's argument that the possibility of harm to children could outweigh the rights of speakers to post
safe sex ads promoting condom use.41 Moreover, the court found that
the constitutional "interests of minors in receiving information trump
the government's interest in insulating them from that same information."1 5 AIDS Action provides a model of how courts should cut their
inquiry short
once the government fails to demonstrate a compelling
4 16
interest.
B. Lower Court Cases Findinga Compelling Interest in Protecting
Childrenfrom ControversialSpeech
The three cases in which lower courts expressly sustained the
compelling interest offered by the government do not resolve the
broader question of the nature of the state's interest in regulating
controversial speech that may reach children, because each decision is
tied to the factual context of the case in accordance with the principle
that Speech Clause analysis must be conducted on a case-by-case

413. AIDS Action Comm., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 79, 84 (D.
Mass. 1993) (Zobel, J.) (overturning an administrative ban on public service ads for the mass
transit system on condoms and safe sex). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed on
other grounds, but did not address the issue of whether the state had demonstrated a compelling
interest. See AIDS Action Comm., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 42 F.3d 1, 6 (1st
Cir. 1994). The Court of Appeals found that the agency's "incoherent" policy resulted in an
"unrebutted appearanceof viewpoint discrimination," especially since the agency had accepted
and posted what the court considered an equally offensive paid advertisement for the film "Fatal
,Instinct." Id. at 10-11.
414. See AIDS Action, 849 F. Supp. at 84 (citing cases that do not involve a state claim that
inhibitions on controversial speech were intended to protect children, such as Community for
Creative Non-Violence v. Turner, 893 F.2d 1387, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (invalidating permit
requirement for engaging in free speech activities), Planned ParenthoodAss'n v. Chicago Transit
Authority, 767 F.2d 1225, 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that the transit authority may not bar
family planning advertisements from public property that has become a public forum), and
Coalitionfor Abortion Rights andAgainst SterilizationAbuse v. NiagaraFrontierTransportation
Authority, 584 F. Supp. 985, 989 (W.D.N.Y. 1984) (overturning administrative ban on Planned
Parenthood advertisements based on their "controversial conten)).
415. AIDS Action, 849 F. Supp. at 84 (citing Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d
170, 178-180 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212
(1975)).
416. Other jurists have used this approach in speech cases that did not involve children. See,
e.g., Kirkeby v. Furness, 92 F.3d 655, 658 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,
465 (1980) (overturning an ordinance barring picketing in front of residences "for the purpose of
persuading the public... to protest some action, attitude or belief' because while the interest in
protecting tranquility may be "substantial," it has never been held to be "compelling")); id. at 662
(Gibson, J., dissenting) (observing that the restriction on speech is content-based and not justified by a compelling state interest, and therefore concluding that the court should not indulge in
further analysis of the ordinance which can only amount to obiter dictum in light of the holding).
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basis. "" Taken together, these three cases suggest that where a court
concludes that the government has met its burden to establish a concrete and clearly articulated compelling interest, then the court is able
to consider with greater precision whether the regulation is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.
In Bering v. SHARE, the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, sitting en banc, expressly found that the state had a compelling interest in regulating speech to protect children through an injunction limiting speech by anti-abortion picketers. The lower court
had enjoined picketers' oral use of the words "murder," "kill," and
"their derivatives" during their demonstration and barred them from
marching in front of the single entrance to the Medical Building which
housed a number of doctors' offices, including the office where abortions were performed." The court focused initially on the question of
"whether the State has a compelling interest in protecting... children
by limiting the oral expression of the proscribed words at the picket
site.".. After a hearing, the lower court had found that the antiabortion picketers interfered with parents who were bringing their
children to see a pediatric allergist in the Medical Building. Specifically, the picketers referred to the doctors collectively as "killers or
murderers in the presence of young children."4 Experts testified that
this verbal assault disturbed the children and undermined their trust
in their doctors."'
In light of these facts, the Supreme Court of the State of
Washington found that the state had established a compelling interest
in preventing such speech in the presence of children." Pirst, the
court emphasized that the injunction served the rights of parents by
helping them to protect their children from verbal assault and allowing them to "explain the concept of abortion to their children personally, and only when they believe the children are able to understand
it. '' 4 Second, the court found that the government's "independent
interest in the well-being of its youth"42' was compelling where the

417. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 781 (1996)
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing "the essence of the case-by-case
approach to ensuring protection of speech under the First Amendment, even in novel settings");
see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503 (1984) (holding that the concept
of manner of speech must be evaluated on a case by case basis).
418. See Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 921 (Wash. 1986).
419. Id. at 933.
420. Id. at 923.
421. See id. at 933.
422. See id. at 923, 933-34.
423. Id. at 934.
424. Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)).
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trial court expressly found that the specific language, when directed at
young children, was abusive and interfered with the ability of doctors
to treat young children effectively. 45 The court concluded that the
state had established "a compelling interest in avoiding subjection of
children to the physical and psychological abuse inflicted by the picketers' speech.""'
Even though the injunction was relatively narrow because it
did not bar use of the same words on placards and was designed solely
to protect children who were too young to read, the state Supreme
Court held that the articulated interest did not support the terms of
the injunction, which the court found would "water down speech to
make it suitable for the sandbox. 4 '27 The court remanded the case for
even more specific findings to pin down the precise scope of the government's compelling interest. It instructed the lower court to determine the ages at which the speech would be most harmful to children.
The Supreme Court of the State of Washington further ordered that
the injunction be narrowed to proscribe the offensive language only
when children within that precisely defined age range are present,
and also that the injunction be modified to provide guidance to picketers about how to assess the ages of children.4 ' Bering underscores the
importance of both specificity and a nuanced concern for context in
speech cases.4" It suggests that courts are better equipped to decide
whether a regulation is narrowly tailored when they understand precisely what the regulation aims to accomplish. Where judicial analysis
sustains the government's compelling interest, the rigor demanded by
sound legal argument is more likely to lead to regulation that is carefully circumscribed to tread lightly on protected speech.
In ACT v. FCC ('ACT I'), the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit sitting en banc held that the government has a
compelling interest in "supporting parental supervision of what children see and hear," as well as a compelling governmental interest in
the well-being of minors, each of which was deemed sufficient to jus-

425. See id. at 934-37 (discussing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 756-58 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring)).
426. Id. at 935.
427. Id.
428. See id. at 936 (holding that the injunction was not drawn narrowly enough, because it
applied whether or not children were present, regardless of whether the child was a teenager,
and without guidelines to the picketers that would enable them to gauge the age of listeners, and
thus the need to refrain from speech).
429. Id. at 935 n.7 (citing Cohen v. California,403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971), for the proposition that
context is the key to speech cases and supports distinguishing the printed from the spoken
word)); see also Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 903 (1972) (Powell, J., dissenting).
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43
tify a ban on indecent radio broadcasts with a brief "safe harbor." "
The en banc opinion resolved a lengthy struggle among the three
branches of government about regulation of indecent speech on the
radio. The court remanded the matter to the FCC with instructions to
revise its regulations to provide a slightly longer safe harbor for the
broadcast of indecent speech on radio. 3' The District of Columbia
Circuit Court considered the FCC's regulations on controversial
speech within the confines of the much-criticized Pacifica decision.
The context of radio broadcasts gave the FCC a foot up in arguing that
the Supreme Court had already found the interests compelling. Once
the court deferred to that position, the only remaining question appeared to be whether the regulation was narrowly crafted-which the
court held it was not. ACT I1 illustrates the importance of analyzing
the interests asserted by the government, because in the context of
those articulated interests, the court was able to conclude that the
means did not appropriately serve the proclaimed ends.
Finally, in Playboy Entertainment Group v. United States
('Playboy I'), a case pending before the Supreme Court, ' the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware found a compelling
interest in shielding children from "signal bleed," which occurs when
portions of the video or audio from a subscription cable channel appear to non-subscribers despite the cable operator's efforts to limit the
signals to subscribers. Congress addressed the problem of signal bleed
in Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which is the
subject of a facial challenge in Playboy H. 33 Section 505 requires cable
television operators to "scramble" subscription (premium) channels
specializing in sexually explicit adult programming in order to "protect
children from signal bleed," or to limit their broadcasts of explicit
material to "safe harbor" hours in the middle of the night.43 ' Scrambling eliminates the possibility that non-subscribers could accidentally
receive visual or audio signals which they do not seek.

430. Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT IMl", 58 F.3d 654, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
431. See id. at 658.
432. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc v. United States ("playboy Hr), 30 F. Supp. 2d 702,
714 (D. Del. 1998), prob. juris. noted, 119 S.Ct. 2365 (1999).
433. Id. at 706.
434. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States ("Playboy r), 945 F. Supp. 772,
774-77 (D. Del. 1996), affid mem., 520 U.S. 1141 (1997) (removing a temporary restraining order
and denying a preliminary injunction). The statute, 47 U.S.C. § 561, provided that if a cable
operator proved unable to fully block the transmission of non-obscene sexually explicit materials,
it must "time channel" such programming, limiting the transmission to "safe harbor" hours when
children were deemed unlikely to be in the audience, which the FCC determined would be
between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. See Playboy I, 945 F. Supp. at 774.
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A series of opinions by Judge Roth of the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit expressly considered "whether [the statute] survives
strict scrutiny by addressing a compelling interest."45 The court took
Denver Area as its starting point, noting that content-based strict
scrutiny applies to regulations on cable television, and that Denver
Area had expressly defined the interest asserted before the Court as
"the protection of children from exposure to patently offensive depictions of sex"-the "same problems" that led to enactment of Section
505. It then distinguished the statute overturned in Denver Area from
Section 505 on two grounds. First, Judge Roth explained that the
target of Section 505 was not the protected speech itself, but rather
"signal bleed, a secondary effect of the transmission of that speech."'
Second, Judge Roth distinguished the speech at issue in Section 505
from most other efforts to regulate speech because the signal bleed
intrudes into the homes of persons who have chosen not to subscribe
and thus expect not to receive explicit programming.4 37 The court declined to grant a preliminary injunction. The Supreme Court affirmed
the panel's decision in Playboy I by memorandum opinion."'
Plaintiff Playboy ultimately obtained an injunction enjoining
enforcement of Section 505 following a trial at which Judge Roth
presided.4 39 In granting the injunction, the court once more expressly
considered the nature of the interest offered by proponents of Section
505. Because it had admonished the parties during the preliminary
hearing not to return without briefing the nature and scope of the
government's interest and providing "additional evidence demonstrating the effects of sexually explicit materials on children," " the
court criticized the "paucity" of the government's evidence. In particular, Judge Roth regarded two important questions as unanswered
by the government's presentation: "does viewing signal bleed of sexu-

435. Id.
436. Id. at 785. The secondary effects of speech may be subject to zoning that resembles time
channeling. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-49 (1986). At the
subsequent hearing, Judge Roth rejected the government's reliance on the secondary effects
doctrine, because the regulations directed to scrambling were based on content. "[S]ignal bleed
from the Disney Channel, for example, does not come within the purview of the statute." Playboy II, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 714 (enjoining enforcement of the statute).
437. See Playboy I, 945 F. Supp at 785; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748
(1978) (holding that in the privacy of one's own home, the individual's right to be left alone
outweighs the First Amendment rights of the intruder).
438. See Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States, 520 U.S. 1141 (1997) (mem.),
affg 945 F. Supp. 2d 772 (D. Del. 1996).
439. See Playboy II, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 720. The court required Playboy to use its contractual
negotiations with cable operators to ensure use of the least restrictive alternative by informing
subscribers that lockboxes which can prevent signal bleed are available. See id. at 719-20.
440. See Playboy I, 945 F. Supp. at 786 n.25.

2000]

ANYTHING GOES

515

ally explicit programming constitute a harm to children?," and does
signal bleed even constitute a pervasive problem?" 1 Subsequently, at
oral argument before the Supreme Court, the Justices noted more
than once that the record failed to answer either of these questions."'
Instead, at the evidentiary hearing, the government relied on studies
of the effect of televised violence on children, which the lower court
deemed inapposite to regulations on sexually explicit speech, and
offered no evidence at all on the effects of "intermittent signal bleed"
as opposed to "explicit pornography.""' Even though it acknowledged
that the "mere articulation of a theoretical harm is not enough" to
establish a compelling government interest under normal circumstances, the court concluded that the standard of proof was lower
where protection of children was at issue.'
Applying its own new flexible standard that "[o]nly some
minimal amount of evidence is required when sexually explicit programming and children are involved," the court reluctantly held that
the government had established a sufficient risk of harm to constitute
a compelling interest."5 Nonetheless, the court enjoined enforcement of
Section 505 because the statute was not narrowly tailored to use the
least restrictive means of regulating the controversial speech: a cable
lockbox which would allow parents to block signal bleed from entering
their homes, combined with a requirement that cable providers notify
all subscribers that blocking devices are available without charge.
The district court in Playboy I correctly demanded that the
government present evidence supporting its claim to a compelling
interest, but the court failed to follow its analysis to the requisite
conclusion. Even though the government failed to show that signal
bleed actually reaches children with any regularity, or that intermittent signal bleed harms children when it reaches them, the court
found that the cumulative merits of the government's purported interests sufficed under a relaxed standard, which it erroneously assumed
should apply because children were involved. In this respect, the
Playboy H court fell short of the more rigorous analysis performed by
the courts in both AIDS Action, which found that the government

441. Playboy II, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 709. The government pointed to only a handful of isolated
incidents over a sixteen-year period. See id.
442. Transcript of Oral Argument, 1999 WL 1134595, at *2, *4, *17 & *20, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States, No. 98-1682 (Nov. 30, 1999).
443. Playboy L, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 716.
444. Id. (noting the "paucity" of evidence of harm presented).
445. Id. at 716-17 (ruling that the government's interests in protecting children, reinforcing
parental authority and the privacy of the home "in sum can be labelled 'compelling' ').
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failed to show a compelling interest, 46 and Bering v. SHARE, which
held that a very narrowly defined compelling interest existed, justifying an even narrower regulation on speech. 7
C. PendingAppellate Litigation:Playboy II and ACLU H
Two important cases which would allow appellate courts to examine the nature of the government's purported interest in regulating
controversial speech to protect children are currently undergoing
review: Playboy H1 and ACLU Hf. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the government's appeal of the decision below in Playboy
H on November 30, 1999; the case is pending as this Article goes to
press."8' Playboy H offers an excellent opportunity for the Supreme
Court to clarify that it is not sufficient for the government to invoke
the needs of children in order to establish a compelling interest that
will justify regulations on speech that is protected for adults. 4

9

The Supreme Court might well use Playboy H1 to emphasize
that the government faces the same burden of establishing a compelling interest where the speech of all members of the community is
regulated with the express aim of protecting children as in any other
case. The need for such analysis may be even more pressing when the
government's purported purpose is to protect children because the
cultural temptations to take that interest at face value are so strong.
Even if the Supreme Court declines to raise the issue sua sponte in
Playboy H and decides the case entirely on other grounds, the case
illustrates how imperative it is not only to scrutinize the government's
purported interest in shielding children from controversial speech, but
to also insist that the government meet its constitutional burden to
establish that interest.
An appeal is also pending before the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in ACLU H. Revisiting the problem of children and
controversial speech on the Internet after the Supreme Court's 1997
decision in ACLU.I, Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act,
47 U.S.C. § 231 ("COPA"), which was to go into effect in November of

446. AIDS Action Comm., Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 849 F. Supp. 79 (D.
Mass. 1993); supra notes 413-15 and accompanying text.
447. Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918 (Wash. 1986); see supra notes 418-29 and accompanying
text.
448. Transcript of Oral Argument, 1999 WL 1134595, at *4-*5, Playboy Entertainment
Group, Inc. v. United States ("Playboy II), No. 98-1682 (Nov. 30, 1999).
449. Although the parties did not brief the issues surrounding the government's assertion of
a compelling interest in regulating signal bleed, several of the Justices posed questions at oral
argument relating to the nature of the government's interest. See generally id.
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1998. COPA makes it a criminal offense for a person engaged in the
business of communicating on the World Wide Web to knowingly post
communications "harmful to minors.""' A federal district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of COPA before it took effect. 5 ' The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit heard oral argument in the
matter on November 4, 1999, and the court has not yet issued its
decision.
The district court in ACLU I did not examine the government's asserted interest, except to note that "the government clearly
has an interest in the protection of minors, including shielding them
from materials that are not obscene by adult standards. 452 Congressional findings make clear that COPA relies primarily on the
government's alleged independent interest in deciding what speech
minors should be able to receive. Congress expressly stated that "innovative ways to help parents... restrict material that is harmful to
minors through parental control protections and self-regulation.., have not provided a national solution to the problem of
minors accessing harmful material on the World Wide Web. ' '4n Parents, the government repeatedly asserts, cannot be trusted to protect
their children in ways that meet congressional approval."'
At the time it passed the CDA, overturned in ACLU I, Congress did not examine which speech, if any, actually harms the young
and expressly rejected the modifying phrase "harmful to minors" as
too narrow. 55 In COPA, Congress again made no effort to determine
what sort of controversial computer speech, if any, in fact harms minors."' Instead, COPA defines the material "harmful to minors" as
including all communications that meet a statutory variable obscenity
standard based on the Miller test, refined for minors on the assump-

450. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a) (West Supp. 1999).
451. ACLU v. Reno ("ACLU IT), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 498 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (Read, J.), appeal
docketed, No. 99-1324 (3d Cir. Apr. 1999).
452. Id. at 495 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968).
453. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 1402, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-736
(1998).
454. See Reply Brief for the Appellants, 1999 WL 1021220, at *10-*11, Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. United States ('Playboy I), No. 98-1682 (filed Nov. 3, 1999) (stating that
when parents fail to request blocking devices "out of distraction, inertia, or indifference," scrambling or safe harbor hours "would be the only means to protect society's independent interest,"
which is "independent of the actions of particular parents'). But the Supreme Court already
rejected the substitution of congressional values for parental choices in Denver Area. -Denver
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 758-59 (1996) (noting that the
existence of "inattentive parents" means that nothing short of a total ban can protect the "determined child").
455. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 189 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 124, 202;
see Corn-Revere, supranote 383, at 174.
456. See ACLU v. Reno ("ACLU I), 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
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tion that such material is harmful rather than merely distasteful
when it reaches minors.457 The approach closely mirrors the state
5 But Ginsberg
statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg."
indicates that material does not meet the definition of variable obscenity under the statute unless the communications "taken as a
whole, lack[ ] serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for
minors."59 COPA's own language, however, belies a facial effort to
limit its scope to material that fits the Ginsberg model. Despite its
initial reliance on a definition of material "harmful to minors" that
mirrors the test for obscenity, COPA bars commercial Internet communications that "include[] any material" harmful to minors. The
phrase "any material" suggests that analysis of the value of the speech
would not be confined to the communication "taken as a whole.""
Moreover, COPA is both over- and under-inclusive because it would
reach some arguably indecent sexual speech which has not been
shown to lead to concrete harms, but would fail to reach depictions of
violence unless they also fall into the category of variable obscenity,
even though the evidence is stronger that depictions of violence harm
children more than sexually explicit speech harms children.
In addition, the statute appears to reach a much broader array
of sexually explicit speech than the speech which meets a definition of
variable obscenity for minors. In granting a preliminary injunction,
the district court ruled that COPA could threaten valuable content
including "resources on obstetrics, gynecology and sexual health;
visual art and poetry... information about [non-obscene] books and
photographic images offered for sale; and online magazines," even
news magazines."'
COPA provides an affirmative defense to speakers who restrict
access to their web sites by requiring proof of age through means such
as credit cards or identification numbers. The imposition of adult
identification requirements as a mode of regulating speech at first

457. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (e)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1999).
458. On the legislative history of COPA, see Marc Rohr, Can Congress Regulate "Indecent"
Speech on the Internet?, 23 NOVA L. REV. 709, 731-38 (1999) (arguing that COPA is distinguishable from the statute at issue in Ginsberg).
459. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (6)(C).
460. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (a)(1), (e)(6) (using the phrase "includes any material" two times); see
-alsoACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999) (overturning a New Mexico statute
that criminalizes dissemination of "material that is harmful to a minor" defined as containing "in
whole or in part... nudity, sexual intercourse or any other sexual conduct"); Cyberspace Communications v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 740 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (overturning a Michigan
statute that redefines obscenity as "sexually explicit... material harmful to minors" knowingly
disseminated to them).
461. ACLUII, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 483-84, 495.
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glance seems constitutionally palatable4 6 compared to bans or channeling, at least to the extent that it resembles proof of age to purchase
liquor or tobacco. But it is not legal for minors to purchase or consume
alcohol or tobacco and consumption of such products does not enjoy
constitutional protection. Controversial speech, in contrast, is constitutionally protected.
Equally important from a doctrinal vantage point, as the district court found in ACLU H, a risk exists that adult identification will
be transformed into a requirement that consenting adults affirmatively request controversial speech and identify themselves before
entering Internet sites.4" While adults may choose to identify themselves by using credit cards in bookstores, or by checking out library
books, they can preserve anonymity in acquiring many forms of speech
by paying cash or browsing. Forcing adults either to identify themselves to request speech or to forgo the speech altogether violates the
holding of the Supreme Court in Lamont v. Postmaster General that
imposing an affirmative obligation on a person who wishes to receive
unpopular speech violates the First Amendment.4
Adult identification regimes that allow parents to obtain controversial material for minors or encompass the possibility of verifiable parental consent for those under the age of majority may be conducive to accommodating the range of family types from the idealized
normative to the nonconformist, depending on whether the nature of
the medium makes such identification schemes feasible. Newsstands,
bookstores, libraries, movie theaters, video rental stores and even diala-porn businesses can establish effective adult identification at a
reasonable cost. For Internet communications, however, the Supreme
Court found in ACLU I that no reliable technology currently exists "to
determine the age of a user who is accessing material through e-mail,
mail exploders, newsgroups or chat rooms."" The government did not
contest this finding in ACLUR1."' To the extent that age verification is
currently technologically feasible on the Internet, courts have found

462. See Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 533 (Tenn. 1993) (upholding a ban on selling material "harmful to children" in display or coin-operated stands).
463. ACLU II, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 473, 495 ("[A]ny barrier that Web site operators and content
providers construct to bar access to even some of the content on their sites will be a barrier that
adults must cross as well."); see also Fabulous Assocs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
896 F.2d 780, 785 (3d Cir. 1990).
464. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307 (1965) (requiring addresses to affirmatively request delivery of "communist political propaganda" from abroad violates First Amendment rights).
465. Reno v. ACLU ("ACLU r), 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (reporting the findings of the district court); see ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
466. ACLUII, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 487-88.
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that verification would be "prohibitively expensive" for many speakers
with inherently valuable messages." ' Because it is not currently feasible to segregate material that is obscene for minors from material that
is protected and valuable for minors on websites (as opposed to magazine stands and video stores), Ginsberg is inapposite to computer
communications.4 8 Limitations designed to protect children from
Internet speech will chill speakers and inhibit the speech available to
adults. '9
It may not be sufficient, however, to distinguish Ginsberg in
the Internet context, or to limit its applicability based on its use of the
rational basis standard. COPA confronts us with the underlying flaws
in the Ginsberg analysis. COPA, like Ginsberg and the entire concept
of variable obscenity, fails to draw comprehensible lines for speakers
and those who distribute speech. By failing to define the specific types
of speech that harm children and to articulate the nexus between that
speech and the harm, regulators may unleash a regime of unbridled
censorship.47 The statutory definition of variable obscenity brings us
no closer to understanding how to delineate the speech that is protected from being labeled "obscene for minors" because it is valuable
for children. COPA would likely prevent children from receiving valuable speech to which their parents may wish them to have free access
by limiting the availability of speech with artistic, literary, and educational value.4"' COPA's definition of variable obscenity makes no provision for differentiating speech that has social value for three-year-olds
from speech that has value for mature adolescents. But assessment of
value will vary depending on the individual youngster's maturity and
ability to use information thoughtfully, which parents can interpret in
each instance, but the government cannot.

467. See ACLU , 521 U.S. at 877 (1997); Reno v. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 845-48; see also
ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th Cir. 1999).
468. See Johnson, 194 F.3d at 1158 (disagreeing with the government's assertion that its effort to regulate Internet speech reaching minors is "cyber-Ginsberg:nothing more, nothing less').
469. Even if it were to become technologically feasible to install affordable age-sensitive
screening devices on computers, COPA would not further the government's purported interest in
a way that would significantly ameliorate the purported harm. Minors would still be able to
receive the controversial material from outside the United States and from speakers who have no
commercial intent.
470. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 674 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
471. See Cyberspace Communications v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 749 (E.D. Mich. 1999)
('Discussions would be stifled to the point that a teenager seeking answers to curious questions
concerning a subject foremost on their mind, could not find answers via this medium [creating a
risk of] greater numbers of teenage pregnancy or sexually transmitted diseases [which would be]
contrary to the interests of the State.").
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The notion of variable obscenity leaves the question of what
speech is harmful unresolved despite the congressional effort to create
a definitional tautology that equates variable obscenity with harm to
minors. Variable obscenity, directed at speech which would be merely
"indecent!' for adults, raises all of the issues of subjectivity which
plague efforts to define indecent speech directed at adults.4" Nor does
the construct of variable obscenity answer the threshold question of
whether the state is entitled to make value judgments about speech on
behalf of the young, or whether such decisions are reserved for parents.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At times, the struggle over controversial speech appears to be a
war between "two ancient enemies: Anything Goes and Enough Already," as one federal judge observed in holding a rap recording obscene.473 When sensitive matters of freedom of speech collide with
images of children's vulnerability, and are framed in terms of the
battle between good and evil, even well intentioned people can lose
sight of fundamental constitutional principles. In the process, the
requirement that courts apply each element of strict scrutiny to regulations on speech has all but evaporated.
Faced with the justification of shielding children, courts have
repeatedly failed to apply the standard enunciated in Turner, which
requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest in
regulating protected speech. In all of the major cases decided by the
Supreme Court, the state has failed to meet its burden with respect to
the three elements of a compelling interest: the state has failed to
articulate the precise harm it seeks to address; the state has failed to
establish a nexus between the regulated speech and the specific harm;
and the state has failed to do more than speculate that the restriction
of speech will alleviate the articulated harm.
Neither of the interests most commonly alleged by the government to support regulations of controversial speech stands up to strict
scrutiny. As Part V makes clear, the government's professed interest
in reinforcing parental authority often clashes with principles of family autonomy and cultural pluralism that are central to the Constitu-

472. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 505 (Scalia, J., concurring); see discussion supra notes
140-45 and accompanying text.
473. See Skyywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 739 F. Supp. 578, 582 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (Gonzalez, J.), rev'd sub nom., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 138 (11th Cir. 1992).
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tion. The state's evaluation of speech undercuts the authority of parents who do not share normative cultural values. In order to empower
parents in a constitutionally permissible manner, government regulation on speech would have to support equally the choices made by the
idealized normative family, the imperfect normative family and by all
manifestations of the nonconformist family. Instead, by replacing
parental judgment with its own, the state threatens a new level of
intrusion into the family.
The second compelling interest offered by the government-an
independent interest in protecting children regardless of their parents'
preferences-also threatens state interference in the family. The
government's claim of an independent interest often reflects concerns
about social anxieties and personal morality rather than any demonstrable harm precisely linked to the speech. The realm of cultural
morality is best left to informal gatekeepers of social norms and may
not be appropriate for legal remedies within the framework of the
Constitution. 7'
Moreover, even if either of the two interests that the government offers as compelling were to withstand scrutiny, they appear to
be mutually exclusive. The state cannot simultaneously claim to reinforce the authority of all parents and proclaim its own independent
interest in sheltering children from speech that their parents allow
them to receive. Under the Speech Clause, only parental authority and
discipline stand between minors and protected speech absent clear
evidence that the speech causes a specific harm.
The flaws in the government's reasoning suggest that regulations of speech to protect children will more often than not fail to meet
the stringent requirements of the Speech Clause. In most instances,
the burden on the government to establish a compelling interest will
probably prove insurmountable when formulated in broad terms.""
Regulations on controversial speech imposed under the guise of protecting children face additional constitutional hurdles even if the
government were to satisfy all three elements of the Turner test. After
satisfying the requirements of Turner, the government would still
have to convince a court that the regulation should survive balancing

474. See Henkin, supranote 191, at 407.
475. The question of what data would prove sufficient to support the government's burden is
best reserved for a specific case or controversy, but the facts that the government offers should be
more than speculative assumptions. See generally William E. Lee, Manipulating Legislative
Facts: The Supreme Court and the First Amendment, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1261 (1998) (arguing that
in cases involving protected expression, the Supreme Court too often allows legislatures to
operate based on unproven assumptions, and that legislative facts have had little bearing on
cases subjected to strict scrutiny).
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of competing interests at the margin and met requirements such as
narrow tailoring.
It is not necessarily impossible for the state to satisfy the strictures of Turner in regulating carefully defined controversial speech
tied to a specific harm to children. In some circumstances, the state
may be able to establish a compelling interest in protecting children
that comports with the requirements of both the Speech Clause and
the doctrine of family autonomy. To do so, legislatures and administrative agencies would need to demonstrate that the speech actually
harms children, that the private market or other means are unable to
provide remedies for parents who seek them, and that the regulation
would actually facilitate the choices made by parents, including all of
the diverse views of nonconformist parents. Any effort to craft regulations that satisfy those conditions will call for a great deal more precision than has generally been exercised in this sensitive area. As
analysis of narrow bans on anti-abortion demonstrators in Bering v.
SHARE made clear, the more precisely the state defines the purported
harm, and the narrower the state's purported interests, the more
likely it becomes that the state will be able to demonstrate a harm
that can be ameliorated by a narrowly crafted regulation.
Serious attention to the doctrinal framework developed in this
Article would help all three branches of government to keep the mandates of the Speech Clause clearly before them when dealing with the
emotionally charged issues raised by children and controversial
speech. To articulate the state's compelling interest in a manner that
will withstand constitutional scrutiny, legislators, regulators, and
judges must use a fine brush rather than a paint roller when they try
to shield children. To the extent that government actors fail to demonstrate the requisite sensitivity when regulating speech to protect
children, plaintiffs who seek to overturn restrictions on speech may
wish to reconsider the traditional reluctance to challenge the government's alleged interest.
The state has frequently disregarded a range of constitutional
principles in the quest to safeguard children. 6 Widespread tolerance
for intrusions on the rights of minors, and of adults in the name of
protecting minors, is predicated on the misconception that the resulting compromises are small and that the rights at stake are relatively
insignificant. That complacency is unwarranited. The compromises to
free speech and family autonomy are great, and the rights affected lie
at the heart of constitutional liberties. The Supreme Court warned

476. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1967).
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against such encroachment over one hundred years ago: "It may be
that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form;
but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from
legal modes of procedure.''71

477. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886).

